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I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews decisions by the Supreme Court of Florida in the
substantive area of criminal law published between May 1, 2002 and Sep-
tember 1, 2004.1 The time period begins where the last criminal law review
survey created for this Law Review ended.2 This article will follow the con-
ventions in selecting cases for discussion utilized in prior criminal law sur-
vey articles.3 As in past surveys, this article will focus on significant cases
dealing with substantive issues concerning the area of criminal law decided
by the Supreme Court of Florida, but it will not address district courts of
appeal decisions that have not been appealed to the supreme court, nor will it
discuss cases that only deal with evidentiary or procedural issues raised on
appeal.4
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, J.D.,
Indiana University, 1978; B.A., Indiana University, 1975.
1. The author has selected, as the beginning and ending points of this article, decisions
reported in Volumes 804 through 877 of the Southern Reporter, Second Series.
2. See William E. Adams, Jr., Criminal Law: 2000-2002 Survey of Florida Law, 27
NOVA L. REv. 1 (2002).
3. As in past criminal law surveys, this article will not address issues concerning crimi-
nal procedure, such as search and seizure. Although significant to the practitioner, those is-
sues raise constitutional concerns that extend beyond the substantive focus of this piece.
Furthermore, consistent with past articles, this survey will not generally address the complex
and specialized areas of death penalty and sentencing guidelines. The article will address
select sentencing and procedural cases that involve disputes about the definition of substantive
crimes.
4. The article does not cover every decision issued by the Supreme Court of Florida
during this time period. As in past criminal law surveys, cases that simply apply standard fact
patterns to well-settled rules of law are not discussed. Instead, the survey attempts to identify
and discuss cases that have settled conflicts, interpreted statutes for the first time, or altered
4
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During this two-year period, most of the cases selected have clarified
conflicts between the district courts of appeal concerning the interpretation
of a variety of criminal statutory provisions. Section II will discuss a number
of cases in which defendants challenged the finding that they had premedi-
tated the killings that they committed. In Section III, the article will look at
the required mens rea for some controlled substance statutes. Section IV
revisits an issue discussed in the last criminal law summary in this Law Re-
view: the correct application of the "remaining in" phrase in the state's bur-
glary statute. Section V deals with cases that involve disputes concerning the
interpretation of a variety of criminal law statutes. As has been the case with
previous criminal law surveys in this Law Review, the Supreme Court of
Florida has considered a number of challenges involving new statutory inter-
pretation questions and has also revisited some recurring issues.
II. HOMICIDE
As one leading commentator on criminal law has noted, almost all states
that divide murder into grades include "willful, deliberate, [and] premedi-
tated" killings as first-degree murder. 5 Florida's homicide statute continues
to maintain that a "premeditated design" is a condition that will elevate a
homicide to a first-degree capital felony.6 Although commonly used, courts
have had much difficulty in applying this term in a precise and consistent
manner. 7 Rather than designate a certain minimum amount of time that will
satisfy the standard, the Supreme Court of Florida has stated its standard for
this phrase to mean a "fully formed conscious purpose to kill," which may be
"formed a moment before the act but must exist for a sufficient length of
time to permit reflection as to the nature of the act to be committed and the
probable result of that act." 8 The court has also noted that it can 'be formed
in a moment and need only exist 'for such time as will allow the accused to
be conscious of the nature of the act he is about to commit and the probable
existing understandings of a statutory provision, or otherwise clarified or changed the substan-
tive criminal law in Florida.
5. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.03[C][1] (3d ed. 2001).
6. FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1)(a) (2003). "The unlawful killing of a human being: 1)
When perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or any
human being ... is murder in the first degree and constitutes a capital felony, punishable as
provided in s. 775.082." Id.
7. Id.
8. Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d 980, 985 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Wilson v. State, 493 So. 2d
1019, 1021 (Fla. 1986)).
[Vol. 29: 1:1
5
: Nova Law Review 29, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
2004] CRIMINAL LAW: 2002-2004 SUR VEY OF FLORIDA LAW 3
result of that act."' 9 In order to satisfy this elusively imprecise standard, the
Supreme Court of Florida has attempted to provide guidance by stating that
the following factual circumstances can support an inference that the killer's
state of mind satisfies the premeditation requirement: "the nature of the
weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous
difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was com-
mitted, and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted."10
In the past two years, the Supreme Court of Florida has had the oppor-
tunity to discuss how this test should be applied to a number of appealed
homicide cases. In Morrison v. State," the court found that the nature of the
stab wounds, and the fact that the victim could have identified the victim,
were circumstances that supported the finding of premeditation.12
In Evans v. State,'3 the court was able to point to a number of pieces of
evidence that indicated that the defendant had considered killing the victim
before the fatal act. 14 The defendant had told a number of witnesses that he
was going to "'take care of his brother's work' for him" and specifically told
his prison-mate, before he was released from prison, that he was going to kill
his brother's girlfriend, whom he believed was unfaithful to his brother. 15 In
addition, there was evidence on the evening of the shooting that he was look-
ing for the victim.'
6
Similarly, the court found sufficient evidence of premeditation in Floyd
v. State.' 7 The evidence in this case included "selection and transportation of
a gun to the victim's home," remaining in the victim's home for a significant
period of time before shooting her, chasing the victim, and stating one day
prior to the killing that he was going to "kill his wife or someone she loved"
(the victim was the defendant's mother in law).'
8
In Conde v. State,'9 the court considered that the defendant had spent
considerable time with the victim before attacking her, the victim had strug-
gled during the attack, "it takes approximately three minutes to strangle
someone to death," and that the defendant had murdered five other victims in
9. Blackwood v. State, 777 So. 2d 399, 406 (Fla. 2000) (quoting DeAngelo v. State, 616
So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. 1993)).
10. Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d 284, 289 (Fla. 1990).
11. 818 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2002).
12. Id. at 453.
13. 838 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2002).
14. Id. at 1095.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 850 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 2002).
18. Id. at 397.
19. 860 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 2003).
6
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similar fashion.20 Taken together, the court found that these circumstances
constituted more than sufficient evidence of premeditation. El Similarly, in
Johnston v. State,22 the court found that evidence of manual strangulation
and defensive bruising on the victim-showing that she had struggled with
her assailant-were sufficient to support a finding of premeditation.23
It surely appears that the supreme court was correct in holding that these
defendants had formed a conscious purpose to kill more than a moment be-
fore the fatal act. It is hard to argue that these particular defendants did not
understand the nature of their acts or the probable results. This seems par-
ticularly easy in the strangulation cases where it takes more than a moment to
strangle someone and in these cases, the defendants overcome the struggling
defensive actions of the victims.2 4 In none of these cases did the court push
the limits of the brevity of time that even its definition of premeditation
could arguably permit, and some formulations of which by some courts have
come under criticism by commentators.25
III. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court of Florida has also taken a look
at what the knowledge element in the statute outlawing the possession of
controlled substances requires. In Scott v. State,E6 the defendant was charged
with the possession of contraband in a correctional facility.2 7 At the conclu-
sion of the trial, defense counsel requested a jury instruction, pursuant to the
court's prior opinion in Chicone v. State,28 that the element of knowledge
requires that the defendant have "knowledge of the illicit nature of the sub-
stance possessed., 29 The court reiterated that mere knowledge of possession
20. Id. at 943.
21. Id.
22. 863 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2003).
23. Id. at 285.
24. See Johnson v. State, 863 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2003); Floyd v. State, 850 So. 2d 383 (Fla.
2002).
25. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, § 13.7(a) (Thompson
West 2003) (criticizing statements that premeditation "require[s] only a brief moment of
thought" or a "matter of seconds."); see also DRESSLER, supra note 5 at §31.04[C][3] (criticiz-
ing formulations that premeditation can be satisfied by "[a]ny interval of time between the
forming of the intent to kill and the execution of that intent, which is of sufficient duration for
the accused to be fully conscious of what he intended" or that "no time is too short for a
wicked man to frame in his mind the scheme of murder.").
26. 808 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 2002).
27. Id. at 168.
28. 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996).
29. Scott, 808 So. 2d at 168.
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of the substance was not sufficient; the defendant must also know the nature
of the substance. 30 Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that the lack
of knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance is an affirmative defense. 3'
The court explained how this case impacted its earlier opinion in State v.
Medlin,32 which seemed to be creating some confusion in the district courts
of appeal.33 In the Medlin case, the court had held that the possession of a
controlled substance raises a rebuttable presumption that the possessor is
aware of the nature of the drug possessed.34 The court noted that the Medlin
presumption applied in cases where the defendant had actual possession of
the contraband, and even then, only after the element of the illicit nature of
the drug was first explained to the jury. In the Scott case, the drugs were
found in the defendant's locker.36 Justice Wells argued in dissent that the
element was to be determined by the legislature, and that lack of knowledge
should be an affirmative defense.37
In a subsequent case, McMillon v. State,38 the Supreme Court of Florida
ruled that it was reversible error to deny a Chicone instruction in a case of
actual possession, but that the state was also entitled to a Medlin instruction
in such a case. 39 Similarly, the court in Washington v. State40 held that the
failure to provide the Chicone instruction in a case in which the defendant
sold a bag of cannabis was reversible error.4 1 In yet another case, William-
son v. State,42 the defendant was charged with illegal possession of codeine,4 3
30. Scott, 808 So. 2d at 169 (citing Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736, 744 (Fla. 1996)).
31. Id.
32. 273 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1973).
33. Id. at 395.
34. Id at 397.
35. Scott, 808 So. 2d at 171.
36. Id. at 172.
37. Id. at 173.
38. 813 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 2002).
39. Id. at 58. The erroneous jury instruction used by the trial court was the standard jury
instruction for possession cases. Id. The supreme court held this instruction inadequate be-
cause it did not "indicate that the State must prove the defendant had knowledge of the illicit
nature of the substance he possessed... [f]ailure to so instruct diminishes the State's respon-
sibility to prove each element of its case." Id.
40. 813 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 2002).
41. Id. at 60.
42. 813 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 2002).
43. See id. at 62. Williamson was charged with violating section 893.13(6)(a) of the
Florida Statutes, which provides that:
It is unlawful for any person to be in actual or constructive possession of a controlled sub-
stance unless such controlled substance was lawfully obtained from a practitioner or pursuant
to a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his or her profes-
sional practice or to be in actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance except as
otherwise authorized by this chapter.
8
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and the court attempted to further explain the interrelationship of the two
instructions." In Williamson, the defendant was charged with stealing pills
marked "Tylenol," below which the word "codeine" was written; however,
the word was written in such fine print that it could not be read without the
aid of a microscope.45 In reversing the conviction for error because the trial
court had refused to give the Chicone instruction, the court again noted that
the Medlin presumption was applicable to cases in which the defendant had
actual possession or exclusive constructive possession, but that the presump-
tion might not be sufficient when there is other evidence which tends to ne-
gate it.46 Certainly, the Chicone and Medlin decisions have led to confusion
about the interrelationship of the opinions and the instructions to be given in
possession cases.47 The court's attempt to provide an explanation should be
helpful to Florida trials and lower appellate courts in the future.
IV. BURGLARY
The Supreme Court of Florida continued to address the application of
the burglary statute in relationship to its prior holdings in the case previously
discussed in Section II, Floyd v. State. In the most recent summary of Flor-
ida criminal law in this Law Review,48 the author discussed the disagreement
between the Supreme Court of Florida, as per its opinion in Delgado v.
State,49 and the Florida Legislature over the proper interpretation concerning
the "remaining in" portion of the state's burglary statute,"0 as well as, the
legislature's subsequent attempt to overturn the court's interpretation of that
51provision. In Floyd, the contested jury instruction did not include a finding
that the defendant remained in the victim's home surreptitiously; therefore,
the court reversed the armed burglary conviction, and was thus required to
reverse the felony murder conviction as well, because the burglary was the
Id. at 64.
44. See id. at 64-5.
45. Id. at 63.
46. Id. at 64.
47. See Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996); see State v. Medlin, 273 So. 2d 394
(Fla. 1973).
48. Adams, supra note 2, at 4-7.
49. 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000).
50. Adams, supra note 2, at 4-7.
51. See Adams, supra note 2, at 4-7. The relevant part of the statute, prior to amendment
by the legislature, stated that burglary included "remaining in a structure or a conveyance with
the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public
or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain." FLA. STAT. § 810.02(1) (1989).
The Delgado case held that the defendant was only guilty of burglary if his remaining in the
structure or conveyance was done surreptitiously. Delgado, 776 So. 2d at 237.
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predicate felony for the felony murder conviction. 2 Despite the fact that the
legislature indicated its desire to nullify the holding in Delgado, the court
noted that the amendment to the Act was made to operate retroactively to
February 1, 2000, and the killing in this case occurred prior to that date.53
The majority's holding in Floyd drew a dissent from Justice Wells, who ar-
gued that the legislature's intent in amending the burglary statute was to
completely nullify the holding in Delgado, which it believed improperly in-
terpreted the burglary statute.54
The court also attempted to clarify its Delgado decision in the Morrison
case discussed in Section II of this article.55 It noted that the victim's failure
to lock the door after telling the defendant that he could not come into the
apartment, and then closing the door, negated the defendant's argument that
his entry had been consensual; therefore, his case was similar to Delgado
where the victim had originally consented to the entry, but then withdrew
it.56 This rejection seems to be a reasonable construction of its earlier deci-
sion and the burglary statute.57
In State v. Byars,58 the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the scope of
the "open to the public" provision of the burglary statute. 59 The accused in
Byars entered his wife's place of employment, a consignment store, despite a
domestic violence injunction prohibiting his presence there, and killed his
wife.60 The court found that the statute's reference to the public nature of the
premises was to be interpreted to refer to the general nature of the premises,
not the personal characteristics of the individual charged with the crime. 61 It
thus held that the injunction was irrelevant to the consideration of whether
the premises were open to the public. 62 The majority rejected contrary deci-
sions from other states and an argument of a contrary construction of the
Florida trespass statute because of differences in statutory language.63 The
52. Floyd v. State, 850 So. 2d 383, 402 (2003).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 411. (Wells, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. Morrison v. State, 818 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2002).
56. Id. at 454.
57. Id.
58. 823 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 2002).
59. Section 810.02 of the Florida Statutes, says in part: "Burglary means entering or
remaining in a dwelling, structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense
therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or
invited to enter or remain." FLA. STAT. § 810.02 (2003).
60. Byars, 823 So. 2d at 740.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 743.
63. Id. at 743-45.
10
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statutory construction given to the statute by the court seems to be the most
reasonable one.64
V. OTHER CRIMES
The Supreme Court of Florida also dealt with a number of other sub-
stantive criminal issues during the past two years. In Wright v. State,65
"Wright was the driver of a vehicle from which [his] two cohorts wearing
masks emerged and robbed another driver., 66 Wright, who was not wearing
a mask, had his crime reclassified to the next higher degree under the Florida
statute increasing the severity of the category of crimes committed while the
offender was wearing one. 67 The majority properly held that the statute re-
quires that the defendant personally wear a hood, mask, or similar device, in
order to have his crime enhanced.68 Chief Justice Wells 69 dissented, arguing
that the legislature intended that an accomplice could be vicariously liable by
making this act a separate substantive crime, as opposed to merely a sentence
enhancer.
70
The Supreme Court of Florida considered the constitutionality of a
driver's license statute in Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor
Vehicles v. Critchfield.7 1 In Critchfield, the defendant had his license perma-
nently revoked in 1987 after his fourth DUI conviction. 72 At the time of his
sentencing, he was told that he would be eligible for a hardship license after
five years.73 However, when he applied in 1999, he was informed that he
64. Id.
65. 810 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2002).
66. Id. at 874.
67. See FLA. STAT. § 775.0845 (2003). Section 775.0845 of the Florida Statutes pro-
vides:
The felony or misdemeanor degree of any criminal offense, other than a violation of... [sec-
tions] 876.12-87.15, shall be reclassified to the next higher degree as provided in this section
if, while committing the offense, the offender was wearing a hood, mask, or other device that
concealed his or her identity.
Id.
68. Wright, 810 So. 2d at 874.
69. Formerly referred to as Justice Wells. Rule 2.030(2)(a) of the Florida Rules of Judi-
cial Administration provides that "[t]he chief justice shall be chosen by a majority vote of the
justices for a term commencing on July 1 of even-numbered years. If a vacancy occurs, a
successor shall be chosen promptly to serve the balance of the unexpired term." FLA. R. JUD.
ADMIN. 2.030 (2)(a).
70. Wright, 810 So. 2d at 876.
71. 842 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2003).
72. Id at 783.
73. Id at 784-85.
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was no longer eligible because of a change in the law.74 The court found that
the amendment violated Florida's state constitutional requirement that each
statute contain but one subject v5  The amendments to the driver's license
statute also contained an amendment to the bad check statute, which involves
the assignment of a bad check debt to a private debt collector.7 6 The court
correctly considered this provision to be unrelated to the provisions regulat-
ing criminal penalties related to driver's licenses.7 7 Justice Cantero argued
that the provision should be upheld because one of the amendments in the
Act also provided for suspension of drivers' licenses for those passing worth-
less checks.7 8 The dissent also argued that doubts about whether the single
subject requirement was violated should be resolved in favor of upholding a
statute.79 Although it is true that the section on driver's license revocation
for passing bad checks was related to the other provisions relating to driver's
licenses, this arguably should not save this provision whose relationship to
most of the amendment was unrelated. 80 The need to prevent "logrolling" is
of sufficient importance to require the legislature to separate out unrelated
provisions when it proposes legislation into separate bills.81
In a separate case, the court considered a concept that has perplexed
courts, scholars, and law students throughout the ages.82  In Reynolds v.
State, the question was whether a crime is one that requires a general or a
specific intent by the defendant. 83 In this case, Ronald Reynolds was con-
victed of felony animal cruelty,84 which he argued required a specific intent
or, in the alternative, was unconstitutional if it did not so require.8 5 The issue
74. Id.
75. Id. at 784-85. Article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution provides, in pertinent
part: "[e]very law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, and
the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title .... " FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
76. Critchfield, 842 So. 2d at 785.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 788.
79. Id. at 786.
80. Id.
81. Critchfield, 842 So. 2d at 785 (citing Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167 (Fla.
1991)).
82. Reynolds v. State, 842 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 2002).
83. Id.
84. See FLA. STAT. § 828.12 (2) (2003). Section 828.12(2) of the Florida Statutes, pro-
vides:
A person who intentionally commits an act to any animal which results in the cruel death, or
excessive or repeated infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering, or causes the same to be
done, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or by a fine
of not more than $10,000 or both.
Id.
85. Reynolds, 842 So. 2d at 47.
12
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of what elements follow and modify the word "intentionally" is one that
comes up with some frequency in cases involving statutory construction. 6
In this case, the issue was whether it applied only to the commission of the
act itself or to the result of a cruel death or the infliction of unnecessary pain
or suffering. 87 The court distinguished the language in this statute from one
where the adjective at issue was followed immediately by a list of nouns.88 It
also distinguished it from another animal cruelty statutory section that more
clearly indicated that the mens rea element modified the result element in
that provision.8 9 The court also rejected the constitutional argument of the
defendant that his due process rights were violated because it found that the
statute did expressly have an intent requirement.90 Although the statute is
not a model of clarity in indicating the scope of the intent requirement, the
court seems to have applied the best interpretation in this case, particularly
when compared with the other animal cruelty statutory section noted. 91
The court considered the sufficiency of the evidence produced in a bur-
glary case in D.S.S. v. State.92 This case involved four juveniles who broke
into Plant City High School, where they committed acts of vandalism and
stole a number of items.93 They were charged with burglary, criminal mis-
chief, petit theft, and resisting an officer without violence.94 D.S.S. argued
that the state failed to prove its prima facie case by failing to show that the
Hillsborough County School Board owned the building into which the de-
fendants had illegally entered.95 Although the court held that ownership of
the building or structure is a material element of burglary, it also held that the
ownership element is not the same as would be required in property law.96
Rather, it argued that the "ownership" interest was possessory in nature; thus,
protecting "'any possession which is rightful as against the burglar and is
satisfied by proof of special or temporary ownership, possession, or con-
trol.' 97 The court upheld the verdict, despite a failure by the state to provide
86. Id. at 49.
87. Id. at 48.
88. Id. (distinguishing State v. Huggins, 802 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2001)).
89. Id. at 49 (comparing section 828.12(2) that provides: "A person who tortures any
animal with intent to inflict intense pain, serious physical injury, or death upon the animal is
guilty of a felony of the third degree ... .
90. Reynolds, 842 So. 2d at 51.
91. Id.
92. 850 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2003).
93. Id. at 460.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 460-61.
96. Id. at 461.
97. D.S.S., 850 So. 2d at 461 (quoting In re ME., 370 So. 2d 795, 797 (Fla. 1979)).
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direct evidence of ownership of the building, by noting that there was con-
siderable circumstantial evidence of possession of the school building, in-
cluding references to the high school by various witnesses.98 Although it
appears that the court properly upheld the verdict, it serves as a warning to
attorneys to be careful about neglecting to provide evidence on a material
element, even if the material element seems to be undisputed.
Another situation involving alleged sloppiness in producing evidence
arose in the case of Glover v. State.99 In this case, Bruce Glover was charged
with capital sexual battery under section 794.011 (2)(a) of the Florida Stat-
utes.'00 Glover argued on appeal that the instructions given to the jury were
defective because the trial court did not specifically instruct the jury that the
age of the defendant was a material element of the case.' 0' The Supreme
Court of Florida resolved a conflict amongst the district courts by holding
that the age of the defendant is a material element.10 2 However, it upheld
Glover's conviction by holding that the proof of his age was not disputed
where the thirty-seven year old defendant sat in the courtroom and the book-
ing admission that he was born in 1964 was admitted into evidence and not
disputed. 1
03
The Supreme Court of Florida considered the application of the term
"carried" in Florida's robbery statute, 1°4 in State v. Burris.' 0 5 The case in-
volved Daniel Burris, who reached out the window of his pickup truck and
grabbed the victim's purse while he was driving past her, knocking her off
her feet and dragging her along the pavement. 10 6 The relevant statute in this
case enhanced the charge from a second-degree to a first-degree felony, be-
cause the accused carried a deadly weapon while committing the robbery.
10 7
The court rejected an opinion by the First District Court of Appeal that inter-
preted "carried" to be synonymous with "possessed."'' 0 8 The Supreme Court
of Florida applied the commonly ascribed definition to "carry" in this statute,
98. Id. at 462.
99. 863 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2003).
100. Id. at 237.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 238.
103. Id. at 237.
104. See FLA. STAT. § 812.13 (2003). Section 812.13 of the Florida Statutes provides:
"(1) 'Robbery' means the taking of money or other property... from the person or custody of
another... (2)(a) If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or
other deadly weapon .. " § 812.13.
105. 875 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2004).
106. Id. at 409.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 410 (citing Jackson v. State, 662 So. 2d 1369, 1371-72 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1995)).
14
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looking to dictionary definitions to buttress its common sense interpretation
that carrying generally means holding, supporting, or bearing.'19 As the
court noted, automobiles generally carry people as opposed to people carry-
ing automobiles.110 It also looked to the legislature's intent in using this
term, which it perceived to be to deter robbers from bringing portable in-
struments to a robbery for the purpose of inflicting harm.1I' Furthermore,
although it noted that automobiles have been deemed deadly weapons in
other criminal statutes, it would require an improperly broad inference in this
provision, in violation of the court's duty to resolve ambiguous provisions in
favor of the defendant under the statutory rules of lenity. 11
2
The State v. Castillo13 case involved a police officer accused of seeking
or accepting unauthorized benefits in return for nonperformance of his offi-
cial duty under section 838.016(1) of the Florida Statutes. 14 In this case, the
officer stopped a motorist for speeding and driving while intoxicated." 5
According to the victim, the officer asked her to follow him in her car to a
deserted warehouse area, where he proceeded to engage in vaginal inter-
course with her." 6 The Third District Court of Appeal had reversed the con-
viction because there was no evidence of a specific agreement stated by the
parties that arrest would not occur if the victim had sex with him.'
As noted by the court, the statute is silent on the type of proof required
to show that the statute had been violated." l8 However, it reasonably held
that an express agreement should not be required lest defendants evade con-
viction by avoiding the making of explicit promises." 9 It went further by
rejecting the argument that even an implicit agreement was required since the
statute also criminalized the solicitation of a benefit. 120 It thus held that cor-
rupt intent was sufficient to support a conviction. 21 The latter statement is
probably an overstatement of the court's true intentions because even a so-
licitation involves more than mere intent, and to permit conviction on intent
alone would violate one of the basic tenets of criminal law in that crimes
109. Id. at412.
110. Burris, 875 So. 2d at 412.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 415 (citing FLA. STAT. § 775.021(1) 2003)).
113. 877 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 2004).
114. Id. at 691.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 692.
118. Castillo, 877 So. 2d at 693.
119. Id. (citing State v. Gerren, 604 So. 2d 515, 520 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
120. Id. at 694.
121. Id. at 695.
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must have at least some type of actus reus requirement. 22 Nonetheless, it
does seem an appropriate interpretation to hold that the statute does not re-
quire an agreement.123 The court found that the circumstantial evidence in
this case was more than adequate here to support the police officer's convic-
tion. 1
4
VI. CONCLUSION
As can be seen by this review, the Supreme Court of Florida has not is-
sued any opinions in the past two years that seem to radically alter settled
criminal law principles in this jurisdiction. The battle over the proper inter-
pretation of Florida's burglary statute continued during the past two years
and is reflective of an ongoing debate with the state legislature over the dif-
ference between interpretation of the law and creating law. In most of the
substantive criminal areas addressed by the supreme court, Florida's criminal
law, and its interpretation by its highest court seems to be in line with the
approach taken by most American jurisdictions at this point in time.
122. Id.
123. Castillo, 877 So. 2d at 695.
124. Id. at 696.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey article aims at conveying a sense of key developments and
events in public sector labor and employment law during 2003-2004. While
the focus is on Florida and the public sector, this article also mingles federal
legislation and case law that affects Florida public employment. Major Elev-
enth Circuit cases, even if they originate in Georgia or Alabama, are included
because such precedents are equally binding in Florida.
Part II highlights developments involving the hiring phase of employ-
ment, such as background checks of prospective employees and summarizes
federal and state legislation aimed at restricting genetic and HIV screening.
Privatization and outsourcing-trends that began in earnest during the 1980s
in an effort to downsize government and cut costs-remain ripe topics today.
Part II also covers conflicts of interest regulation, the ease with which dis-
charged police officers are rehired, and claims that a state judge illegally
resides far from the bench where he sits.
Part III, terms of employment, begins by summarizing landmark regula-
tions that took effect August 23, 2004, which radically overhauled overtime
rules for millions of employees, including police officers and firefighters.
Other wage issues are also covered, such as proposed amendments of the
Equal Pay Act' and teachers' salaries. Part III also covers key developments
in employee benefits, from public pension plans and health insurance to fam-
ily medical leave, workers' compensation, and unemployment compensation.
In addition, Part III touches on new ways of conducting drug tests on public
employees and privacy concerns raised by employees' e-mail. This section
concludes with a look at health and safety concerns and a miscellany of other
hard-to-categorize workplace issues.
Part IV takes a look at constitutional challenges public employees may
raise, primarily free speech and due process issues. The heart of Part IV,
however, deals with employment discrimination. Additionally, Part IV not
only discusses such staples as race, sex, and religious bias claims commonly
1. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2000).
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addressed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642, but other forms of
discrimination such as age and disability arising under separate federal stat-
utes. Moreover, this section summarizes the number of cities and states that
offer protection for gay and lesbian workers. Part IV concludes appropri-
ately with a glance toward remedies, where proposed federal legislation, if
enacted, would amend the Federal Arbitration Act3 to exclude employment
contracts and would eliminate altogether the existing cap on damages recov-
erable for violations of Title VII.
II. HIRING, PRIVATIZATION, SCREENING, ETHICS, & RESIDENCE
A. Background Checks and Genetic and HIV Screening
While privacy concerns are always at stake whenever public employees
come under scrutiny, the constitutionality of background investigations has
been upheld. Nevertheless, eighty-five percent of all employers do no inves-
tigate prospective employees.4
As a practical matter, employers are advised to conduct background in-
vestigations as a strategy for avoiding liability stemming from negligent hir-
ing. In 2003, Florida's juvenile justice chief implemented a plan to weed out
convicted felons who supervise delinquent youths.5 In place of the current
five-year screenings, the new policy screens all juvenile detention workers
annually for arrests.6 A study conducted by the Miami Herald revealed that
about 350 out of 2000 detention workers and supervisors statewide have ar-
rest records. 7 Among other proposals, the department will require employ-
ees to sign forms agreeing that they must alert the department of an arrest, or
else be fired. s Moreover, the department is drafting a psychological test to
screen out candidates prone to excessive use of force.9 In 2004, a Florida
State House committee adopted a bill that would require public agencies to
2. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2000).
3. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000).
4. Beatrice Garcia, Background? Check It Out, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 12, 1999, at 1C.
But, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, far more employers are conducting background checks as
a routine matter. Eve Tahmincioglu, Tense Employers Step Up Background Checks, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 3, 2001, at C9.
5. Tina Cummings & Carol Marbin Miller, Detention Workers to Have Yearly Arrest
Screenings, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 11, 2003, at lB.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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undertake a background check of anyone who works or volunteers at parks,
playgrounds, child care centers, or other venues where children meet.' °
Another emerging form of screening that employers sometimes conduct
at the hiring stage is known as genetic testing. The aim of this type of testing
is to identify employees who may be prone to disease. While there are salu-
tary reasons to conduct genetic testing, such as monitoring the impact of em-
ployee exposure to workplace toxins, it can also be enlisted to weed out dis-
ease-prone applicants in an effort to reduce health costs. Public employees
have successfully contested genetic testing on constitutional grounds, argu-
ing that it is a due process violation and an unreasonable search and seizure."
Legislative efforts at the federal level have aimed at restricting the use
of genetic screening. On October 14, 2003, the United States Senate passed
a bill that prohibits employers from relying on individuals' genetic data when
making hiring, firing, job assignment, or promotion decisions.12
Like genetic testing, screening for HIV can be motivated by salutary or
harmful purposes. Under Florida law, HIV test results may "not be used to
determine if a person may be insured for disability, health, or life insurance
or to screen or determine suitability for, or to discharge a person from, em-
ployment." 3
Among other things, the Fair Credit Reporting Act14 regulates the in-
formation that can be collected by investigators while conducting back-
ground checks on job applicants.' 5 Under the Act, employers must notify the
targeted applicant or employee before conducting an investigation that enlists
outside investigators, secure the individual's prior consent, and fully disclose
investigative reports before disciplining an employee.6 In other words, "an
employee or job applicant can't be investigated for any wrongdo-
ing-including sexual harassment-without the target's permission.' 7 Em-
ployers have asked Congress to exempt some employee investigations from
the prior-approval rule, in addition to those probes involving employee mis-
conduct and violations of state or federal laws.'8
10. Child Protection: Background Checks Urgedfor Workers, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 17,
2004, at 9B.
11. See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1275 (9th Cir.
1998).
12. See S. 1053, 108th Cong. § 202 (2003).
13. FLA. STAT. § 381.004(4)(d) (2003).
14. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681u (2000).
15. Kathy M. Kristof, Credit Reporting Act Would Null Tough State Laws, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2003, at C3.
16. See §§ 1681-1681u.
17. Kristof, supra note 15.
18. Id.
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B. Privatization and Outsourcing
One of the definitions of privatization is "[t]he contracting out of func-
tions previously performed by government to one or more private provid-
ers."1 9 The 1980s witnessed a dramatic increase in contracting out of public
services, ranging from janitorial services and garbage collection to school
and prison administration. 20 Despite this trend, one occupation where the
reverse is true, i.e. private jobs turning public, involves airport security,
which came about largely due to 9/11.
When it comes to other airport positions, however, the pressure has
been toward privatization.2 ' For example, the Bush Administration vowed in
2003 to veto an aviation bill unless the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) was authorized to let private operators manage government-run air
traffic control towers.22 This issue of whether air traffic controllers should be
public or private employees goes back to 1981 when President Reagan fired
striking controllers. 23 A union representing controllers sued the government
in an Ohio federal court, alleging that privatizing control towers is illegal.24
Some claim that the FAA's goal of staffing small control towers with pri-
vately employed workers will reduce safety. 25 The FAA looks to save one
million dollars per private tower.26 Today 219 of the 484 public airports
have contracted with private controllers.27 President Bush has steadily
chipped away at President Clinton's Executive Order protecting air traffic
controllers from privatization.28
Long waits at airports have led to some in Congress to call for privatiz-
ing airport security screeners.2 9 Orlando's airport has faced persistent prob-
lems adjusting staffing to meet demand, and Miami International Airport is
seriously considering privatizing its screening positions.3" Congress has
19. Brian Clemow, Privatization and the Public Good, 43 LAB. L.J. 344 (1992).
20. See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 33 FED B.
NEWS & J. 194 (1986) (discussing the new emerging concept of privatization of correctional
facilities, also known as "prisons for profit").
21. Leslie Miller, Controllers, Government Revive Old Dispute, MIAMI HERALD, Sept.
25, 2003, at 7A.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Miller, supra note 21.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Leslie Miller, Airports May Dump Federal Workers, MLAMI HERALD, Mar. 26, 2004,
at IC.
30. Id.
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given airports the option of returning to private screening.31 The Jacksonville
Airport Authority, plagued by too many managers, and too few screeners, is
likely to opt out of government screening entirely.32
In the face of budget shortfalls, privatizing city services is often seen as
an obvious way of saving money.33 Fort Lauderdale, for example, is consid-
ering hiring a security company to respond to home alarms, instead of rely-
ing on city police. 34 In addition, the city is assessing whether to contract-out
utility bill collections and management of city pools.3 5 Parking enforcement,
the city's most profitable enterprise, is the least likely candidate for privati-
zation.36
Two synonyms for privatization, outsourcing and offshoring, have fu-
eled debate as American jobs continue to disappear at home, and reappear
overseas. By one estimate, at least fifteen percent of the three million jobs
lost in the United States since 2000 have been outsourced to foreign mar-
kets.37 As public resentment against outsourcing has mounted, federal and
state legislatures have proposed measures to reduce the practice.38 In Flor-
ida, critics of outsourcing argue that the state should not do business with
companies that outsource their labor needs to foreign workers. 39 To date,
however, bills requiring state contractors to hire U.S. workers have not be-
come law.4" In 1996, the Florida Department of Children and Families
turned to a private company to end the agency's reliance on paper food
stamps and welfare checks-saving the state four million dollars a year.4'
Similarly, in 2000, the state contracted with a company that subcontracts in
India to identify "welfare fraud and mistakes. 42 Despite the fact that these
services have never been performed by state employees, Florida has continu-
ally laid-off state employees who deal with welfare and food stamps pro-
grams.43
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Natalie P. McNeal, Mayor Brings Up the Possibility of Privatizing Some
City Services, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 26, 2004, at 5B.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Louis Uchitelle, A Statistic that's Missing: Jobs that Moved Overseas, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 2003, at A20.
38. David Streitfeld, Indian City Rides Tech Euphoria, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2004, at Al.
39. Kathleen Chapman, State Hot Line Takes Callers Around World, MIAMI HERALD,
May 10, 2004, at 8B.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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C. Ethics
Federal law prohibits presidential appointees from commenting on po-
tential employment with companies doing business with, or hoping to be
doing business with agencies headed by those officials." In January 2004,
the White House made a change in ethics rules by ordering all federal agen-
cies to no longer issue ethics waivers that enable presidential appointees to
negotiate positions with private firms while they are managing federal poli-
cies vital to the potential employers. 45 The move was portrayed as an "effort
to strengthen government ethics." '46
Most states have enacted so-called codes of governmental ethics.47 In
2003, "44 states required their employees to undergo ethics training ... [b]ut
only 16 states make such training mandatory."' 8 Public officials are held to a
higher standard of ethics than rank and file public employees on grounds that
the former owe a fiduciary duty to the electorate. 9 "[A]ll 50 states regulate
the conduct of their public officials .... ""
In Florida, a variety of government ethics issues have arisen recently,
from a state supreme court ruling on the definition of bribery of a govern-
ment official,5 to an ethics law forcing "government officials to publicly
disclose gifts they receive" from non-relatives. 2
The Supreme Court of Florida case involved a police officer who was
convicted of unlawful compensation, i.e. a form of bribery, for letting a fe-
male drunk driver go free after having sex with her.53 Because the police
officer never explicitly said he would arrest her if she refused to have sex
with him, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the officer's convic-
tion. 4 On appeal, the state high court unanimously overturned this decision,
ruling that prosecutors need not prove public officials talked explicitly about
a quid pro quo to convict them.55 Circumstantial evidence of intent is suffi-
44. Amy Goldstein, White House Halts Job-Hunting Waivers, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 15,
2004, at 9A.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See P. J. Huffstutter, Illinois Takes on Its Culture of Scandal, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4,
2004, at A24.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. State v. Castillo, 877 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 2004).
52. Scott Andron, Gift Law Confusing, Experts Say, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 8, 2004, at lB.
53. Jay Weaver, Burden of Proof Lightened, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 23, 2004, at 5B.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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cient: there need be no spoken understanding to show a gift was exchanged
for a favor. 6
Part of Florida's ethics law regulates gift-giving to government offi-
cials.57 The gift law aims at limiting gifts to public officials from lobbyists,
developers, or city contractors, and at making public any gifts officials re-
ceive from others so that voters can assess their propriety.58 But experts who
know the law say it is confusing and often disregarded.59 For example, are
paid trips that mix business with pleasure gifts that must be disclosed to the
Florida Commission on Ethics? Opinion varies.6" The law has other short-
comings as well, for example, it shifts the burden of reporting minor gifts
from lobbyists, not on the public official, but on the gift-giver.6 Voters learn
the name of the lobbyist but not the official who received the gift.62 Thus,
public oversight of official conduct is compromised.
D. Rehiring Fired Employees
In 2002, the Broward Sheriffs Office recommended the discharge of
fifty police officers for an array of misconduct "ranging from drug use to
false imprisonment to improper display of a firearm., 63 A dismissed officer
can trigger a grievance procedure, but even if he loses, the officer is entitled
to a full due process hearing before an arbitrator.64 Even if the arbitrator
sustains the dismissal, the officer is still free to seek a job as a police officer
elsewhere, unless he is decertified by the Florida Department of Law En-
forcement.65
While the burden of proof at arbitration is by preponderance of the evi-
dence, there must be clear and convincing evidence before an officer's li-
cense is revoked.66 According to a study undertaken by the Miami Herald,
many fired police officers are rehired, either involuntarily forced upon a de-
partment by an arbitrator or voluntarily hired by another city.67 A strong
56. Id.
57. Andron, supra note 52.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Andron, supra note 52.
63. Wanda J. DeMarzo & Daniel de Vise, In BSO, Fired Officers Routinely Rehired,
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 29, 2003, at 14A.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id.
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police union, which zealously defends its members, and a grievance proce-
dure, that tilts in favor of officers, is blamed for this result.68
Several Florida police departments have turned to early intervention
systems to identify bad police officers or those with potential problems.69
Such systems have turned up a surprising predictor: that many officers in
trouble have exhausted not only their "sick leave, [but also their] vacation
and compensatory time."70
E. Residence
There is a growing trend toward establishing residency requirements for
public employment on the assumption that employees should have a stake in
the economic health of the community from which they draw their salaries.
These requirements will play a vital role in addressing economic and social
issues of the communities in which residents earn their livelihood. Resi-
dency is often defined as a person's permanent place of abode."v Proof of
residency can range from receipt of mailing, to voter registration or utility
statements. 72 Proof of residency ensures against workers maintaining a phan-
tom address within one city, for example, while the family and the employee
actually reside in another.73
These factors governing residency came into play in Florida in 2003
with regard to a Third District Court of Appeal's judge who was accused of
illegally living four hundred miles north of the bench upon which he sat.74
The allegation was that the judge and his family lived in Gainesville while he
decided appellate cases in Miami-Dade and Monroe counties.75 While the
judge held a one-third interest in a condominium on Miami Beach and had
avowed that the Miami address was his permanent homestead for property
tax purposes,76 the legal question boiled down to whether there was intent to
make the Miami condo his actual residence.
68. See Demarzo & de Vise, supra note 63 (stating they found "case after case of fired
officers who were promptly rehired").
69. Wanda J. DeMarzo & Daniel de Vise, Cities Turn to Early Intervention, MIAMI HER-
ALD, Sept. 29, 2003, at 14A.
70. Id.
71. BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 1335 (8th ed. 2004).
72. See id.; see also Steinhardt v. Batt, 753 So. 2d 928, 930-31 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (stat-
ing that defendant had acquired residency from receipt of mailing and utility bills).
73. See id.
74. Critic Says Judge Has Illegal Residence, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 11, 2003, at 3B.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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III. TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT
A. Hours and Wages
1. Fair Labor Standards Act
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the rule of thumb in the public sec-
tor is that employees who work over forty hours a week are entitled either to
time-and-a-half pay or to compensatory time off.77 The largest category of
employees who are exempt from overtime pay are salaried workers in certain
executive, administrative, or professional posts. 78 Under regulations that
have not been revised in fifty years, many inequities and criticisms have
emerged. 79 For example, "[t]he pay level below which [employees] are auto-
matically eligible for overtime pay" has stagnated at $8060, leaving some
assistant managers, with salaries of around $20,000, ineligible for overtime
pay, even if they put in sixty hour weeks.8° Moreover, critics claimed the
regulations were so unclear that they generated a flood of litigation.81
In response to growing criticism and increasing litigation over archaic
overtime rules, the Bush Administration issued draft regulations in 2003
aimed at modernizing and simplifying rules governing over one hundred
million employees. The proposed rules, over five hundred pages long,
prompted an excess of seventy-five thousand e-mail messages and letters
commenting on the draft. 83 A fairly non-controversial feature of the draft
involved raising the threshold below which employees are automatically
eligible for overtime pay from $8060 to $23,660.8' A controversial feature of
the draft was the proposal to disqualify virtually every employee earning
over $65,000 a year for overtime pay.85 Under the old rules there was no
ceiling.86 Moreover, critics claimed it was unclear which employees earning
between the floor and the ceiling in the new rules would be eligible for over-
time pay.87 Police officers and fire fighters, among other higher-paid blue-
77. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Dept. Revises Plans to Cut Overtime Eligibility, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 21, 2004, at A14.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Greenhouse, supra note 77.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Greenhouse, supra note 77.
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collar employees, feared that the proposed rules rendered them ineligible for
overtime pay.8" All told, critics claimed the proposed rules threatened over-
time pay for as many as eight million employees.8 9 In the United States, a
corporate tax bill was delayed by Democrats who insisted that the proposed
overtime rules leave those workers currently entitled to overtime pay as eli-
gible.9"
In response to these pressures and criticisms over the draft, the Labor
Department issued revisions that have only partially allayed concerns. 9' For
one thing, in April 2004 the Secretary of Labor made clear that police offi-
cers and firefighters would still qualify for overtime pay.92 For another, the
revisions increased from $65,000 to $100,000, the amount that would almost
automatically disqualify a worker from overtime pay.93 Only white-collar
workers covered by a union contract that ensures overtime pay for those
earning over $100,000 would continue to be eligible. 94 Despite these conces-
sions, it still took a vote in the Senate on May 4, 2004, to guarantee the right
to overtime pay for all employees who are currently eligible. 95 The revised
overtime pay regulations go into effect August 23, 2004.96 It will be miracu-
lous if the five hundred page document does not generate its share of litiga-
tion.
Apart from federal overtime pay overhaul, there were three noteworthy
Eleventh Circuit Court decisions that were handed down over the last year
that bear on the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).97 Two involve FLSA
collective actions98 and the third deals with FLSA remedies.99
Under the FLSA, a group of employees are entitled to sue to recover
wages even though such a suit is not, strictly speaking, a class as defined in
rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure./° The difference is that an
88. Id.
89. Mary Dalrymple, Tax Bill Stalls; OT Pay Tariffs at Issue, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 25,
2004, at 3A.
90. Id.
91. Greenhouse, supra note 77.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. David Espo, Senate Opposes OT-Rule Changes, MIAMI HERALD, May 5, 2004, at 3C.
96. Harry Wessel, OT May Fatten Adjusters 'Pay, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 11, 2004, at
Cl.
97. Prickett v. DeKalb County, Ga., 349 F.3d 1294 (1 1th Cir. 2003); Cameron-Grant v.
Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240 (1 1th Cir. 2003); Barragan v. LCT Transp.
Servs., Inc., No. 02-15542-HH, 2002 WL 32172203, at *2 (1 1th Cir. Dec. 10, 2002).
98. Prickett, 349 F.3d at 1249; Cameron-Grant, 347 F.3d at 1240.
99. Barragan, 2002 WL 32172203, at *2.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1998).
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employee must opt-in to become a member of a FLSA class, while a member
of a rule 23 class must request exclusion to avoid becoming a member.' 0' In
Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Services Inc., °2 the Eleventh Circuit
ruled that a named plaintiff in a FLSA collective action cannot alert other
class members of a possible case after his own claims have been settled.
0 3
In Prickett v. DeKalb County, Georgia,""4 the court ruled that opt-ins to a
FLSA collective action need not file additional consent forms when an addi-
tional FLSA claim is added to a case.
10 5
The third Eleventh Circuit case involved the awarding of attorneys' fees
under the FLSA."16 The only time a prevailing employer is entitled to re-
cover attorneys' fees under the Act is when the employee acted in bad
faith.'0 7 In LCT Transportation Services, Inc. v. Barragan,18 the court ruled
that an employer must identify a specific Department of Labor opinion to
establish a good faith defense. 9 Under the FLSA, the amount of reasonable
attorney's fees is left to the sound discretion of the trial court." ° In Barra-
gan, the court also recognized that in assessing attorneys' fees the court may
exclude compensation for excessive hours and may take into account the fact
that the litigation was decidedly vexatious."'
2. Equal Pay Act
The Equal Pay Act (EPA) guarantees that men and women performing
substantially the same work are paid equally. 112 Under the EPA, employees
may bring suit only for back wages and for liquidated damages (plus attor-
neys' fees and court costs)."' But under proposed federal legislation, the
Civil Rights Act of 2004, the EPA would be amended to provide for com-
101. See, e.g., Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1977).
102. 347 F.3d 1240 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
103. Id. at 1249.
104. 349 F.3d 1294 (11 th Cir. 2003).
105. Id. at 1298.
106. Barragan, 2002 WL 32172203, at *2.
107. 48 AM. JUR., Labor and Labor Relations § 4705 (2004) (citing McBride v. Cox, 567
N.E.2d 130, 134 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)).
108. No. 03-3, 2003 WL 22428397, at*l (June 25, 2003).
109. Id. at'*12-13.
110. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2003).
111. LCT Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Barragan, No. 03-293, 2003 WL 22428892, at *9 (Aug.
20, 2003).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2004).
113. Id.
[Vol. 29:1 :15
28
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss1/1
2004] 2004 SURVEY OF FLORIDA PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LAW 27
pensatory and punitive damages and would bar employers from retaliating
against employees who share wage information."
4
3. Public Employee Wages
Studies undertaken over the last year have uncovered significant wage
gaps. Nationally, women continue to lag behind men, earning twenty per-
cent less than men."' Closer to home, Florida's average wage is only eighty-
seven percent of the national average and about forty percent of Florida's
workers earn less than nine dollars per hour. 1 6 To counter these trends, a
coalition, Floridians For All, aims to raise the state minimum wage to $6.15
per hour."7 An estimated three hundred thousand state workers would re-
ceive an immediate wage increase."' At the high end of the income spec-
trum, a review of Florida's payroll records revealed that nine presidents of
state public universities earned more than $250,000 in 2003.11' Despite these
high salaries they remain below the national average, of course many state
university athletic coaches earn far more, but the bulk of their pay comes
from outside sources. 2
0
In 2003, budget cuts in Fort Lauderdale led not only to the freezing of
police officer's salaries, but also to layoffs, early retirements, and an abrupt
halt in hiring.' 2 1 Other public employees have fared better than Fort Lauder-
dale police officers when it comes to wages. In a controversial move
Miramar city commissioners gave themselves a raise for the third time in
three years. 22 However, in fairness it should be mentioned that the new sala-
ries are comparable to what commissioners in other Southwest Broward cit-
ies earn. 123
Under a plan hotly contested by the state's second-largest public em-
ployee labor union (because it rewards junior employees more than veteran
114. H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. § 603 (2004); S. 088, 108th Cong. § 603 (2004).
115. Study Finds Women Still Earn 20% Less than Men, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 21, 2003, at
3C.
116. Gregg Fields, Economic Diversity Lacks State Support, Leaders Say, MIAMI HERALD,
Sept. 5, 2003, at 1C.
117. Gregg Fields, Hike in Minimum Wage Sought, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 23, 2003, at 3C.
118. Id.
119. Brent Kallestad, University Leaders Among Highest Paid, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 23,
2004, at 8B.
120. Id.
121. Ashley Fantz, Police Will Ax 42 Jobs, Shave $6.3 Million, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 12,
2003, at lB.
122. Natalie P. McNeal, Miramar Leaders Seek Pay Hike Again, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 26,
2003, at 3B.
123. Id.
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employees) hefty pay raises were proposed for three thousand employees
who investigate child abuse or supervise children in foster care. 24 As is of-
ten the case, the goal is to bring the salaries of these public employees up to
the national average. 1
25
The final category of public employees whose wages are always widely
publicized is that of public school teachers. The Miami-Dade school district
awarded teachers not only two years' worth of raises, but also reduced their
health insurance costs. 26 In February 2004, Broward County approved a
contract giving teachers a nine percent raise over three years. 27 Moreover,
the contract includes "[a] $6000 incentive over three years for employees to
move from a PPO to an HMO healthcare provider."'
28
B. Public Employee Pension Plans
Many state and local governments, up against daunting pension obliga-
tions to public employees, have turned to selling bonds to keep their pension
funds solvent.2 9 Bond sales are attractive because they deliver ready cash,
relieving budget pressures without added tax increases or cuts in retirement
benefits. 30 The downside is that the strategy can fail, leaving taxpayers to
pick up the tab. 3 For example, in California an unpopular bond sale for
state employees' pension played a part in the recall of Governor Gray
Davis. 13 2 In 2003, Pembroke Pines, Florida borrowed forty-five million dol-
lars to fund a new pension plan for city firefighters. 33 The city will borrow
the money through a bond issue, promising to repay the debt by tapping in-
124. Carol Marbin Miller, Welfare Workers'Raise Upsets Union, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 6,
2003, at 5B.
125. Id.
126. Matthew I. Pinzur, Teachers, Aides to Get Sizable Raises, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 11,
2003, at 5B.
127. Mary Ellen Flannery, Teachers OK Deal, but Some Still Upset, MIAMI HERALD, Feb.
11, 2004, at 9B.
128. Steve Harrison & Mary Ellen Flannery, Teachers Reach Deal on Raises; If the New
Contract Deal is Formalized, Broward Teachers Would Get a Retroactive 3 Percent Raise for
This Year, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 28, 2004, at B 1.
129. Mary Williams Walsh, States and Cities Risk Bigger Losses to Fund Pensions, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, at Al.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Scott Andron, Bond Issue to Fund Pensions; The City is Going To Borrow Millions of
Dollars, Not For a Bricks-and-Mortor Project, But To Increase Firefighter Benefits, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 18, 2003, at 2B.
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come from consumers' utility taxes.1 4 While risky, the bond issue will en-
able fire fighters to retire on eighty percent pay after twenty years.
3 5
Florida's public pension fund, the fourth-largest in the United States,
gained national attention on two matters in the past year. In 2003, federal
auditors concluded that "Florida's public pension fund owe[d] the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services $267 million" for excessive pension
benefits paid to Florida employees who worked in federally funded pro-
grams. 3 6 In March 2004, the Florida pension plan joined a dozen other large
investors in pledging to vote against Chairman Michael Eisner's reelection to
the Walt Disney Board of Directors. 37 Despite this opposition, Eisner re-
tained his seat.
Pension plans come in two types: defined benefit and defined contribu-
tion. Most public employee pension funds are defined benefit plans. Under
such a plan, upon retirement an employee is entitled to a fixed share of her
salary multiplied by the number of years of service. While in the last ten
years, over seventeen thousand private employers have discontinued defined
benefit plans, one of the few new plans was set up in 2003 for the police and
firefighters of Lighthouse Point, Florida.
3 8
Under many public pension plans, pension benefits received by the sur-
viving spouse of a deceased plan member are terminated if he or she remar-
ries. Arguably, this result prevents a surviving spouse from receiving bene-
fits, which the decedent had earned over his or her working lifetime and pe-
nalizes surviving spouses who choose remarriage over widowhood. For ex-
ample, in Fort Lauderdale, "widows whose spouses retired from the city be-
fore 1999" lose their survival benefits if they remarry.'39 This loss can be
mitigated, some argue, by life insurance policies aimed at supporting surviv-
ing spouses. 4 °
Many public pension plans integrate the payment of disability benefits
with workers' compensation, social security, or other employer-provided
disability programs. In many cases, for example, the sum of workers' com-
pensation and pension benefits cannot exceed one hundred percent of the
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Joni James, Audit: State Pension Fund Owes Feds $267 Million, MIAMI HERALD,
Sept. 11, 2003, at 6B.
137. Claudia Eller, Film Unit Caught in Crossfire; With Support for Eisner Eroding, 'The
Alamo' and Other Big-Budget Bets Face Close Scrutiny, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2004, at C 1.
138. Mary Williams Walsh, United Methodist Church Bucks the Trend on Employee
Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2004, at Cl.
139. Ashley Fantz, City Cool to Widows'Pension Plea, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 18, 2004, at
8B.
140. Id.
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employee's salary at time of disability. 41 Under an 1890 federal law, retire-
ment pay for disabled veterans "is reduced by a dollar for every dollar re-
ceived in disability compensation.' ' 142 United States House Minority Leader
Nancy Pelosi, a California Democrat, is pushing to abolish this century-old
tax policy. 1
43
Pursuant to an August 2002 opinion by the federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), it is illegal age discrimination for state or
local governments to bar a worker from membership in a defined benefit
pension plan on grounds of the employee's age at time of hire.1" In light of
this opinion, Fort Lauderdale and its public employee union are scrambling
to include previously excluded older workers in the pension plan. 45 In July
2003, the city amended its laws excluding hirees older than fifty-five from
pension eligibility to open membership to all hirees regardless of age. 46 The
city will pick up the cost of past contributions for those over fifty-five years
of age formerly excluded by its illegal policy.'47
C. Health Insurance
In 2002, forty-four million people were without health insurance, bring-
ing the proportion of Americans who were uninsured to fifteen percent, up
from fourteen percent in 2001 .4' The number of full-time employees lack-
ing health insurance rose by about nine hundred thousand dollars in 2002,
equaling approximately twenty million dollars. 49 The figure for Florida is
worse than the national average: seventeen and one-half percent of Florida's
residents are uninsured.' 50 The higher number of uninsured is blamed on the
tepid economy, layoffs, and employers' increasing refusal to pay soaring
health insurance rates.' Average premiums rose almost fourteen percent in
2003, so more employers are shifting more of the costs onto their employees,
141. Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So. 2d 252, 255 (Fla. 1989).
142. Mitch Stacy, 'Tax'on Disabled Vets Decried, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 12, 2003, at 10B.
143. Id.
144. Sonji Jacobs, Fort Lauderdale Looking to Place Older Workers in City Pension Plan,
MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 26, 2003, at 3B.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Robert Pear, Big Increase Seen in People Lacking Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2003, at Al.
149. Id.
150. Tony Pugh, 43 Million Lack Insurance, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 30, 2003, at 3A.
151. Id.
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hiking co-payments and deductibles as well.152 Legislative efforts to expand
coverage to the uninsured through the use of tax credits have languished in
Congress. 153
One side effect of the rising cost of benefits, like health insurance, is
that salaries are stagnating at the slowest wage growth in decades, according
to one expert.'54 The cost of prescription drugs is rising even faster than that
of health insurance. 155 In light of this development several state governments
are turning to Canada, lured by the prospect of slashing prescription drug
costs in half.'56 Florida officials, however, insist it is wrong to import drugs
from Canada.'57 The toll that soaring healthcare costs have exacted is seen in
Florida's public sector in other ways. Legislators have required public em-
ployees to pay higher premiums for health insurance and for the first time
ever, even Florida's elected officials may be forced to pay for their cover-
age.1
58
At age sixty-five, retirees become eligible for Medicare and the ques-
tion arose whether an employer committed unlawful age discrimination by
according such Medicare eligible retirees fewer health insurance benefits
than those accorded non-Medicare eligible retirees. 5 9 In an effort to give
guidance to employers caught in the middle of this issue, the EEOC issued a
final rule on April 22, 2004 that allows employers to reduce or terminate
health benefits once a retiree becomes eligible for Medicare, or similar state
retiree health benefits, without committing unlawful age discrimination.'6"
The new rule, critics claim, will fuel anxiety among the "[twelve] million
Medicare beneficiaries who also receive health benefits from their former
employers.''
152. Robin Toner, Boiling Brew: Politics and Health Insurance Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
30, 2003, at A27.
153. Id.
154. Marilyn Geewax, Experts: Don't Expect a Big Raise, MIAMI HERALD, May 7, 2004,
at IC.
155. Id.; see also Theresa Agovino, Four States Mull Buying Canadian, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 14, 2003, at IC.
156. Agovino, supra note 155.
157. Id.
158. Gary Fineout, Florida Elected Officials Could Lose Key Benefit, MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 30, 2004, at 7B.
159. Erie County Retirees Ass'n v. County of Erie, 220 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2000).
160. Robert Pear, Agency to Allow Insurance Cuts for the Retired, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
2004, at Al.
161. Id.
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D. Family Medical Leave Act
Under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 162 all state and local
government eligible employees are entitled to twelve weeks of unpaid leave
in a twelve-month period: 1) for birth or adoption of a child or placement of
a foster child; 2) to care for a spouse, child, or parent with a serious health
condition; or 3) for the employee's own serious health condition. 163 In Rus-
sell v. North Broward Hospital,64 the Eleventh Circuit upheld a Department
of Labor regulation interpreting "serious health condition" to require more
than three consecutive full days of incapacity, rather than three consecutive
partial days.
1 65
Those individually liable under the FMLA have been the subject of
much debate. In determining whether supervisors or managers may bear
individual liability under the FMLA, courts generally have concluded that
the Act extends to all those who controlled, in whole or in part, the plaintiffs
ability to take a leave of absence and return to her position. 66 When it
comes to suing the federal government, however, the question of individual
liability has divided the courts. The Sixth and Eleventh Circuit Courts,
unlike the Eighth Circuit, have ruled that the FMLA bars individual liability
suits against federal agency employers. 67
State and local governments have looked to the FMLA in shaping and
extending either paid leave or other forms of unpaid leave for employees.
Starting July 1, 2004, for example, California became the first state to pro-
vide six weeks of paid leave for family and medical emergencies.168 Under a
1999 Miami-Dade County law, companies with fifty or more employees
must offer up to thirty days of unpaid leave for victims of domestic vio-
lence. 6 9 Increasingly, employers are setting up formal domestic-abuse poli-
cies, some with paid time off and legal counseling. 7 '
Another emerging trend in the workplace that is aimed at strengthening
families is the growing ranks of employers who provide some kind of adop-
162. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000).
163. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000).
164. 346 F.3d 1335 (11 th Cir. 2003).
165. Id. at 1344.
166. Waters v. Baldwin County, 936 F. Supp. 860, 863 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (explaining that
supervisors may be counted as employers if they exercised some control over employee's
efforts to take FMLA leave).
167. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 829 (6th Cir. 2003).
168. THEODORA LEE, EMPLOYMENT LAW UPDATE 2003-2004, at 113, 161 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 774 2004).
169. D.E. Le' Ger, A Helping Hand, Unclenched, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 2, 2003, at 3C.
170. Id.
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tion benefit to their employees.'71 On average, some employers give between
"$1,500 to $10,000 in financial assistance and from one week to [twelve]
weeks of paid time off."'172 While some employers maintain workplace poli-
cies that discourage employees from bringing their children to work on
school holidays, others employers have "no problem with . . . employees
taking their children to work on school holidays or when they're sick.
173
E. Drug Testing
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that routine periodic
drug testing of federal employees may be conducted without individualized
suspicion or even absent suspicion of a drug problem whatsoever.'74 Be-
cause urine testing may require direct observation of urination to guarantee
the reliability of the results, the federal government has cast about for less
privacy-invasive means of drug testing of its employees. In April 2004, the
federal government proposed testing the hair, saliva, and sweat of its 1.6
million employees in an effort to avoid the privacy issues surrounding uri-
nalysis. 7  The new techniques will make it harder for workers to adequately
prepare for, or to avoid, detection--even though since 1986 the positive rate
for federal employees has declined to under one half percent from eighteen
percent.1
76
F. Computer Privacy
Many states have enacted so-called "Open Meetings Acts" which
require that the public business be conducted in the open and not
behind closed doors. At the same time, these statutes carve out
classes of information, such as personal materials from public dis-
177closure to protect the privacy rights of public employees ....
171. Cindy Krischer Goodman, More Firms Offering Adoption Help to Employees, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 19, 2003, at 1C.
172. Id.
173. Cindy Krischer Goodman, More Dads Taking Kids to Work, Raising Familiar Gen-
der-Gap Issue, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 11, 2004, at IC.
174. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989).
175. Leigh Strope, Feds Propose New Drug Tests, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 7, 2004, at 3A.
176. Id.
177. JOHN E. SANCHEZ & ROBERT D. KLAUSNER, STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYMENT LIABILrrY, LIABILITY PREVENTION SERIES, § 6:15, at 6-39 (Thompson-West
2003).
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Employee e-mail has raised its own set of privacy concerns.'78 The Supreme
Court of Florida ruled in 2003 that public employees' personal e-mails con-
tained on government computers are not "public records" which must be
disclosed under the state's public records law. 7 9 By contrast, 541 e-mail
messages between West Virginia Governor Bob Wise and a state employee,
"with whom he may have been romantically involved," have been released to
the public under the Freedom of Information Act. 80
G. Workers' Compensation
Florida's Workers' Compensation statute grants employees suffering
from work-related injuries or illness medical and hospital benefits. 8 ' The
employer bears the burden of providing that any challenged medical treat-
ment is unreasonable or unnecessary.' 2 In many "soft-tissue" workers' com-
pensation cases, employers can be hard pressed to challenge the extent of an
injury. 83 Emerging medical technology, however, may be able to prove
whether workers are faking neck, back, and carpal tunnel injuries. 4 With
workers' compensation insurance rates soaring, employers search for any-
thing "that will allow them to keep costs down."'' 8 5 A test offering objective
medical diagnostics would likely prompt employers to contest claims that
presently go un-investigated.
86
Employees injured while commuting to work are ordinarily denied
workers' compensation under the so-called "going-and-coming" rule.'87 The
theory behind the rule is that the causal link between work and the injury is
too attenuated and that hazards faced by commuters are merely the perils of
ordinary life. 88 Injuries sustained in the course of meal breaks or the run-
ning of personal errands during the workday pose similar questions.'89 Un-
der a bill approved by the Florida State Senate, all state law enforcement
178. Id. at 6-40.
179. Florida v. City of Clearwater, 863 So. 2d 149, 155 (Fla. 2003).
180. Bettijane Levine, FYI: Yr E-mail Can Haunt U 4ever; A Word to the Unwary: Pri-
vate Missives Don't Belong on the Internet, L.A. TIMEs, June 6, 2003, at El.
181. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(1) (2003).
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. John Dorschner, Machine May Stop Job-Injury Fakes, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 17,
2003, at 1C.
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. Voehl v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 288 U.S. 162, 169 (1933); Longo v. Associated
Limo, 943 So. 2d 871, 944 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
188. See Voehl, 288 U.S. at 169.
189. Id.
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officers will be covered by workers' compensation and vehicle insurance
"while traveling 'to and from lunch or meal breaks' or on 'personal errands'
that are 'not substantial deviations from official state -business.'19 Local
law enforcement officers, however, are excluded from the bill.' 9'
Workers' compensation benefits are sometimes reduced when the in-
jured worker becomes eligible for social security."' For example, Florida
law requires workers who were permanently and totally disabled before age
sixty-two to have their state cost-of-living supplements to their workers'
compensation benefits terminated after reaching age sixty-five.'93 A chal-
lenge to this law on federal preemption grounds was unsuccessful.' 94
H. Unemployment Compensation
On May 11, 2004, the United States Senate rejected by a single vote a
bill that would have funded thirteen weeks of federal benefits for those un-
employed who have exhausted their state aid.' 95
I. Occupational Health and Safety Issues
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 5524 employees died in the
workplace in 2002, down from 5915 in 2001.196 Workplace homicides de-
clined to 609 in 2002.197 Hispanic employees died at a higher rate than black
or white workers. 198 According to a study conducted by the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention, driving fatalities increased with age; and time,
pressure, fatigue, and unfamiliar travel enhanced the risk. 99 Some work-
place deaths stem from employers' failure to remedy safety violations.0 0
190. Marc Caputo, New Push to Give Cops a Break on Insurance, MIAMI HERALD, Apr.
22, 2004, at 7B.
191. Id.
192. See Harrell v. Fla. Constr. Specialists, 834 So. 2d 352, 355-56 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2003).
193. Id. at 354 n.1.
194. Id. at 354.
195. Mary Dalrymple, Jobless Benefits Won t Be Extended, MIAMI HERALD, May 12,
2004, at 3C.
196. Fewer Dying on the Job, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 18, 2003, at 1C.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, PUB. 2003-119,
WORK-RELATED ROADWAY CRASHES-CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITY FOR PREVENTION
(Sept. 2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2003-119/2003-119b.html (last
visited Oct. 30, 2004).
200. Id.
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United States Senate democrats pledged to support legislation in 2004
that would raise the maximum prison sentence for willful safety violations
that cause death in the workplace.2 1 Stress in the workplace leading to pre-
mature deaths in the United States is blamed in part on a volatile labor mar-
ket and on strained personal finances.2°2
Presenteeism, according to a recent study, can cost more than absentee-
ism when workers go to work sick.20 3 Apart from getting co-workers sick,
sick employees cost their employers about $255 each per year in lost produc-
tivity.
2 °4
J. Miscellaneous Workplace Issues
1. Meal Breaks
In Florida, under Broward Sheriffs Office rules, an entire day shift of
police officers cannot take a coffee break together in an adjoining city, leav-
ing the workplace city without a patrol presence.2 °5 The disclosure of such a
violation gave substance to charges by critics that the merger of several cit-
ies' police departments with the Broward Sheriffs Office would mean that
police protection would suffer.2 6  Among other exacting rules, deputies'
meal breaks are limited to thirty minutes and they cannot be taken during the
first or last hour of their shifts.20 7
2. Take-Home Cars
According to a study by the Miami Herald, over one thousand Miami
employees get a free car to drive home, but only seventeen percent have
homes within the city; this policy is costing taxpayers millions of dollars.08
Defenders of the policy argue that parked fire and police department cars
201. David Barstow, Strong Criminal Penalties Sought for Violations That Kill Workers,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2004, at A15.
202. Working Too Hard May Lead to Early Grave, Writer Says, MIAMI HERALD, May 10,
2004, at 2GB.
203. William Kates, Costly Sniffles; If You Go to Work Sick, You Could Hurt Your
Boss-Big Time, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 23, 2004, at 1C.
204. Id.
205. Wanda J. DeMarzo, BSO Bagel Break Broke the Rules, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 25,
2004, at IA.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. David Kidwell & Justin Willett, Free Cars for Its Workers Cost Miami Millions,
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 15, 2003, at IA.
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deter crime in residential neighborhoods.0 9 In response to this study, Miami
has been scaling back the number of take-home vehicles which in turn has
angered the city's public employee unions who allege the city has breached
its labor contract by reducing the city's fleet.21 °
3. Break on Traffic Tickets
For twenty-two years, Sheriffs deputies in Hillsborough County, Flor-
ida, have received a free pass on traffic tickets.2 1 The deputies' traffic ticket
immunity was successfully challenged by a driver who was injured by a dep-
uty who ran a red light.2 12
IV. DISCIPLINE, DISCHARGE, DISCRIMINATION, AND REMEDIES
A. Constitutional Challenges
1. First Amendment
To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim under section 1983, a
public employee must prove: 1) her speech involves a matter of public con-
cern; 2) her speech outweighs the government-employer's legitimate interest
in running an efficient workplace; 3) the speech played a key role in the con-
tested adverse employment action; and 4) the employer would not have
reached the same employment decision absent the protected speech.21 3
In Quinn v. Monroe County,214 the Monroe County Commissioners
asked plaintiff as Library Director to study the feasibility of opening a library
branch in Big Pine Key.215 Plaintiff opposed the plan and told her supervisor
so.2 16 About a year later, plaintiff was discharged, allegedly for failure to
cooperate, poor judgment, and ethical violations. 2 7 After an administrative
hearing, plaintiffs dismissal was upheld.21 8 Upon appeal, the Monroe
County Circuit Court affirmed plaintiff's dismissal.21 9 Next, plaintiff sued in
209. Id.
210. Employees Can Keep 76 Take-Home Cars, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 20, 2004, at 3B.
211. Traffic Tickets Are for Deputies Too, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 12, 2003, at 1 OB.
212. Id.
213. Quinn v. Monroe County, 330 F.3d 1320 (1 th Cir. 2003).
214. Id. at 1329 n. 10.
215. Id. at 1322.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1323.
218. Quinn, 330 F.3dat 1323.
219. Id.
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federal court, contending for the first time that her dismissal was in retalia-
tion for exercising her First Amendment right to contest the opening of the
proposed library branch. 2 ' Losing again, plaintiff appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit, which ruled that the person who fired plaintiff was not the final deci-
sion maker, a prerequisite for holding the county liable.22' At the same time,
the person who fired the plaintiff could be held individually liable on
grounds that they were the official decision maker with respect to plaintiffs
discharge.222
In Travers v. Jones,223 a firefighter engaged in a verbal exchange with
his boss while the firefighter and his co-workers were picketing outside the
County's administrative office during their off-duty hours.224 The plaintiff
was suspended for thirty days for insubordination and unbecoming con-
duct.225 The plaintiff alleged that he was disciplined in retaliation for engag-
ing in protected union activity, a violation of his First Amendment 226 rights
of free speech, freedom of association, and freedom of petition. 227
While the Eleventh Circuit made clear that an employer may not disci-
pline a public employee for engaging in protected speech, an employer need
not "tolerate an embarrassing, vulgar, vituperative, ad hominem attack, sim-
ply because the employee was waving the [political] sign while conducting
the attack., 228 Because a state administrative hearing officer resolved the
disputed facts in favor of the employer, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that it
must give the hearing officer's fact-finding preclusive effect.229
In Silva v. Bieluch,23° deputy sheriffs campaigned in favor of the incum-
bent sheriff who lost the election to the defendant.2 11 The deputies "appeared
in campaign advertisements, attended political rallies, and ... in 'get out the
vote"' activities.232 Upon taking office, the new sheriff transferred the plain-
tiffs from their probationary lieutenancies back to their former posts. 233 After
the federal district court dismissed plaintiffs complaint, they appealed.234
220. Id. at 1324.
221. Id. at 1326.
222. Id.
223. 323 F.3d 1294 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
224. Id. at 1295.
225. Id.
226. U.S. CONST. amend I.
227. Travers, 323 F.3d at 1295.
228. Id. at 1296 (quoting Morris v. Crow, 117 F.3d 449, 458 (11 th Cir. 1997)).
229. Idat 1297.
230. 351 F.3d 1045 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
231. Id. at 1046.
232. Id. at 1046-47.
233. Id. at 1046.
234. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit ruled against the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim,
concluding that their political conduct did not constitute speech sufficient to
trigger the traditional "Pickering" balancing test commonly enlisted to weigh
public employees' free speech rights. 35 In effect, plaintiffs had not spoken
out on issues of public concern. 36 While not addressing freedom of associa-
tion, the court indirectly discussed this issue by concluding that a sheriff may
promote, or demote, deputies on the basis of political patronage without of-
fending the First Amendment.237
2. Due Process
The deputy sheriffs in Silva v. Bieluch also alleged violation of due
process. 238  Rejecting their substantive due process claim stemming from
their loss of rank, the Eleventh Circuit, citing circuit precedent concluded:
"[b]ecause employment rights are state-created rights and are not 'fundamen-
tal' rights created by the Constitution, they do not enjoy substantive due
process protection. ' '239 Turning to plaintiffs' procedural due process claims
based on their alleged property and liberty interests, the Circuit Court re-
jected these claims as well. 24" As probationary employees, the court made
clear that the plaintiffs had no property interest in their rank as lieutenants.24'
As for the alleged deprivation of their liberty interest, the court applied the
so-called "stigma-plus" test. 42 Under this test, plaintiffs must prove defama-
tion in addition to the infringement of some more tangible interest.243 Given
that plaintiffs kept their jobs, the court concluded that no liberty interest was
implicated. 244 A mere transfer back to their former rank evinced no "addi-
tional loss of a tangible interest.,
241
235. Silva, 351 F.3d at 1046-47.
236. Id. at 1047.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1047-48.
239. Id. at 1047 (quoting McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1560 (11 th Cir. 1994)).
240. See Silva, 351 F.3d at 1047-48.
241. Id. at 1048.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Silva, 351 F.3dat 1048.
41
: Nova Law Review 29, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
NOVA LAW REVIEW
B. Employment Discrimination
1. Generally
In general, public employees may look to the Equal Protection Clause in
the Fourteenth Amendment 4 6 and to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964247 for protection against discrimination in the workplace on grounds of
race, sex, and national origin. While Title VII also protects against religious
bias, under the United States Constitution such claims are nearly always as-
sessed under the First Amendment.
During the past year the federal government has issued rules governing
the collection of data useful in assessing compliance with anti-discrimination
laws.248 On December 29, 2003, the Commerce Department's Census Bu-
reau released data on the sex, race, and ethnicity of U.S. employees, which
can be enlisted by employers in tracking progress toward a bias-free work-
place.249
The Labor Department's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Pro-
grams (OFCCP) requires federal contractors to maintain gender, race, and
ethnicity data on applicants and employees. On March 29, 2004, the OFCCP
issued a proposed rule requiring contractors to collect gender, race, and eth-
nicity information from internet job applicants as well.
On June 11, 2003, the EEOC proposed revisions to its key employer re-
porting form, EEO-1, to increase the number of race and ethnic categories of
individuals, including the number of job categories.251
2. Race: Section 1981
Section 1981 of the United States Code,252 enacted by Congress in the
wake of the Civil War to police the Thirteenth Amendment,25 3 supports only
246. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
247. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2003).
248. See 57 AM. JuR. 3D Proof of Facts § 75 (2004).
249. See U.S. CENsus BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
(EEO) TABULATION, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/eeoindex.html (last re-
vised Jul. 8, 2004).
250. Obligation to Solicit Race and Gender Data for Agency Enforcement Purposes, 69
Fed. Reg. 16,446, 16,477 (March 29, 2004) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-1).
251. Agency Information Collection Activities: Revision of the Employer Information
Report (EEO-1) Comment Request, 68 Fed. Reg. 34,965, 34,967 (June 11, 2003).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
253. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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claims alleging racial discrimination.254 In 1991, Congress amended section
1981 by adding 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c), which makes clear that "[t]he rights
protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmen-
tal discrimination. ,255 There is a circuit court split over whether section
1981(c) opened up an implied private right of action against municipali-
ties. 6 Until recently, there was also a circuit court split over whether sec-
tion 1981 claims are governed by different statutes of limitations depending
upon whether they allege pre-formation or post-formation bias claims. But
on May 3, 2004, in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,257 the Supreme
Court resolved this circuit court split by ruling that federal causes of action
created after 1990 are governed by a four-year statute of limitations if Con-
gress has not spelled out a specific limitation period for them.258
3. Same-Sex Bias
While Title VII offers no direct protection against discrimination in the
workplace on grounds of sexual orientation, gay and lesbian public employ-
ees receive some measure of protection under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment 1 9 and under an array of state and local laws. In
2003, 13 states, 119 cities, and 23 counties banned sexual orientation dis-
crimination in the workplace.2 16  On July 1, 2003, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. be-
came the largest private employer to ban sexual orientation discrimination in
employment. 26 ' At the federal level, Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle, a
South Dakota Democrat, introduced a Senate bill in 2003 to ban sexual ori-
entation bias in the workplace.262 A House bill offered by Representative
Edolphus Towns, a New York Democrat, would do the same.263
254. See § 1981.
255. § 1981(c).
256. See, e.g., Watkins v. Penn. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, No. 02-CV-2881, 2002 WL
321182088, at *4 (E.D. Penn. Nov. 25, 2002); Fed'n of African Am. Contractors v. City of
Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 1996).
257. 124 S. Ct. 1836 (2004).
258. Id. at 1845.
259. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
260. Wal-Mart Stores Expand Job Policies to Include Protection for Gay Workers, 72
U.S.L.W. No. 2, at 2017, 2027 (2004).
261. Id.
262. S. 16, 108th Cong. (2003).
263. See H.R. 214, 108th Cong. (2003).
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4. Gender
a. Title VII
At times, the law treats some employees who quit as though they were
dismissed. This judicial doctrine is known as constructive discharge. 64 To
prevail on such a claim, the former employee must establish that a reasonable
person, faced with similar unfair employment conditions, would leave rather
than continue to suffer such conditions. 65 While the United States Supreme
Court has acknowledged the doctrine in other labor contexts, 66 until 2004, it
had not explicitly recognized it under Title VII.
167
But on June 14, 2004, the United States Supreme Court ruled that em-
ployees who quit over "intolerable" sexual harassment may sue their em-
ployers as though they had been fired, even if they did not actually lodge a
complaint.26' Employers however, may avoid liability for damages if they
can persuade a jury that the employee unreasonably ignored the complaint
procedure. 269 This ruling can fairly be read as applying not only to sexual
harassment, but also to race, national origin, religion, age, and disability dis-
crimination.
In 1998, to further strengthen the law governing sexual harassment in
the workplace, the United States Supreme Court decided two cases dealing
with employer liability for sexual harassment by supervisors under Title VII:
Faragher v. City of Boca Ratonz7" and Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth.27'
These two rulings left room for employers to raise a successful defense by,
for example, establishing that victims of sexual harassment had unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities pro-
vided by the employer. In Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Services Inc.,272 the
Eleventh Circuit Court ruled that the employer was entitled to avail itself of
this affirmative defense outlined in Farragher and Ellerth, given that the
employer quickly removed the harassing supervisor.273
264. See Penn. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2351 (2004) [hereinafter Suders 1].
265. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 445 (3d. Cir. 2003).
266. See, e.g., Speth v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 139 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that
an employee was unable to establish prima facie case for constructive discharge).
267. Suders 1, 124 S. Ct. at 2352.
268. See id. at 2357.
269. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
270. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
271. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
272. 347 F.3d 1272 (11 th Cir. 2003).
273. Id. at 1293.
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b. Title lX
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,274 provides that "[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination un-
der any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance. 275 Title IX governs public employees to a limited extent. 76 Public
school teachers, for example, may sue for sex discrimination under the
Act. 77 The Supreme Court has made clear that damages are recoverable
under Title IX only for intentional sex discrimination.2 7' But under proposed
federal legislation, namely the Civil Rights Act of 2004, disparate impact
claims would also be cognizable under the Act. 279
5. Age
The 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits
age discrimination of any worker age forty or older.280 In General Dynamics
Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,281 two hundred employees alleged they suffered
reverse age discrimination because they were too young to qualify for bene-
fits offered to co-workers age fifty and over.282 On February 24, 2004, the
United States Supreme Court ruled, six to three, that an employer does not
violate the ADEA rights of employees in their forties by favoring an older
employee over a younger one.283 In rejecting the plaintiffs' reverse discrimi-
nation claim, Justice Souter, who wrote for the majority, pointed out that
"[t]he enemy of 40 is 30, not 50.," 284 Advocacy groups for people over fifty
nailed the decision, giving older workers preferential treatment. 85
The circuit courts of appeal are split five-to-three over whether dispa-
rate impact claims may lie under the ADEA.286 Unlike disparate treatment,
disparate impact does not include the intent to discriminate, and the em-
274. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
275. § 1681(a).
276. See id.
277. See, e.g., Chance v. Rice Univ., 984 F.2d 151, 152 (5th Cir. 1993).
278. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
279. See H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. § 603 (2004); S. 2088, 108th Cong. § 603 (2004).
280. 29 U.S.C. § 63 1(a) (2000).
281. 124 S. Ct. 1236 (2004).
282. Id. at 1239.
283. Id. at 1248-49.
284. Id. at 1243.
285. Gina Holland, Younger Workers Lose Age-Discrimination Case, MIAMI HERALD,
Feb. 25, 2004, at 3C.
286. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 351 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2003).
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ployer's burden is heavier.2"7 For these reasons, this framework has influ-
enced various appeals for many aggrieved employees. Proposed legislation,
namely the Civil Rights Act of 2004, would make clear that disparate impact
claims are cognizable under the ADEA.28 Moreover, on March 29, 2004,
the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case involving older police officers in
Jackson, Mississippi that will decide the issue under the ADEA as it is cur-
rently written. 219 In Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi,290 older officers
claimed that new wage rates had the effect of giving proportionately smaller
increases to the older officers.29 ' Both lower federal courts in the case ruled
that only disparate treatment cases may be brought under the ADEA.292 In
2002, the United States Supreme Court sidestepped the issue in a case
brought by older workers against the Florida Power Corporation.293 EEOC
regulations recognize the disparate impact framework under the ADEA.294
Currently, ADEA suits must be filed within ninety days of receipt of a
right to sue notice from the EEOC.295 However, on December 17, 2003, the
EEOC published a final rule clarifying that charging parties under the ADEA
need not wait for the EEOC's notice of dismissal of the charge before pursu-
ing a private civil suit.
296
6. Disability
The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination
against applicants and employees who suffer either from mental or physical
impairment, not only at the hiring and dismissal stages, but also regarding
virtually every other term and condition of employment. 297 Despite the scope
of this protection, according to a survey by the American Bar Association in
287. Ass'n for Disabled Americans v. Concorte Gaming Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1353,
1361 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
288. See H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. § 603 (2004); S. 2088, 108th Cong. § 603 (2004).
289. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Consider Role of Intent in Age Bias, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2004, at A16.
290. 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003).
291. Id. at 185.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 187.
294. Id. at 200.
295. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (2000).
296. Procedures-Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,150 (Dec. 17,
2003) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1626).
297. Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1084 (10th Cir. 1997).
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2002, employers won 94.5 percent of federal court decisions rendered under
Title I of the ADA, which pertains to employment. 98
In 2001, the United States Supreme Court ruled, in Board of Trustees of
the University of Alabama v. Garrett,299 that state employees may not sue
their employers for damages in federal court for violations of Title I of the
ADA.3 °° Another source of state and local government liability for public
employee claims of disability discrimination is found in section 503 of the
Rehabilitation Act,30 1 which covers contracts between the federal govern-
ment, and state and local governments.30 2 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has ruled that the receipt of federal funds by a state agency is a
waiver of that agency's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under the
Rehabilitation Act.30 3
Under the ADA, "the term 'individual with a disability' does not in-
clude an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs. '3t'
On December 2, 2003, in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,°5 the United States
Supreme Court addressed a disparate treatment claim by a former employee
who was terminated after testing positive for drugs.306 The Court ruled that it
was improper to apply disparate impact analysis to conclude that the em-
ployer's neutral no-hire policy had a discriminatory impact on rehiring reha-
bilitated drug addicts.30 7 Instead, the Court made clear the proper framework
for judging whether the employer's policy violated the ADA, which was
whether it amounted to a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason sufficient to
defeat the employee's prima facie case of discrimination.38 This narrow
ruling does not decide the larger issue of whether former drug addicts and
alcoholics are entitled to equal treatment when they seek employment else-
where.30 9
The ADA outlaws retaliation against employees who file a charge, tes-
tify, assist, or play any role in investigations, proceedings, or hearings under
298. Amy L. Allbright, 2003 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I-Survey Up-
date, 28 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 319, 320 (2004).
299. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
300. Id. at 374.
301. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (2000).
302. Id.
303. Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 193 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir.
1999).
304. 42 U.S.C. § 12210(a) (2004).
305. 540 U.S. 44 (2003).
306. Id. at 516.
307. Id. at 520.
308. Id. at 521.
309. David G. Savage, High Court Upholds Firm's Rehiring Ban, L.A. TIES, Dec. 3,
2003, at A22.
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the ADA.3'0 The term "retaliation" includes any interference, coercion, or
intimidation of employees exercising their ADA rights.31' But the plaintiff
must prove that she sustained an adverse employment action in order to pre-
vail on her retaliation claim. In Mays v. City of Tampa,312 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit ruled that neither critical performance reviews by a supervisor, nor
added work load to compensate for an employee's pregnancy and hearing
loss, amounted to an adverse employment action required to make out a
prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA.313
Under the ADA, the employer owes the duty of reasonable accommoda-
tion to the physical or mental impairments of an otherwise qualified individ-
ual.314 In an informal guidance letter, the EEOC has clarified that employers
are not required "to collect and safely dispose of used needles and syringes
as a reasonable accommodation for employees who must use them to treat
medical conditions, such as diabetes., 31 5 In Wood v. Green,1 6 the Eleventh
Circuit ruled that an employer need not reasonably accommodate an em-
ployee's request for indefinite leave to treat his headaches so that he could
work at some uncertain point in the future. 7 And at Miami International
Airport, a security screener alleged that his employer wrongfully refused to
reasonably accommodate his disability, poor night vision, by forcing him to
ride his bicycle to work at three o'clock in the morning.318
7. Religion
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire, dismiss,
or otherwise discriminate against anyone with respect to her wages, terms, or
conditions of employment owing to such person's religion.319 In 2003,
nearly six hundred Muslims filed employment discrimination claims involv-
ing their faith, about double the number of cases arising in 2000.320 Most
310. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2000).
311. § 12203(b).
312. No. 02-16556, 2003 WL 21283511, at *1 (1lth Cir. May 23, 2003).
313. Id.
314. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
315. Employer Not Required to Dispose of Syringes for Employees Treating Medical
Conditions, 72 U.S.L.W. 2665, 2674 (2004).
316. 323 F.3d 1309 (llthCir. 2003).
317. Id. at 1314.
318. Joan Fleischman, Airport Screener is Suing Over Bike Rides, MIAMI HERALD, May
12, 2004, at lB.
319. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
320. Mary Beth Sheridan, Bias Against Muslims Surges, Group Reports, MIAMI HERALD,
May 4, 2004, at 9A.
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cases involved an employer's refusal to accommodate Muslims' religious
practices."'
Two Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals cases involving religion in the
workplace were decided in 2003.322 In Rossi v. Troy State University,323 a
public university professor's hostile work environment claim failed because
the plaintiff was unable to prove that repeated religion based harassment was
sufficiently hostile to alter the terms and conditions of his employment.3 24 In
Eljack v. Security Engineers Inc. ,325 the Court addressed a perennial question
raised by some employees sporting facial hair out of religious conviction:
whether an employer violates a worker's religious rights by forcing him to
shave his beard?3 26 The answer often turns on the business justification for
such a policy.
C. Remedies
There is a growing form of mandatory arbitration negotiated between
individual employees and their employers governed by the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act.3 27 This type of arbitration may be binding on the parties, foreclos-
ing any recourse to courts other than to appeal the decision of an arbitrator,
which is rarely overturned.32 8 However, under proposed legislation, the Civil
Rights Act of 2004,329 the Federal Arbitration Act would be amended to ex-
clude employment contracts and would bar employers from forcing employ-
ees to sign mandatory arbitration agreements waiving their right to sue in
court.3 3 0 If enacted, the measure would overturn a United States Supreme
Court decision, Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams,33' interpreting the Federal
Arbitration Act as encompassing most employment contracts, except for
those involving transportation employees.332
321. Id.
322. See Rossi v. Troy State Univ., No. 02-15455, 2003 WL 21283627, at *1 (11th Cir.
May 30, 2003); Eljack v. Sec. Eng'rs, Inc., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 22183, at *1 (11th Cir.
May 30, 2003), reh "g denied, 124 S. Ct. 2091 (2004).
323. No. CIV.A.01-A-1319-N, 2002 WL 32627779, at *1 (M.D. Ala. July 22, 2002), rev'd
en banc, No. 02-15455, 2003 WL 21283627, at *1 (1lth Cir. May 30, 2003).
324. Id. at *3-4.
325. Appellees' Brief at *3, Eljack v. Sec. Eng'rs, Inc., No. 02-15852-AA, 2002 WL
32182374 (11 th Cir. Dec. 23, 2002).
326. Id.
327. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
328. Id.
329. H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. § 603 (2004); S. 2088, 108th Cong. § 603 (2004).
330. Id.
331. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
332. H.R. 3809 § 603; S. 2088 § 603.
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The proposed Civil Rights Act of 2004 would substantially alter current
labor and employment law in other ways as well.333 For example, under the
bill, undocumented workers would be entitled to recover back pay if they are
victims of employment discrimination.334 Moreover, the Act would also lift
the cap on Title VII damage awards.335
Finally, many courts have attempted to constrain efforts by employers
to tip the scales in their favor by slipping in one-sided provisions in arbitra-
tion agreements. The Eleventh Circuit faced such an issue in Summers v.
Dillards, Inc.,336 where language in an arbitration agreement, drafted by the
employer, afforded relief for attorneys' fees only. 33' Thus, the employee
initially prevailed at arbitration.338 Despite this exacting standard, the Court
refused to deem the provision unconscionable, thus leaving the employee
bound by his promise to arbitrate all sex and age discrimination claims.339
333. Id.
334. H.R. 3809 § 702.
335. H.R.3809§ 112.
336. 351 F.3d 1100 (1 lth Cir. 2003).
337. Id. at 1101.
338. Id.
339. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal research and legal writing are fundamental skills necessary to the
practice of law. Thus, it should come as no surprise that an attorney's failure
to perform adequate legal research and write well can violate the attorney's
professional responsibility. A demonstrated lack of competent legal research
and legal writing performance is injurious to an attorney's reputation. Fail-
ure to adequately research or write well, or both, is a violation of ethics rules
and can result in a reprimand, suspension, or disbarment from the practice of
law; a client may decide that it is the basis of a legal malpractice lawsuit.
Many states have adopted the American Bar Association (ABA) Model
Rules of Professional Conduct and the ethics rules of other states may have
provisions similar to those of the Model Rules. A number of the Model
* Associate Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice and Legal Studies of the
University of Central Florida, Orlando; J.D., magna cum laude, New York Law School, 1982;
M.A., University of Wisconsin, 1976; B.A., Kalamazoo College, 1974.
** Associate Professor in the Division of Criminal Justice and Legal Studies of the
University of West Florida, Pensacola; J.D. Samford University, Cumberland School of Law,
1984; B.F.A., University of Georgia, 1978.
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Rules are related to the duty of the attorney to perform adequate legal re-
search and write well. Far from being a technicality, problems with the at-
torney's legal research and legal writing can violate the Model Rules.
Those professors who teach legal research and legal writing bemoan the
students who do not apply themselves in class, perhaps believing that class
material will not be relevant to them in the future. Exposing students to
cases in which sloppy legal research or inattention to grammar or court rules
resulted in severe sanctions can serve as a cautionary tale, impressing upon
them the importance of developing sound legal research and legal writing
skills.
This article will provide a discussion of specific parts of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct that relate to the attorney's legal research and
writing obligations. Each section will introduce the reader to a Model Rule,
or a portion of a Model Rule, and supply case law examples of the sanctions
meted out to attorneys found to be in violation of the rules. The importance
of the attorney's duty to perform adequate legal research may possibly be
reflected in the fact that it is the first rule in the Model Rules.
II. ADEQUATE LEGAL RESEARCH
Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires the attor-
ney to provide the client with competent representation.' The rule provides:
"A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and prepara-
tion reasonably necessary for the representation.,
2
Performing any needed legal research is one of the elements to provid-
ing competent representation for the client. An attorney must perform legal
research to have the legal knowledge necessary to competently represent a
client.3 However, many attorneys apparently fail to perform even basic legal
1. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2004).
2. Id. In Howard v. Oakland Tribune, 245 Cal. Rptr. 449, 451 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988),
the annoyance of the court was palpable when it chastised the attorney for sloppy citations.
"We were not aided in our resolution of this appeal by the appellants' opening brief, which
was riddled with inaccurate and incomplete citations and which frequently referred to cases
without reference to the pages on which the cited holdings appear." Id.
3. One of the fundamental tasks in legal research is to ascertain that authority found is
still good law by using a citator. Omitting this step can cause grave problems. In Fletcher v.
State, 858 F. Supp. 169, 172 (M.D. Fla. 1994), the court noted that the plaintiffs cited one case
that had been overruled and another that was reversed.
[Vol. 29:1:49
52
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss1/1
ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS
research. Weinstein, the attorney in the following case, provided legal ad-
vice without performing any legal research.
In Baldayaque v. United States,5 Baldayaque, an illegal immigrant from
the Dominican Republic, pled guilty to a heroin charge and was sentenced to
168 months in prison.6 At sentencing, the court admitted that the sentence
was harsh but required by the sentencing guidelines, and the court would not
object if the government chose to deport Baldayaque rather than have him
remain in prison.7 At Baldayaque's request, his wife, Christina Rivera, hired
Weinstein to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 8 Without completing
any legal research, Weinstein informed Rivera that the time had passed for
filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus; however, Baldayaque had nearly
fourteen months within which to do so. 9 Weinstein did file a motion request-
ing that Baldayaque's sentence be modified to permit the government to de-
port him; however, that motion failed to cite any legal authority supporting
it.10 The district court denied the motion stating that the court did not have
jurisdiction and the motion was untimely." Weinstein informed Baldayaque
in writing of the court decision, but the letter was returned to Weinstein.1
2
Eighteen months later, Baldayaque filed a motion on a pro se basis to
have his sentence modified. 13 The court denied the motion but gave Bal-
dayaque information regarding the filing of a habeas petition.' 4 With that
information, Baldayaque, again on a pro se basis, filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus. 15
4. Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2003). In Smith v. Lewis, 530
P.2d 589 (Cal. 1975), the court explained that an attorney is expected "to possess knowledge
of those plain and elementary principles of law which are commonly known by well informed
attorneys, and to discover those additional rules of law which, although not commonly known,
may readily be found by standard research techniques." Id. at 595. The court gave an exam-
ple of a minimum standard: "In evaluating the competence of an attorney's services, we may
justifiably consider his failure to consult familiar encyclopedias of the law." Id. at 593 n.5
(citing People v. Ibarra, 386 P.2d 487, 491 (Cal. 1963)). In Pineda v. Craven, 424 F.2d 369,
372 (9th Cir. 1970), the Ninth Circuit brutally clarified that although an attorney may make a
strategic or tactical decision on behalf of a client, "[t]here is nothing strategic or tactical about
ignorance."
5. 338 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2003).
6. Id. at 147.
7. Id. at 148.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 148-49.
10. Baldayaque, 338 F.3d at 149.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Baldayaque, 338 F.3d at 149.
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The court found that Weinstein had violated the state ethics rule, which
is identical in wording to rule 1.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct.'6 The court held that "an attorney's conduct, if it is sufficiently egre-
gious, may constitute . . . 'extraordinary circumstances."",17 Extraordinary
circumstances combined with reasonable diligence on Baldayaque's part
could allow tolling of the one year period.18 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether
Baldayaque had been reasonably diligent.19
The failure to perform adequate research is clearly unprofessional and
unacceptable. However, the failure to comply with a court rule that specifies
a format becomes unbelievable. Courts burdened under an overwhelming
number of cases do not take kindly to attorneys who fail to comply with the
format required by court rules.
III. COMPLIANCE WITH COURT RULES
If an attorney fulfills the obligation to perform adequate research and in
doing so locates specific formats that the court rules require, logic would
suggest that the format should be followed. Incompetence may be demon-
strated by the attorney's noncompliance with court rules.2 ° In the following
three cases, failure to comply with court rules resulted in severe sanctions.
16. Id. at 152.
17. Id. at 152.
18. Id. at 153.
19. Id.
20. In Henning v. Kaye, 415 S.E.2d 794, 794 (S.C. 1992), the Supreme Court of South
Carolina barely refrained from dismissing an appeal because the appellant's brief failed to
conform to the court rule regulating brief format.
[T]he components of the brief are incorrectly organized and labeled, the issues are not dis-
tinctively headed, the table of authorities is not alphabetized or referenced to the body of the
brief, the statement of the case contains contested matter and omits required information,
and the arguments contain no citations to the record or to the cases listed in the table of au-
thorities.
Id. The court reminded the attorney of the importance of court rules: "[Tlhe South Carolina
Appellate Court Rules are not mere technicalities but provide the parties and this Court with
an orderly mechanism through which to guide appeals .. " Id. In TSC Express Co. v. G.H.
Bass & Co. (In re Allen), 176 B.R. 91, 95 n.2 (D. Me. 1994), the court denied both parties'
motions for summary judgment because they failed to comply with the local rule requiring a
motion for summary judgment to be supported with a memorandum containing a factual
statement with references to the record. One of the parties failed to make references to the
record and the other failed to provide a factual statement. Id. In addition, both parties'
memoranda were too long. Id. "The briefs of both sides are prolix, verbose, and full of inac-
curacies, misstatements and contradictions. The lawyering on behalf of both parties falls
woefully short of the standards to which attorneys practicing before this court have been tradi-
tionally held ..... Id. Many courts take page limit restrictions seriously. In the following
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In In re O'Brien,2 1 the court dismissed the appeal because the appellant
"has seen fit to ignore the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Ninth
Circuit rules, and essentially tossed this bankruptcy case in our laps, leaving
it to us to figure out the relevant facts and law. We decline to do so."' 22 The
court commented that "[a]n enormous amount of time is wasted when attor-
neys fail to provide proper briefs and excerpts of record that should have
supplied the court with the materials relevant to the appeal. 23
cases, the courts sanctioned attorneys for failure to comply with page limit restrictions. In
Insulated Panel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 743 N.E.2d 1038, 1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001), the
appellate court approved the trial court's decision of considering only the first ten pages of a
fifty-page brief after the court had announced that it was limiting briefs to ten pages. Simi-
larly, in Van Winkle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 683 N.E.2d 985, 989 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997), Owens-Coming placed some of its argument in single-spaced footnotes to comply with
the page limit on briefs. The court announced that in the future it would ignore material in
footnotes when the footnotes are used to avoid the page limit rule. Id at 990. In State v.
Hudson, 473 S.E.2d 415, 417 (N.C. App. 1996), rev'don other ground, 483 S.E.2d 436 (N.C.
1997), the court ordered Hudson's attorney to pay $500 because the brief was forty-two pages,
thus above the thirty-five page limit under the appellate rules. In Varda, Inc. v. Insurance Co.
of North America, 45 F.3d 634, 640 (2d Cir. 1995), the successful party was not awarded costs
because of its violation of the court rule limiting briefs to fifty pages. "[A]pproximately 75%
of Varda's statement of facts and argument appear in footnotes. If Varda had presented its
facts and argument in ... the text, its briefs would have been roughly seventy pages." Id. In
TK-7 Corp. v. Estate of Barbouti, 966 F.2d 578, 579 (10th Cir. 1992), the court struck the
defendants' brief because it failed to conform to the fifty-page limit. The writer had moved
text into footnotes and reduced the footnote font below the pica ten pitch spacing minimum.
Otherwise the brief would have been almost twice the fifty-page limit. Id. In White Budd Van
Ness Partnership v. Major-Gladys Drive Joint Venture, 811 S.W.2d 541, 541 (Tex. 1991), the
Supreme Court of Texas dismissed an Application for Writ of Error because, although the
Application complied with the fifty-page limit, the writer had reduced the type size and nar-
rowed the margins to achieve the limit. In Buffalo v. Robbins, 811 S.W.2d 541, 541-52 (Tex.
1991), the Supreme Court of Texas struck the Application for Writ of Error because it failed
to comply with the court rule governing format of the Application. Some page limit restric-
tions apply even in a death penalty case. In Pratt v. Armenakis, 56 P.3d 920, 921 (Or. 2002),
the attorney seeking post-conviction relief for the client asked to file a 260-page brief. The
judge permitted a brief of one hundred pages instead of the usual fifty. Id. The attorney re-
peated the request to file a 260-page brief. Id. The judge permitted a brief of 150 pages. Id.
The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the judge's decision to allow a brief with a maximum
of 150 pages. Id. at 923. One Illinois court takes pinpoint references seriously. In Ikari v.
Mason Properties, 731 N.E.2d 975, 978 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000), the court admonished the parties
for failing to include pinpoint references. "All of the cases cited by defendant, and most of the
cases cited by plaintiffs, lack reference to the official reports' page numbers upon which the
pertinent matters appear." Id.
21. 312 F.3d 1135(9th Cir. 2002).
22. Id. at 1137.
23. Id. In Morters v. Barr, No. 01-2011, 2003 WL 115359, at *4 (Wis. App. Jan. 14,
2003), the court ordered the appellants to pay the respondents' costs and attorney fees because
the appellants's brief failed to comply with the applicable court rule. The court stated: "We
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In Catellier v. Depco, Inc.,24 Ziobron, Catellier's attorney, was ordered
to pay Depco's attorney fees for the appeal because of Ziobron's failure to
comply with the appellate rules governing appellate briefs.25 Ziobron's brief
exceeded the maximum number of pages allowable and used smaller font
than required in the text and the footnotes.2 6 The statement of the case and
the statement of the facts incorrectly included an argument.27 Pinpoint cita-
tions were omitted.28 The argument section was so poorly written that it was
difficult to understand and contained accusations against the trial court.29
recognize that it is unreasonable to expect every attorney in Wisconsin to construct arguments
as if they were authored by Learned Hand, but a line must be drawn separating adequate from
inadequate briefs in order to give some life to the requirements of Wis. Stat. Rule 809.19." Id.
at *3-4, In evaluating the appellants' brief the court found that "[t]he appellants' brief falls
short of the mark-the brief was apparently thrown together by making a number of general
claims of error and then quoting two pages of law that may or may not be relevant to the case
at hand." Id.
24. 696 N.E.2d 75 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
25. Id. at 80.
26. Id. at 79.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Catellier, 696 N.E.2d at 79. The statements about the judge could have violated
another ethics rule prohibiting an attorney from impugning the reputation of the judge. An-
other ploy attempted by some attorneys to avoid the maximum page limit is to incorporate
another document by reference. In Guerrero v. Tarrant County Mortician Services Co., 977
S.W.2d 829, 832-33 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998), the court refused to consider the appellants' argu-
ments regarding official immunity contained in their responses to the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. In Glover v. Columbia Fort Bend Hospital, No. 06-01-00101-CV, 2002
WL 1430783, at *5 (Tex. Ct. App. July 3, 2002), Glover's pro se brief was ninety pages long,
exceeding the maximum length by more than forty pages. When the court struck the brief and
ordered him to submit a brief in compliance with the court rule, Glover requested leave to
exceed the page limit, which the court denied. Id. Glover's new brief complied with the page
limit but incorporated a number of arguments by reference from his original brief. Id. The
court refused to consider argument contained in the original brief. Id. at *5-6. In Westing-
house Electric Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 809 F.2d 419, 424-25 (7th Cir. 1987), the court sanctioned
an attorney $1000, to be paid by the attorney, for failing to conform the brief format to rule
28(g), which limits the opening brief to fifty pages. The court noted that:
Fed. R. App. P. 32(a) requires typed briefs to be double-spaced and to observe specified margins.
Briefs also must have type II points or larger, ruling out elite type. Westinghouse disregarded all
of these rules. It filed a brief with approximately 1 1/2 spacing, with type smaller than 11 points,
and with margins smaller than those allowed. The effect was to stuff a 70-page brief into 50
pages. One has the sense that the lawyers wrote what they wanted and told the word processing
department to jigger the formatting controls until the brief had been reduced to 50 pages. Our
clerk's office did not catch the maneuver. The judges did, and when we required Westinghouse to
file a brief complying with the rules counsel responded by moving gobs of text into single-
spaced footnotes, thereby leaving essentially the same number of words in the brief.
Id. at 425 n. 1. In Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 919 F.2d 1579, 1584 (Fed. Cir.
1990), the attorneys were each ordered to pay $1000 in sanctions due to their failure to con-
form the briefs to applicable court rules.
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In Ernst Haas Studio, Inc. v. Palm Press, Inc. ,30 the court affirmed the
dismissal of the appellant's complaint and sanctioned the attorney, ordering
the attorney personally liable for the appellee's reasonable attorney's fees
where the attorney failed to conform the appellate brief to the court rule gov-
erning briefs. 3 1 "Appellant's Brief is at best an invitation to the court to scour
the record, research any legal theory that comes to mind, and serve generally
as an advocate for appellant. We decline the invitation." 32
Although most attorneys do not have difficulty following formats re-
quired by court rules, some attorneys graduate from law school and pass the
bar, yet their writing skills fall below what courts tolerate. The following
section discusses two cases in which attorneys were sanctioned because of
their poor writing.
IV. ADEQUATE WRITING
The competence required under rule 1.1 includes adequate writing
skills.33 In Kentucky Bar Ass 'n v. Brown,34 attorney Brown filed an appellate
Counsel for neither side appears willing, even when cautioned, to understand and follow the rules
governing the appellate process. Showing no mercy on this busy court, they first filed briefs so
replete with cross-charges of misstatements and so lacking in record references as to frustrate the
desire of this court to trust its officers in this case. The court was thus compelled to decline the
burden of checking each statement and to reject those briefs ... Continuing a kind of "Alice in
Patentland" approach to the judicial process, the parties' conduct then grew "curiouser and curi-
ouser," for their new briefs include: statements of fact with no record reference; statements of
fact for which there is no record; reliance on attorney argument and counsel's unsworn fact
statements as 'evidence'; citation of materials and raising of questions as though they were be-
fore the district court when the present record indicates they were not; assertions of and reliance
on facts that occurred after entry of the judgment appealed from; irreconcilably conflicting posi-
tions of the same party; citation of inapplicable authorities; page upon page of argument about a
product that was admittedly not before the district court and is not before this court; arguments
directed to products never charged as infringements; disregard of the concerns expressed by this
court at oral argument; and a refusal to come to grips with the questions propounded by this
court. Far from aiding this court to decide, by presenting legal arguments on concrete fact pat-
terns, counsel have in this case wasted this court's resources by playing in the rarified atmosphere
of a debating society. In sum, the parties' briefs and arguments on this appeal serve not to seek
but to obfuscate the truth.
Id. at 1583-84 (citations omitted).
30. 164 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1999).
31. Id. at 113.
32. Id. at 112. In similar fashion, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed
the appeal in Sioson v. Knights of Columbus, 303 F.3d 458, 459 (2d Cir. 2002) for the appel-
lant's attorney to submit "an adequate brief."
33. MODEL R. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1. In State v. Bridget, No. 70053, 1997 WL 25518,
at *3 n.3 (Ohio App. Dist. 1997), the court stated:
[W]e note that appellant counsel's brief is replete with over fifty examples of mistakes in punc-
tuation, citation and spelling. We note that appellant's counsel is a former judicial clerk with
service to this court and is urged to do credit to his former position by applying greater atten-
tion to detail in his brief writing and proofreading efforts before the Bench.
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brief that was "'a little more than fifteen unclear and ungrammatical sen-
tences, slapped together as two pages of unedited text with an unintelligible
message.' ' 35  The Supreme Court of Kentucky noted that Brown's brief
"would compare unfavorably with the majority of the handwritten pro se
pleadings prepared by laypersons which this Court reviews on a daily ba-
sis."'36 The Supreme Court of Kentucky suspended Brown from the practice
of law for sixty days for violating the state ethics rule that was identical in
wording to Model Rule 1.1.
37
In In re Hogan,38 attorney Hogan "'lack[ed] the fundamental skill of
drafting pleadings and briefs,"' with some of the passages understandable
and other passages "incomprehensible. 39  The Supreme Court of Illinois
placed Hogan on inactive status while undergoing rehabilitation. ° In 1998,
Hogan filed a Petition for Restoration to Active Status with the Hearing
Board of the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.4'
The Hearing Board recommended that Hogan's petition be denied because
Hogan had not undergone any treatment since 1987 and the petition Hogan
submitted showed that his writing was "incomprehensible.,,
42
In In re Hawkins,43 Hawkins filed documents in bankruptcy court that
were "rendered unintelligible by numerous spelling, grammatical, and typo-
graphical errors ... sufficiently serious that they amounted to incompetent
representation." 44 The Supreme Court of Minnesota found that Hawkins had
violated the state ethics rule version of rule 1.1 and publicly reprimanded
Id. In Arena Land& Investment Co. v. Petty, No. 94-4196, 1995 WL 645678, at *1 (10th
Cir. Nov. 3, 1995), Arena's third amended complaint was dismissed because it failed to
give defendants notice of the claims against them. The complaint contained "confusing
grammatical and structural problems that contained legal conclusions unsupported by
relevant facts." Id. at *2. Arena also failed to delete 'scandalous, impertinent and re-
dundant matter.. as requested by the trial court. Id. The court added that "[v]ague and
conclusory assertions, regardless of how long or how short, are inadequate to state such
causes of action." Id.
34. 14 S.W.3d 916 (Ky. 2000).
35. Id. at 918-19.
36. Id. at 919.
37. Id. at 918-919.
38. No. 98-RS-2552, 1999 WL 802922, at *1 (Ill. Att'y Registration & Disciplinary
Comm'n Feb. 15, 1998).
39. Id. at *1.
40. Id. at *3.
41. Id. at *4.
42. Id. at *4-6.
43. 502 N.W.2d 770 (Minn. 1993).
44. Id. at 770-71.
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him.45 The court ordered Hawkins to attend ten hours of legal writing and
other continuing legal education programs.g
In Henderson v. State,47 Henderson challenged the adequacy of his in-
dictment because of its poor grammar. 48 The court stated: "Though gram-
matically unintelligible, we find that the indictment is legally sufficient and
affirm, knowing full well that our decision will receive of literate persons
everywhere opprobrium as intense and widespread as it will be deserved. '49
The substantive and procedural content of legal writing must be com-
municated clearly, but it must also meet the requirement of timeliness. The
attorney must perform legal research and legal writing tasks with reasonable
promptness.
V. DILIGENCE
An attorney must comply with deadlines or be subject to sanctions.5°
Rule 1.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires the attorney to
act in a timely fashion: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client." 51 In the following case, the attorney
failed to perform adequate legal research, which resulted in the attorney fil-
ing the lawsuit after the two-year statute of limitations had passed.
In Idaho State Bar v. Tway,5" a client hired Tway in August of 1989 to
pursue a police brutality claim against the Boise Police Department.53 Tway
consulted the annotations to the Idaho Code, finding a 1981 case stating that
a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is subject to a three-year statute
of limitations. 54 Tway failed to Shepardize the case to find that in a 1986
case the Supreme Court of Idaho held that a civil rights action was subject to
a two-year statute of limitations.55 The two-year statute of limitations had
45. Id. at 771.
46. Id. at 772.
47. 445 So. 2d 1364 (Miss. 1984).
48. Id. at 1366.
49. Id. at 1365.
50. In Julien v. Zeringue, 864 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1989), the appeal was dismissed for
failure to prosecute. Id. at 1573. Julien's attorney, C. Emmet Pugh, was ordered to personally
pay $12,087 and $1350 for a portion of the other parties' costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees.
Id. at 1576. In the case, Pugh filed fourteen motions for extension of time and met one dead-
line. Id. at 1573.
51. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3.
52. 919 P.2d 323 (Idaho 1996).
53. Id. at 324.
54. Id. at 325, 327.
55. Id. at 325.
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run by the time Tway filed the case in March of 1992.6 Tway also commit-
ted some irregularities with the client's trust account and with regard to
communicating with the client; at the time, Tway was suspended from prac-
tice because of other misconduct.57 The Supreme Court of Idaho suspended
Tway from practicing law for five years.58
An attorney's failure to perform adequate and timely research not only
harms clients, but also harms the judicial system. With their ever-increasing
case loads, courts seem to deal more harshly with attorneys who file frivo-
lous lawsuits. Cases in which attorneys were disciplined for failing to anchor
the lawsuit to a basis in law and fact are discussed in the following section.
VI. BASIS IN LAW AND FACT
Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires that the
attorney provide a legal and factual foundation for a lawsuit. 59 The rule pro-
vides in relevant part: "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for
doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law." 60 Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 1 (b)(2) contains language similar in substance to the first sen-
tence of rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.61 Rule 11 al-
lows the federal court to impose severe sanctions.62
Courts have resorted to a variety of remedies when faced with attorneys
who file complaints that are groundless, or lack a factual basis. Attorneys
have been ordered to pay opposing counsel's reasonable attorney's fees and
attend continuing legal education classes on professionalism, the rules of
56. Id. at 324-25.
57. Tway, 919 P.2d. at 325-26.
58. Id. at 328.
59. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1.
60. Id. In Federated Mutual Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 920 P.2d 97 (Mont. 1996), the
court sanctioned John Deere by ordering it to pay another party's reasonable costs and attor-
ney's fees on appeal. Id. at 104. The sanctions were "on the basis of the inconsistent and
conflicting positions John Deere has taken ... its baseless claims on appeal, and its inaccurate
citations in its appellate brief." Id. In United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (lst Cir.
1990), the court refused to consider Zannino's arguments that were referenced briefly, yet not
developed. "[W]e see no reason to abandon the settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in
a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed
waived." Id. The four co-defendants, who had been tried separately, had raised various ar-
guments. Id. Zannino told the appellate court that he adopted their arguments as they applied
to him. Id. The court refused to consider their arguments. Id.
61. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 11 with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1.
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
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professional conduct, and substantive areas of law specific to the cases that
were filed.
63In Balthazar v. Atlantic City Medical Center, attorney Branella filed a
medical malpractice action in state court claiming that Balthazar's ureter was
severed during a hysterectomy.64 The state appellate court affirmed the dis-
missal of the case for the attorney's failure to file an affidavit of merit within
the required 120-day period.65 Branella subsequently filed a federal lawsuit
based on the same facts of the state lawsuit in Balthazar.66 The judge al-
lowed Branella to amend his complaint but warned him that the judge might
find Branella in violation of rule 11 if the amended complaint was based on
the same facts as the prior state court lawsuit.67 According to the court, Bra-
nella's amended complaint was "a rambling narrative, which is organized
and drafted so poorly that it is often difficult to comprehend.,
68
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (b)(2) contains language similar in
substance to the first sentence of rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.69 In Balthazar, the federal judge found Branella in violation of rule
1 (b)(2) for his failure to state a cognizable legal claim; the judge ordered
Branella to complete a continuing legal education course on Federal Practice
and Procedure and another on Attorney Professionalism and the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
70
In Carlino v. Gloucester City High School,71 a number of high school
students could not participate in graduation exercises because they became
intoxicated on the senior class trip.72 Prior to the trip, the students had signed
a statement saying that any student consuming alcoholic beverages on the
trip would be excluded from graduation exercises and would possibly not
graduate.73 Malat, the students' attorney, filed a federal lawsuit claiming that
the students' exclusion from graduation exercises violated the students' con-
stitutional rights and caused them and their parents emotional distress.
74
63. 279 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. N.J. 2003).
64. Id. at 578.
65. Id. at 579.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 594 n.18.
68. Balthazar, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 581.
69. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. I I (b)(2) with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1.
70. Balthazar, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 595.
71. No. 00-5262, 2002 WL 1877011, at *1 (3d Cir. 2002).
72. Id. at * 1.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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The district court found "a flagrant failure to conduct any legal research
violates Mr. Malat's obligations under rule 11 (b). 75 If Malat had performed
"[e]ven a casual investigation, let alone [a] reasonable inquiry" he would
have determined that a number of the claims were barred by statute. 76 The
appellate court affirmed the trial court order that Malat complete two con-
tinuing legal education courses and pay a $500 fine. 7
In Brandt v. Schal Associates, Inc.,78 the appellate court affirmed an
award of $443,564.66 in attorneys' fees and costs against plaintiff's attor-
ney. 79 The attorney filed a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO) lawsuit and pursued the lawsuit for a number of years even
though there were no facts to support it.
80
In addition to the requirement that the attorney provide a basis in law
and fact, that basis must be true. Courts do not take kindly to finding that
they have been presented with a false statement of law or fact.
VII. TRUE STATEMENT
Rule 3.3(a)(1) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits an
attorney from making a false statement to a court. 81 The rule provides: "[a]
lawyer shall not knowingly ... make a false statement of fact or law to a
tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously
made to the tribunal by the lawyer. '82 In the following cases, attorneys were
sanctioned or referred for disciplinary action when they misstated the facts.
83
In Dube v. Eagle Global Logistics, 84 the court sanctioned appellants'
law firm $71,117.75, representing the attorney's fees and costs Eagle in-
curred defending the appeal.8 5 The court stated that the briefs prepared by
75. Id.
76. Carlino,2002WL 1877011, at*l.
77. Id at *2. In Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 893 F. Supp. 827, 849-50 (N.D.
Ind. 1995), the plaintiffs had claimed quid pro quo sexual harassment and repeated the claim
numerous times even though the court found no factual or legal basis for the claim. "[Tihe
Attorneys were essentially ostriches who turned a blind eye to the law when they had no facts
to support their claim-a blindness that persisted throughout." Id. at 850. The court ordered
the two plaintiffs' attorneys sanctioned $500 each or to attend a continuing legal education
seminar "on the substantive provisions of sexual harassment." Id. at 833.
78. 960 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1992).
79. Id. at 645, 652.
80. Id. at 642.
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1).
83. Id.
83. Id.
84. 314 F.3d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 2002), vacated as moot (5th Cir. Feb. 4, 2003).
85. Id.
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the appellants' law firm were "noncompliant" as they "contained 'specious
arguments' and had 'grossly distorted' the record through the use of ellipses
to misrepresent the statements and orders of the district court. " ' 6
In Florida Breckinridge, Inc. v. Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,87 both
parties were drug companies and in the lawsuit the attorneys "engaged in a
pattern of practice designed to mislead and confuse the court regarding the
regulatory status of their clients's [sic] drugs."88 The court referred the mat-
ter to its disciplinary committee.89
In Hurlbert v. Gordon,90 the court sanctioned Hurlbert's attorneys $750
for their "laissez-faire legal briefing."'" The numerous misstatements in the
brief frustrated both the court and opposing counsel. 92 "[N]umerous refer-
ences to clerk's papers ... were either non-existent, or difficult if not impos-
sible to find, because of typographical errors in the references."93 Also, "[o]n
several occasions the pages cited were irrelevant to the factual statements for
which the references were made." 94 In addition, "in several instances case
citations contained typographical errors and in numerous other instances
cases were cited which did not support the positions for which they were
cited." 95
In Sobol v. Capital Management Consultants, Inc.,96 the Supreme Court
of Nevada sanctioned an attorney $5000 because the attorney misrepresented
a stipulated fact and quoted a portion of a case as if it were the case holding
rather than language from the dissent.97 The court termed these "statements
of guile and delusion." 9
In Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States,99 the United States
Court of International Trade contemplated holding Department of Justice
attorney Walser in contempt of court "for misquoting and failing to quote
86. Id. at 194-95.
87. Fla. Breckenridge, Inc. v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., No. 98-4606, 1999 WL 292667, at *1
(11 thCir. May 11, 1999).
88. Id. at *9.
89. Id.
90. 824 P.2d 1238 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
91. Id. at 1245-46 (quotations omitted).
92. Id. at 1245.
93. Id.
94. ld.
95. Hulbert, 824 P.2d at 1245. The court found that the attorneys had violated a court
rule that requires reference to the record. Id. "Virtually all of the factual statements made in
the argument section of the brief were made without reference to the record .. " Id.
96. 726 P.2d 335 (Nev. 1986).
97. Id. at 337.
98. Id.
99. 315 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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fully from two judicial opinions in a motion for reconsideration she signed
and filed."'00 In Precision, the government's response to Precision's motion
for summary judgment was due by May 5, 2000.101 The day prior to the
deadline, the government requested a thirty-day extension. 0 2 The court de-
nied the request on May 10 and ordered the government to file its response
"forthwith."' °3 After the government filed its response on May 22, the court
struck it as untimely.10 4 Walser then filed a motion for reconsideration,
which contained several quoted passages from cases in which the courts at-
tempted to define the term "forthwith."'
0 5
The quoted passages in the motion for reconsideration omitted a citation
to a 1900 United States Supreme Court case and a quotation from the case,
"[i]n matters of practice and pleading ['forthwith'] is usually construed, and
sometimes defined by rule of court, as within twenty-four hours."' 0 6 The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court's formal
reprimand of Walser, stating: "She violated Rule 11 because, in quoting
from and citing published opinions, she distorted what the opinions stated by
leaving out significant portions of the citations or cropping one of them, and
failed to show that she and not the court has supplied the emphasis in one of
them."
10 7
The obligation to perform adequate legal research carries with it the
ethical requirement that the attorney must disclose adverse authority that the
attorney knew or should have known. The following cases involve attorneys
who knew or should have known of adverse authority because either the at-
torney or the attorney's office previously had been involved in the case that
was the basis of the adverse authority.
VIII. DISCLOSURE OF ADVERSE AUTHORITY
Rule 3.3(a)(2) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires the
attorney to disclose adverse authority to the court. 0 8 The rule provides: "A
lawyer shall not knowingly.., fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority
100. Id. at 1347.
101. Id. at 1348.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Precision Specialty Metals, Inc., 315 F.3d at 1348.
105. Id.
106. Dickerman v. N. Trust Co., 176 U.S. 181, 193 (1900).
107. Precision Specialty Metals, Inc., 315 F.3d at 1357.
108. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2).
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in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to
the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel." 10 9
In Massey v. Prince George's County,'10 the government attorney failed
to disclose an adverse case in which the government had been a party.' 1 The
court ordered Prince George's County to show cause why it had not cited
Kopf v. Wing,' an on-point case that was directly adverse to the county. I
The court found it "troublesome" that the county had also been a defendant
in Kopf, but had failed to cite the case to the court.' 14 The court rejected the
county's second answer to the order to show cause, that Kopf did not make
new law and the Kopf facts are distinguishable from the Massey facts.' 15 The
county also commented that the county attorney who handled Kopf was a
different attorney than the attorney representing the county in Massey.
16
The court responded that the attorney's failure to cite Kopf violated rules 1.1
and 1.3 in that the attorney had an obligation to "pursu[e] applicable legal
authority in [a] timely fashion." '117
In a more disturbing case, the attorney failed to inform the court of a
controlling, but adverse case.118 The court was understandably upset by this
omission because the attorney had been counsel to one of the parties in the
case.1 19 In Nachbaur v. American Transit Insurance Co.,12° Nachbaur sued
the driver's insurance company for injuries Nachbaur, while a pedestrian,
allegedly received in an automobile accident.' 2 1 On appeal, the court stated
that the pedestrian was not the intended beneficiary of the insurance policy
and could not maintain an action alleging a bad faith breach of the insurance
109. Id. In Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Guthrie, No. 90-C-04050, 1990 WL 205945, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1990), the court warned defense counsel of a near violation of the Illinois
ethics rule equivalent of Model Rule 3.3. "This failure to disclose relevant legal authority
borders perilously close to a violation of the legal profession's ethical canons." Id. The attor-
ney had cited to a line of cases discussing the rule of law but had failed to explain the excep-
tion to the rule, which was applicable to the case under consideration. Id. The attorney had
quoted from a case but omitted the sentence following the quoted language, which discussed
the exception to the rule of law. Id.
110. 918 F. Supp. 905 (D. Md. 1996).
111. Id. at 906.
112. 942 F.2d 265 (4th Cir. 1991).
113. Massey, 918 F. Supp. at 906.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 907-08.
116. Id. at 906-07.
117. Id. at908.
118. Nachbaur v. Am. Transit Ins. Co., 752 N.Y.S.2d 605, 607 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002),
appeal dismissed 785 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 2003).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 605.
121. Id. at 606.
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policy.1 22 The court chastised Moore, the plaintiffs attorney, for failure to
cite to adverse authority. 123  "The failure is especially glaring in this case
since plaintiffs attorney represented the losing appellant in Bettan ... a Sec-
ond Department case issued a matter of weeks before plaintiffs reply brief
on the instant appeal was submitted, which precisely addresses five out of six
of plaintiffs causes of action ....
Courts have no difficulty punishing attorneys whose conduct is so bla-
tantly unprofessional. In the heat of litigation, the attorney may be tempted
to ridicule or impugn the integrity of opposing counsel. Such ad hominem
attacks are unprofessional, if groundless, and also unethical, as discussed in
the following section.
IX. STATEMENT CONCERNING OTHERS
Rule 4.4(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits an at-
torney from making baseless accusations about others.1 25 In the following
case, the attorney was sanctioned for making groundless accusations against
opposing counsel. 26 The rule provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer
shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass,
delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that
violate the legal rights of such a person.'
' 27
122. Id.
123. Nachbaur, 752 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
124. Id. at 607. Failure to cite to adverse authority seems to have been the least of
Moore's worries. Moore's conduct would be a violation of rules 1.1, 3.1, 3.3(a), 4.4(a), and
8.2(a). Moore failed to provide citations in his appellate brief and the court characterized the
appeal as frivolous. Id. "The 4 1/2 and 3 1/2-page appellate briefs submitted by plaintiffs
attorney, completely devoid of relevant discussion, are vividly reflective of the appeal's utter
lack of even arguable merit." Id. In addition, Moore insulted opposing counsel, made un-
founded allegations concerning the trial court, and made inaccurate statements concerning the
record. Id. The court stated that:
[P]laintiffs attorney replicates the conduct sanctioned in the Supreme
Court by repeating the insult directed at opposing counsel, adds to that in-
sult with new invective, makes baseless, serious accusations against the
motion court, makes unsupported accusations against defendant, seriously
mischaracterizes the record and makes no reference to recent adverse au-
thority.
Nachbaur, 752 N.Y.S.2d at 607. The appellate court affirmed sanctions of $5000 against
Moore and ordered Moore to pay defendant's reasonable attorneys' fees for defending against
the appeal. Id. at 606.
125. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a).
126. Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1308 (1 1th Cir. 2002).
127. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a).
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Attorney Munson filed a federal lawsuit, Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging
Co.,128 claiming that Tenneco had discriminated against Thomas on the basis
of his race. 29 At the trial level, Munson filed documents containing "insult-
ing remarks about defense counsel's physical traits and demeanor; remarks
that called into question defense counsel's fitness as a member of the bar;
thinly veiled physical threats directed at defense counsel; a racial slur; and
unsubstantiated claims that defense counsel was a racist."' 3° The district
court censured and reprimanded Munson. 131 In addition, the court ordered
any further similar documents filed by Munson were to be stricken, after
notice and opportunity for hearing.
132
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed what
the district court had done under its inherent power, noting that Munson had
"exhibited a pattern of baseless accusations and invective."' 133 In addition,
the court noted that in Munson's appellate brief, she had "made insulting and
demeaning remarks about the district judge, such as by calling him 'a protec-
torate of white America."",134 One of the ethics rules referenced by the Elev-
enth Circuit was rule 4.4 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct,135
which is identical in wording to rule 4.4 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. 1
36
Almost unimaginable is the practice of some attorneys of making base-
less accusations about a judge. This conduct is an ethics violation, as dis-
cussed in the following section.
X. STATEMENT REGARDING JUDGE
Rule 8.2(a) prohibits an attorney from impugning the integrity of the
judge or other court personnel. 137 The rule provides: "A lawyer shall not
128. 293 F.3d 1306 (1lth Cir. 2002).
129. Id. at 1308.
130. Id. at 1331.
131. Id. at 1308.
132. Id. at 1329.
133. Thomas, 293 F.3d at 1331.
134. Id. This conduct could have violated the ethics rule discussed in the following sec-
tion.
135. Id. at 1323.
136. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a); GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.1 (a).
137. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.2(a). In Henry v. Eberhard, 832 S.W.2d 467,
474 (Ark. 1992), the court struck a number of pages from the appellants' brief because the
pages contained "inflammatory and disrespectful" statements concerning the lower courts. In
State v. Rossmanith, 430 N.W.2d 93, 94 (Wis. 1988), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin did not
sanction the appellant's attorney, although it could have for disparaging the lower court.
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make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard
as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge,
adjudicatory officer or public legal officer .... ,138
In In re Wilkins,139 the Supreme Court of Indiana decided that attorney
Wilkins should be suspended from the practice of law because of language in
a brief.140 In his brief, which supported a petition to transfer the case to the
Supreme Court of Indiana, Wilkins criticized the lower court.' 4 ' A portion of
the text of the brief stated:
The Court of Appeals' published Opinion in this case is quite dis-
turbing. It is replete with misstatements of material facts, it mis-
applies controlling case law, and it does not even bother to discuss
relevant cases that are directly on point. Clearly, such a decision
should be reviewed by this Court. Not only does it work an injus-
tice on appellant Michigan Mutual Insurance Company, it estab-
lishes dangerous precedent in several areas of the law. This will
undoubtedly create additional problems in future cases.
42
The last sentence of the above-quoted text was footnoted at note 2.143
Note 2 stated: "Indeed, the Opinion is so factually and legally inaccurate that
one is left to wonder whether the Court of Appeals was determined to find
for Appellee Sports, Inc., and then said whatever was necessary to reach that
conclusion (regardless of whether the facts or the law supported its deci-
sion)." 144
In Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 145 an attorney ac-
cused a judge of improprieties regarding the attorney's mother's estate. 46
When the attorney appealed the lower court's decision to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, the
attorney fashioned the petition as a letter to the lower court:
You are probably quite smug about your decision in this case .... You think you managed to
avoid deciding the case all together. Sorry I can't congratulate you on this clever evasion of a
precedential statutory interpretation. This may come as something of a shock, but you didn't
avoid an interpretation of the insanity law with a major impact in this state .... If all of this
seems theoretical, think again .... I will, of course, ask the supreme court to grant review.
But between you and me, that should not be necessary. You should withdraw your decision in
this case .... You should do the job yourselves.
Id. at 93 n.2.
138. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.2(a).
139. 777 N.E.2d 714 (Ind. 2002), stay granted, 778 N.E.2d 1290 (Ind. 2002).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at n.2.
144. Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d at 715-16.
145. No. CV010510911S, 2003 WL 22293599, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 2003).
146. Id.
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The attorney was sanctioned by reprimand even though the attorney was not
representing a party to the case.147 Attorney Joseph Notopoulos formerly had
some disagreements with Judge Berman regarding Notopoulos's mother's
estate.148 After the case was concluded, Notopoulos sent a letter to a member
of the court staff criticizing Judge Berman.149 The attorney claimed that
Judge Berman "has clearly prostituted the integrity of his office and is pres-
ently running it as a financial spoils system for [his] cronies."'' 50 The attor-
ney stated that:
[H]ardly all-inclusive of these abuses is his reprehensible extortion
from the undersigned, without legal authority, of money for his
crony[,] ... resorting to threats to impose upon the undersigned a
substantial conservator's cash bond or to dispatch a psychiatrist to
our residence to examine my mother and bill the estate .... 151
The attorney claimed that the judge placed "the financial greed of his cronies
above my mother's best interest and welfare with utter contempt for applica-
ble requirements of the Connecticut General Statutes to act in her best inter-
est., 15  The attorney added that "[b]ecause Mr. Berman has become not
merely an embarrassment to this community but a demonstrated financial
predator of its incapacitated and often dying elderly whose interests he is
charged with the protection," the attorney asked that the judge resign. 153
Notopoulos was charged with violating rules 8.2(a) and 8.4(4) of the
Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct.54 On appeal, the court dis-
agreed with Notopoulos's argument that he could not have violated rule
8.2(a) because he was acting in his individual capacity as a relative rather
than in his representative capacity as an attorney. 55 The court found that the
rule applies to an attorney, even when the attorney is not representing a cli-
ent.' 56 The court also found that Notopoulos had violated rules 8.2(a) and
147. Id. at *3.
148. Id. at*1.
149. Id.
150. Notopoulos, 2003 WL 22293599, at *1.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. The language of rule 8.4(4) of the state rules coincides with rule 8.4(d) of the
Model Rules. Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules is discussed in the following section.
154. See id. Notopoulos had been charged under rule 3.5(3) with disrupting a tribunal.
Notopoulos, 2003 WL 22293599, at *1. The court found that Notopoulos had not violated
rule 3.5(3) because there was no clear and convincing evidence that he had intended to disrupt
a tribunal. Id. at *5.
155. Id at *3.
156. Id.
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8.4(4) because there was no basis in fact for the allegations against the judge
in Notopoulos's letter.157
False statements, baseless allegations, and misrepresentations of fact are
parallel to the theft of another person's work through plagiarism. Plagiarism
committed by an attorney reflects poorly on the legal profession and is con-
trary to the ethics rules. The following section discusses a case in which an
attorney was sanctioned for plagiarism.
XI. HONESTY
Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires the attor-
ney to refrain from conduct reflecting adversely on the attorney's position as
an officer of the court.15 8 In the following case, the attorney violated the rule
by plagiarizing a major portion of a brief filed with the court. 159 The rule
provides in relevant part:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the
acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or mis-
representation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice."'
In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v.
Lane,16' attorney Lane submitted a post-trial brief to the court and requested
$16,000 in attorney's fees for writing the brief.162 Later it was discovered
that Lane plagiarized a treatise in writing the brief.163 "The legal argument of
Lane's post-trial brief consisted of eighteen pages of plagiarized material,
including both text and footnotes, from the treatise .... Lane cherry-picked
the relevant portions and renumbered the footnotes to reflect the altered
157. Id. at *4--5.
158. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4.
159. See Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Lane, 642 N.W.2d 296
(Iowa 2002).
160. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4.
161. 642 N.W.2d 296.
162. Id. at 298.
163. Id. at 298-99.
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text." The similarity between the treatise and the brief was so great that
the "brief does not reveal any independent labor or thought in the legal ar-
gument."'
65
The Ethics Board charged Lane with violating the state ethics rule that
is similar in wording to subsections (b), (c), and (d) of rule 8.4 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.166 The Ethics Board recommended a three
month suspension for Lane from the practice of law; however, the Supreme
Court of Iowa suspended Lane for six months because Lane had "jeopardized
the integrity of the Bar and the public's trust in the legal profession.
1 67
XII. ANALYSIS OF A CASE WITH A COMBINATION OF ETHICAL ERRORS
Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corp. 161 is a case that illustrates a number ofdeficiencies in the attorneys' performance. In the case, seaman Bradshaw
164. Id. at 300.
165. Id. Lane was not an isolated incident, and other courts have dealt with attorneys who
plagiarized. In In re Harper, 645 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), Harper enrolled
in an L.L.M. program at Pace University School of Law. Harper plagiarized a research paper
in one of his classes by submitting a published article as his own writing. Id. Because of
Harper's remorse, Harper's otherwise good reputation, and the fact that the plagiarism was a
single incident, the court censured Harper. Id. at 847-48. In In re Hinden, 654 A.2d 864, 865
(D.C. 1995), Hinden had already been censured by the Supreme Court of Illinois for plagiariz-
ing, by incorporating twenty-three pages of an article word-for-word into Hinden's chapter in
a treatise. The District of Columbia Court decided to censure Hinden also. Id. In In re
Steinberg, 620 N.Y.S.2d 345, 346 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), Steinberg submitted two writing
samples, a requirement of the New York Court of Appeals to be appointed to represent those
charged with felonies. When it was discovered that the writing samples were not his,
Steinberg was publicly censured. Id. In In re Zbiegien, 433 N.W.2d 871, 872 (Minn. 1988),
Zbiegien plagiarized almost all of twelve pages of a research paper he wrote for his fourth
year in law school by including passages of law review articles without crediting the sources.
The court considered the plagiarism a "single incident" and decided that the incident would
not keep Zbiegien from being admitted to the bar. Id. at 877. In In re Lamberis, 443 N.E.2d
549, 550 (Ill. 1982), attorney Lamberis enrolled in an LL.M. program at Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law. Pages thirteen through fifty-nine of his ninety-three page master's
thesis incorporated portions of two books without crediting the authors. Id. Northwestern
expelled Lamberis. Id. at 550-552. Before the Supreme Court of Illinois, Lamberis argued
that he should not be disciplined because he was not practicing law when the incident oc-
curred. Id. at 551. The court disagreed and decided that Lamberis should be censured. Id. at
551-553. In Frith v. State, 325 N.E.2d 186, 188 (Ind. 1975), Frith's brief contained a collec-
tion of material plagiarized from other sources, including ten pages of an American Law Re-
ports annotation. The court briefly mentioned the plagiarism and moved on to consider the
rest of the case, noting that attorneys' fees may take the plagiarism into account. Id. at 188-
89.
166. Lane, 642 N.W.2d at 299.
167. Id. at 297, 302.
168. 147 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
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alleged that he had been injured while working on a ship docked at Phillips
Petroleum Company's dock.'69 Bradshaw sued his employer, Unity Marine,
within two years of the injury and sued Phillips within three years of the in-
jury. 7' The case came before the court on Phillips' motion for summary
judgment in which Phillips claimed that the action against Phillips was
barred by the state law two-year statute of limitations rather than the mari-
time law three-year statute of limitations. 7'
Bradshaw provided no details about the type of injury he incurred or
how he was injured."' Phillips failed to support its motion with relevant
authority as to why the two-year statute of limitations applied and provided
no legal analysis of its argument. 73 In response, Bradshaw failed to direct
the court to relevant case law, gave an incorrect citation, lacked a pinpoint
reference to a case that was not on-point, and failed to provide legal analysis
of Bradshaw's claim against Phillips.'74
The court quickly resolved the motion for summary judgment by citing
to two cases from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 75 Those cases
stated that any duty of the dock owner to the seaman is under state law and
not maritime law. 176  Based on those cases, the court concluded that the
Texas two-year statute of limitations would apply and granted Phillips's mo-
tion for summary judgment. 177
The attorneys had the bad luck of being before Samuel B. Kent, a fed-
eral judge for the Southern District of Texas. 78 Judge Kent has been nick-
named "Judge Seinfeld" for his humorous legal opinions.'79 The word "criti-
cism" is mild compared to what Judge Kent metes out to the attorneys.80
"[T]his case involves two extremely likable lawyers, who have together de-
livered some of the most amateurish pleadings ever to cross the hallowed
causeway into Galveston ... ,,181 The judge explains that the:
169. Id. at 669.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Bradshaw, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 671-72.
174. Id. at 670-71.
175. Id. at 671.
176. Id
177. Id at 671-72.
178. Bradshaw, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 669.
179. Jenny B. Davis, The Limelight Rules: Some Celebrity Judges Just Can't Help Getting
Big Heaps of Attention, 88 A.B.A. J. 28, 28 (Apr. 2002).
180. See Bradshaw, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 668.
181. Id. at 670.
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[Aittorneys have obviously entered into a secret pact--complete
with hats, handshakes and cryptic words-to draft their pleadings
entirely in crayon on the back sides of gravy-stained paper place
mats, in the hope that the Court would be so charmed by their
child-like efforts that their utter dearth of legal authorities in their
briefing would go unnoticed.11
2
The judge explained relevant case law regarding whether state law or
maritime law applied in one paragraph. 183 This contrasts with the attorneys
who were unable to provide relevant law and legal analysis. 8 4 "Take heed
and be suitably awed, oh boys and girls-the Court was able to state the is-
sue and its resolution in one paragraph ... despite dozens of pages of gibber-
ish from the parties to the contrary!' 85 In the following paragraph, Judge
Kent concluded that the two-year statute of limitations applied and granted
Phillips's motion for summary judgment. 186 "[H]aving received no useful
guidance whatever from either party, the Court has endeavored, primarily
based upon its affection for both counsel, but also out of its own sense of
morbid curiosity, to resolve what it perceived to be the legal issue pre-
sented.'
18 7
Even though the propriety of Judge Kent's opinion may be ques-
tioned, 8 8 Bradshaw received wide circulation on the Internet and was pub-
lished in Legal Times. 189 From Bradshaw, one may glean that the perform-
ance of the attorneys was deficient in a number of respects. 9  They appar-
ently failed to perform adequate research, and their writing was deficient.' 91
Neither attorney developed the analysis of the legal argument. 192  Brad-
shaw's attorney failed to provide basic facts concerning Bradshaw's injury,
182. Id.
183. Id. at 671-72.
184. Id. at 670-71.
185. Bradshaw, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 672 n.3.
186. Id. at 672.
187. Id.
188. Steven Lubet, Bullying from the Bench, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 11, 11 (2001). Professor
Lubet claimed that Judge Kent engaged in bullying. Id. at 12. "By belittling the lawyers who
appear before him, Judge Kent used his authority to humiliate people who-in the courtroom
environment-are comparatively powerless." Id. at 12. "[L]aughter at the ill fate of others-
even when they are bunglers-just enables further victimization. Judge Kent, and others like
him, need to know that ridicule isn't funny. It's just mean. It isn't judging, it's just showing
off." Id. at 16.
189. Id. at I In.1.
190. See Bradshaw, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 670-72.
191. Id.at670-71.
192. Id.
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provided an incorrect case citation, and omitted a pinpoint reference to rele-
vant material in a forty-page brief.
193
The Bradshaw attorneys faced humiliation, but they also could have
faced discipline for violating some of the ethics rules discussed in this arti-
cle. 19
4
XIII. CONCLUSION
Although seemingly minor, grammatical errors may indicate that there
is a problem with the substance of the document, and more scrutiny is war-
ranted. The attorney's stock in trade is a good reputation, and problems with
legal research or errors in citation may contribute to the attorney's loss of
credibility. The examples of ethics violations contained in this article show
that even tiny problems with legal research and legal writing leave the attor-
ney open for ethics violations.
Imagine the attorney's chagrin at reading a case in which the attorney
was sanctioned and knowing that the case is a lasting legacy, to be read by
generations of attorneys. One court gave the following career advice: "The
Attorneys should give serious consideration to not practicing in the United
States District Court until such time as they have demonstrably enhanced
their practice skills."' 95 Imagine the client reading one of these cases. The
client would be bound to lose faith in the attorney and may feel that a legal
malpractice lawsuit is warranted. As far as the public is concerned, the at-
torney's conduct reflects poorly on the legal system.
The majority of attorneys conduct themselves ethically. They faithfully
perform any necessary legal research and try to write well. As shown by the
cases discussed in this article, however, there are a number of attorneys
whose legal research and writing falls below the standard expected by the
client and the court.
To a diligent, ethically-minded attorney, the acts discussed in this article
for which attorneys were disciplined are almost unimaginable. This conduct
represents one end of the spectrum. Even so, the competent attorney should
be mindful of these cases and take them as a reminder of the legal research
and legal writing obligations owed the client and the court. Often, an attor-
ney is pressured by a looming deadline or by the client to take shortcuts.
Skimping on research or writing can lead to ethics violations. A momentary
lapse of good judgment may place an attorney in the same predicament.
193. Id. at 670-71.
194. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4; Bradshaw, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 670-72.
195. Vandeventer, 893 F. Supp. at 859 n.43.
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As an officer of the court, the attorney owes a duty to the judge. Courts
attempt to make the right decisions and rely on attorneys to provide the court
with information. This relationship is subverted by the attorney who does
not fulfill his or her obligation to perform adequate legal research and write
well. An officer of the court should help the judge, and not add to the
judge's workload. When reading the cases cited in this article, one can feel
the frustration of the court.
The duty to the client is to provide the best representation possible.
Obviously, the attorneys in the cases cited in this article performed a disser-
vice to their clients by providing substandard representation. In addition,
poor attorney performance damages the public's respect for the legal system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of jurisdiction is an essential legal question. "The foundation
of jurisdiction is physical power."' When a court lacks jurisdiction, it is void
of the inherent power to decide a case.2 One particular form of jurisdiction,
* The author is a graduate of Vassar College and a spring 2006 J.D. candidate from
Nova.
1. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
2. Johnson v. McKinnon, 45 So. 23, 25 (Fla. 1907). Early Roman notions of jurisdic-
tional procedure were by "voluntary" submission. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule
of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 296
(1956). "Inducement and force" were the jurisdictional tools of later Roman courts. Id. Ju-
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personal jurisdiction, has been a topic of controversy and litigation since
before courts existed in America.' The primary inquiry involved in these
disputes is whether the court has the power to hale a particular defendant into
that court, subject them to proceedings, and enforce the will of the court and
the court's judgment upon him or her.4
However, as complicated as personal jurisdictional issues may become,
when these controversies intersect with other jurisdictional issues, the scope
of the litigation tends to become even more confusing and problematic. In-
deed, another form of jurisdiction which may add to this morass is appellate
jurisdiction. "Appellate jurisdiction is the power to take cognizance of and
review proceedings in an inferior court... ," Thus, when issues of personal
jurisdiction intersect and collide with issues of appellate jurisdiction, the
difficulties faced by litigants and courts are amplified.
In Thomas v. Silvers,6 the Supreme Court of Florida faced such a tan-
gled web.7 This paper will focus on Thomas and its interpretation of the in-
tersection of personal jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction. The procedural
technicalities underlying the legal framework for the Thomas decision are
intricate, and therefore it is necessary to provide substantial background on
the relevant law. Thus, part II of this paper will summarize the substantive
elements of personal jurisdiction and their relation to service of process. Part
II will also illustrate essential differences in the nature of motions to quash
service. Part III of this paper will briefly summarize the history and purpose
of the intermediate courts in Florida, the district courts of appeal. Addition-
ally, part III will examine the scope of appellate jurisdiction in Florida. Part
IV of this paper will discuss the mechanics of the writ of certiorari and the
interlocutory appeal, and will demonstrate how these tools are used in con-
nection with issues of personal jurisdiction. Part V of this paper will assess
the case history behind the ultimate decision in Thomas by exploring the
delicate balance between appellate jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, and
risdiction in American courts is based on the Constitution of the United Sates. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2.
3. Joseph J. Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of Quasi
in Rem andIn Personam Principles, 1978 DuKE L.J. 1147, 1148 (1978).
4. Richard W. Garnett, Once More Into the Maze: United States v. Lopez, Tribal Self-
Determination, and Federal Conspiracy Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 72 N.D. L. REV. 433,
438 (1996) (citing A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 944 (8th Cir. 1996)) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting) (noting in the dissent that "the power to adjudicate everyday disputes occurring
within a nation's own territory is among the most basic and indispensable manifestations of
sovereign power").
5. Williams v. State ex rel. Nuccio, 122 So. 523, 524 (Fla. 1929).
6. 748 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1999).
7. Id.
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how subtle decisions in one realm can produce adverse, unforeseen effects in
the other. Part VI of this paper will focus on Thomas itself, and will explain
how the Supreme Court of Florida resolved the conflict between the district
courts of appeal. Specifically, part VI will look to a recent amendment to the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and show how this change makes the deci-
sion in Thomas an equitable one. Finally, part VI will explore additional
policy reasons supporting the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Tho-
mas. Part VII will conclude by stating that Thomas was correctly decided
because time limits for service should not be construed as an essential ele-
ment of personal jurisdiction.
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. Service of Process and Its Relation to Personal Jurisdiction
"Jurisdiction is simply power.",8 A primary form of territorial jurisdic-
tion is personal, or in personam, jurisdiction.9 Personal jurisdiction is the
power of a court to compel a party to litigate and enforce judgment upon that
party in that particular forum.° Under Garrett v. Garrett, II Florida's "power
to exercise personal jurisdiction is limited by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution., 12 For a court to
have personal jurisdiction over a party in Florida, the party must meet certain
criteria.
These criteria are: 1) being physically present in the state of Florida; 3
2) having status as a Florida domiciliary; 14 3) having previously agreed to
8. Johnson, 45 So. at 25.
9. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL
175 (Univ. Casebook Series ed., 8th ed. 1999). The other major forms of territorial jurisdic-
tion are in rem jurisdiction and quasi in rem jurisdiction. Id. These forms of territorial juris-
diction concern property. Id. Although each is important in their own right, a discussion of
these forms of jurisdiction is outside the scope of this discussion.
10. Johnson, 45 So. at 25.
11. 668 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1996).
12. Id. at 993 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 108
(1987)).
13. See generally Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1257-58 (Fla. 2002) (discussing
acts which subject a party to personal jurisdiction in Florida in the absence of physical pres-
ence); see also Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (holding that a Cali-
fornia court's exertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant who was physically present
"constitutes due process").
14. Perez v. Perez, 164 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (noting that to
establish domicile for the purpose of asserting personal jurisdiction, the defendant must have a
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submit to jurisdiction by contract; 5 4) waiving objections to the assertion of
jurisdiction; 6 5) submitting voluntarily to jurisdiction; 7 or 6) possessing
minimum contacts. 8 The minimum contacts test in Florida is somewhat
elaborate and requires further explanation.
Under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 9 a prospective party must
have "certain minimum contacts with [Florida] such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice."' 20 An additional requirement under International Shoe Co. is articu-
lated in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.21 Under Woodson, a
court can assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant when the defendant
"purposefully avails"' 22 himself or herself of the laws of Florida and when the
assertion of personal jurisdiction is "reasonable. 23 Finally, the court will
apply the balancing test provided by Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz2 This
test evaluates: 1) "the burden on the defendant"; 2) "the forum State's inter-
est in adjudicating the dispute"; 3) "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining con-
venient and effective relief"; 4) "the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies"; and 5) "the shared
residence in Florida coupled with the intent to remain in Florida or for an "indefinite period')
(citations omitted)).
15. Vacation Ventures, Inc. v. Holiday Promotions, Inc., 687 So. 2d 286, 288-89 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (cautioning that although parties my subject themselves to personal
jurisdiction through contract, forum selection clauses must also satisfy Florida's long-arm
statute and meet the minimum contacts test).
16. FLA. R. CwV. P. 1.140(h)(2) (ordering that a jurisdictional defense is waived unless
raised by motion, answer, or reply).
17. Beverly Beach Props., Inc. v. Nelson, 68 So. 2d 604, 608 (Fla. 1953) (noting that the
assertion of personal jurisdiction may be acquired through the voluntary appearance of a
party).
18. Harris v. Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, P.C., 831 So. 2d 706, 708 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2002) (citing Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989)) (noting that
the federal due process test for minimum contacts must be satisfied for the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction).
19. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Since Florida courts are bound by decisions from the United
States Supreme Court, these tests have been adopted in Florida. See Nat'l Alcoholism Pro-
grams v. Slocum, 648 So. 2d 234, 236 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Venetian Salami
Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989)) (holding that the requirements of the
minimum contacts test and Florida's long-arm statute must be satisfied for the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant).
20. Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
21. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
22. Id. at 297 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
23. Id. at 292 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317).
24. 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
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interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.
25
As this "minimum contacts" test is applied to non-resident defendants,
there is an additional requirement. Courts must look to Florida's long-arm
statute2 6 to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant is legislatively authorized.27 Not only must it be fair to subject a
prospective party to a suit in Florida, but this prospective party must also be
informed of the pending litigation.
In order to be informed of the pending litigation, the party must be
properly served.28 In the absence of proper service of process, a judgment is
void.29 The Supreme Court of Florida held that "the real purpose of the ser-
vice of summons ad respondendum is to give proper notice to the defendant
in the case that he is answerable to the claim of plaintiff and, therefore, to
vest jurisdiction in the court entertaining the controversy.'3O In Bedford
Computer Corp. v. Graphic Press, Inc.,3 the Supreme Court of Florida held
that
[t]he object of process is to warn the defendant that an action or
proceeding has been commenced against him by the plaintiff, that
he must appear within a time and at a place named and make such
defense as he has, and that, in default of his so doing, a judgment
will be asked or taken against him in a designated sum or for the
other relief specified.32
25. Id. (quoting Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292).
26. FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (2003).
27. Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 584 n.4 (Fla.
2000) (noting assertion of personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendant must fall within
statutorily proscribed provision of section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes).
28. Valdosta Milling Co. v. Garretson, 54 So. 2d 196, 197 (Fla. 1951).
29. Id. (holding "[n]otice and an opportunity to defend is fundamental in our jurispru-
dence"); see also Taylor v. Bowles, 570 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
((citing Li v. Li, 442 So. 2d 327, 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983)) (holding "[w]hen a party
has no notice of a trial date, the trial court abuses its discretion when it proceeds with a final
hearing and enters final judgment")).
30. Klosenski v. Flaherty, 116 So. 2d 767, 768 (Fla. 1959) (alteration in original) (quot-
ing State ex rel. Merritt v. Heffeman, 195 So. 145, 147 (Fla. 1940)); see also Shepard v.
Kelly, 2 Fla. 634, 655 (1849) ("[A] summons, regularly served, as required by the [statute or
rules], gives the court jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.").
31. 484 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1986).
32. Id. at 1227 (citing Gribbel v. Henderson, 10 So. 2d 734, 739 (Fla. 1942)). See also
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("An elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is
notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
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Thus, the form of service of process is also significant as it is central to
process' purpose: notice.33 When a party believes that service of process has
not been perfected in compliance with the relevant provisions, the party may
file a motion to quash service.
B. Essential Differences in the Nature of Motions to Quash Service
In Florida, motions to quash service of process may be filed either in an
answer or before a responsive pleading.34 As one of the seven enumerated
defenses of rule 1.140(b)35 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the de-
fense of "lack of jurisdiction over the person"3 6 may be raised by motion.
Pursuant to section 48.031 (1)(a) 37 of the Florida Statutes,
[s]ervice of original processes is made by delivering a copy of it to
the person to be served with a copy of the complaint, petition, or
other initial pleading or paper or by leaving the copies at his or her
usual place of abode with any person residing therein who is 15
years of age or older and informing the person their contents. Mi-
nors who are or have been married shall be served as provided in
this section.38
As previously discussed, service of process is an essential element of
personal jurisdiction. Without valid service, the court cannot exercise juris-
diction over the person. 39 Thus, when service of process does not purport-
edly comply with the relevant procedural guidelines of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure, the issue of "lack of jurisdiction over the person ' is val-
idly raised. These motions to quash service allege deficiencies in the pur-
ported service of process upon the party. Yet in the realm of jurisdiction
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." (citations
omitted)).
33. Bedford Computer Corp., 484 So. 2d at 1227. Personal service is the preferred form
of service of process. Id. The Florida Statutes also provide for substitute service, but it is less
preferred because it is less likely to effect the goal of process. Id.
34. See Viking Superior Corp. v. W.T. Grant Co., 212 So. 2d 331, 334 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1968) (noting that express statutory construction of rule 1.140 authorizes defenses to
service of process to be made prior to a responsive pleading).
35. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.140(b).
36. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.140(b)(2).
37. FLA. STAT. § 48.03 1(1)(a) (2003).
38. Id.
39. See Klosenski v. Flaherty, 116 So. 2d 767, 768 (Fla 1959).
40. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(2).
41. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b) ("The grounds on which any of the enumerated defenses...
shall be stated specifically and with particularity in the responsive pleading or motion.").
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over the person, these allegations of insufficiency of process span a wide
scope of legal reasoning.
On the one hand, the alleged deficiencies pursuant to section
48.031 (2)(a)41 of the Florida Statutes might point to the fact that the defen-
dant was improperly served because the process was delivered to an address
where the defendant did not reside.43 Likewise, the deficiency alleged could
be that a person not authorized to accept service on behalf of the defendant
was served and therefore, the purported service was invalid.' On the other
hand, the alleged deficiency could be that the plaintiff failed to serve the
defendant within the 120-day time limit as provided by rule 1.070(j). 45
All of these alleged deficiencies, if proven, would violate a provision of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and could warrant service of process to
be quashed.46 This paper will argue that violating the time requirement of
rule 1.0706) 47 is fundamentally different from violating the other provisions.
Rule 1.0700)" is different because it fails to go to the essential requirement
of service of process: notice. The fact that service is late pursuant to rule
1.0700) 49 does not mean that the party did not receive notice. It is simply
late notice. In contrast, the other violations mentioned all go to the essential
nature of service of process. A party who is unauthorized to receive service
of process may have an ulterior motive. Specifically, an estranged husband
may not inform the former wife of the pending litigation.5" Likewise, deliv-
ering service upon someone who is unauthorized by section 48.031(2)(a)5 to
receive service goes to the essence of notice because the unauthorized person
may neither appreciate the gravity of the documents nor care about the po-
tential defendant's welfare. In turn, the unauthorized person may not inform
the true party against whom the litigation is pending.
42. § 48.03 1(2)(a) ("Substitute service may be made on the spouse of the person to be
served ... if the spouse and person to be served are residing together in the same dwelling.").
43. Montero v. DuVal Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Jacksonville, 581 So. 2d 938, 939 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that substituted service upon wife at estranged husband's
home when she did not reside there was invalid).
44. Berne v. Beznos, 819 So. 2d 235, 239 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that as
concierge of apartment building was not a person who resided at the apartment building, con-
cierge was unauthorized to receive service of process for defendant and service of process
should have been quashed).
45. See Thomas v. Silvers, 748 So. 2d 263, 263 (Fla. 1999).
46. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.0700).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Montero, 581 So. 2d at 939.
51. § 48.031(2)(a).
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This distinction between these rule violations is crucial. As such, the
Florida District Courts of Appeal are weary of entertaining all interlocutory
appeals and must distinguish between them as the Supreme Court of Florida
did in Thomas.52 Yet, in order to understand the context in which these inter-
locutory appeals occur, it is necessary to further expand upon appellate juris-
diction in Florida.
III. THE APPELLATE SYSTEM IN FLORIDA
Florida created a two-tier appellate system in 1956. 53 Previous to this
amendment to the Florida Constitution, only the Supreme Court of Florida
conducted appellate review of trial court cases.54 The need for additional
courts arose because the workload of the court system in Florida became
unmanageable.55 Additionally, commentators have suggested that appellate
courts in Florida, as well as in other states, came into existence partially to
correct "routine error.,5 6 With the more rudimentary tasks apportioned to
these mid-level courts, the highest court in the state can concentrate on more
important and urgent legal issues.57 However, even today a significant con-
sideration in constructing effective judicial administration is creating a sys-
tem that effectively and efficiently apportions workloads.58
Thus, an ideal goal of judicial administration is crafting a framework in
which justice is done and the justices maintain manageable dockets. Two of
the methods employed to achieve this goal are limiting what issues are ap-
pealable and limiting when they are appealable.59 To adequately describe
this process, it is necessary to explore the definition of appellate jurisdiction.
"Appellate jurisdiction is the power to take cognizance of and review
proceedings in an inferior court."60 In Florida, state appellate court jurisdic-
tion is statutorily proscribed.6' Jurisdiction of the district courts of appeal
52. See generally Thomas v. Silvers, 748 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1999).
53. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 4, 5 (1957).
54. Gerald B. Cope, Jr., Discretionary Review of the Decisions of Intermediate Appellate
Courts: A Comparison of Florida's System with Those of the Other States and the Federal
System, 45 FLA. L. REv. 21, 62 (1993).
55. See FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 16A-B (1955) (providing for additional county judges for
expanding county populations).
56. Cope, supra note 54, at 33.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 77 (discussing Florida's appellate practice of issuing affirmances without a
written opinion as necessary to manage the workload).
59. See FLA. R. APp. P. 9.130.
60. Williams v. State ex rel. Nuccio, 122 So. 523, 524 (Fla. 1929).
61. See FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(b).
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typically only becomes operative once a final judgment on the merits of the
case is entered.62 In other words, even if a litigant believes that the trial court
has committed an error in ruling on a particular motion or other proceeding,
the ruling is typically not directly appealable until judgment has been en-
tered.63 Simply put: litigants will have to wait to appeal until "all judicial
labor in the case has come to an end."'
This situation often subjects litigants to unnecessary expenditures of
time and money because they may be involved in proceedings that they
should not have been compelled to participate in at all. However, relief is
available from this apparent inequity. Specifically, the judicial mechanisms
of the writ of certiorari and the interlocutory appeal exist for litigants to gain
relief from such adverse rulings, even before a final judgment on the merits
has been entered.
IV. APPELLATE RELIEF PRIOR TO FINAL JUDGMENT
A. An Overview
The Florida district courts of appeal provide mechanisms that allow liti-
gants to appeal adverse rulings before a final judgment on the merits has
been entered. Two commonly employed mechanisms for this purpose are
the common-law writ of certiorari65 and the interlocutory appeal.
66
A threshold question for any litigant wishing to appeal an adverse ruling
at the trial level is where to pursue that appeal. In Florida's two-tier appel-
late system, a narrow class of appeals is heard directly by the Supreme Court
of Florida.67 However, the majority of appeals are heard by the district
courts of appeal.68
62. FLA. CONST. art.V, § 4(b)(1)-(2); FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1).
63. FLA. CONST. art.V, § 4(b)(1)-(2); FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1). See also Mary Piccard
Vance & Ann M. Piccard, Direct Appeal Jurisdiction of Florida's District Courts of Appeal,
33 STETSONL. REv. 153, 154-55 (2003).
64. Vance & Piccard, supra note 63, at 157; See also FLA. R. APP. P. 9.020(h); Howard v.
Ziegler, 40 So. 2d 776, 777 (Fla. 1949) ("A judgment is final when it adjudicates the merits of
the cause and disposes of the pending action, leaving nothing further to be done but the execu-
tion of the judgment." (citations omitted)).
65. FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(2).
66. FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(B).
67. FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(a) (providing for the jurisdictional scope of the Supreme Court
of Florida).
68. See FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(b).
2004]
84
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss1/1
NOVA LA WREVIEW
The right to appeal in Florida is not express, but has been constructively
inferred from the Florida Constitution.69 The original Florida Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure provided appellate relief before a final judgment on the
merits through the writ of certiorari.7" These rules also provided for
"[a]ppeals from interlocutory orders ... relating to ... jurisdiction over the
person" to be "prosecuted in accordance with this rule."'" The distinction
between the two is significant because the grant of a writ of certiorari is more
difficult to obtain than the reversal of an interlocutory order.
B. The Writ of Certiorari
The classic procedure used to gain relief before final judgment is en-
tered is the common-law writ of certiorari.72 A writ of certiorari is "[a]n ex-
traordinary writ issued by an appellate court, at its discretion, directing a
lower court to deliver the record in the case for review."73 However, these
writs are rarely granted.74
Writs of certiorari are seldom granted because the burden of proof
borne by the litigant seeking this extraordinary relief is high.75 Specifically,
appellate courts will grant the writ only when: "(1) the trial court departed
from the essential requirements of the law; (2) the departure resulted in mate-
rial injury that will affect the remainder of the proceedings below; and (3) the
departure cannot be corrected through any other means. 76 Thus, unless a
litigant meets this heavy burden, the litigant will have to wait until the con-
clusion of the trial and directly appeal the adverse ruling. By that time, the
damage may have already been done.
This situation creates unfairness to litigants because by being forced to
continue the trial, they are subjected to unnecessary cost and inconven-
ience.77 This cost and inconvenience is unnecessary because had the ruling
been directly appealable, the appellate court could have stepped in and cor-
69. Hala A. Sandridge, Decisions, Decisions: How the Initial Choice of a State or Fed-
eral Forum May Limit Appellate Remedies, 33 STETSON L. REv. 125, 126-27 (2003).
70. FLA. R. App. P. 4.5(a)(1), (c) (1957).
71. FLA. R. APp.P.4.2(a) (1957).
72. Tracy E. Leduc, Certiorari in the Florida District Courts of Appeal, 33 STETSON L.
REv. 107, 108 (2003).
73. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 220 (7th ed. 1999).
74. Leduc, supra note 72, at 108. Leduc suggests interdependency between certiorari and
rule 9.130 in that they "expand and contract as changes in the law occur." Id. at 124.
75. See id. at 108.
76. Id.
77. Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 1987); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91, 94 (Fla. 1995).
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rected the error, if any, and the trial could have then proceeded properly.7"
Yet judicial economy outweighed these apparent inequities.79 This overbur-
dening of the district courts of appeal compelled the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida to amend the Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1977 to narrow the scope
of appealable issues through interlocutory orders."0 Still, the easier route to
correct error, that is, if your class of appeal is statutorily proscribed, is the
interlocutory appeal.
C. Interlocutory Appeals
Rule 9.130 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure governs "non-
final orders."'" Appeals of non-final orders are more commonly known as
interlocutory appeals. Interlocutory appeals perhaps neatly fall into the cate-
gory of judicial work, which is properly categorized as routine because they
often correct simple trial court errors.82
Yet as much as every litigant would desire an immediate remedy for
perceived errors at trial, the district courts of appeal would be overburdened
if they were called upon to verify every questionable ruling.83 Additionally,
if the appellate jurisdictional scope of interlocutory appeals was extended to
every minute issue, speedy determinations of trials would perhaps become
non-existent.8 4 Thus, the district courts of appeal in Florida command lim-
ited jurisdiction over non-final orders.85
Unless the nature of the non-final order falls within the statutorily pro-
scribed categories, the district courts of appeal lack jurisdiction to hear the
78. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bruns, 443 So. 2d 959, 960-61 (Fla. 1984).
79. Id. (noting the 1977 amendment was intended to preserve judicial resources).
80. See Amends. to the Fla. R. of App. P., 696 So. 2d 1103, 1127 (Fla. 1996). The fol-
lowing committee notes discuss the amended rule:
1977 Amendment. This rule replaces former rule 4.2 and substantially alters current practice.
This rule applies to review of all non-final orders, except those entered in criminal cases, and
those specifically governed by rules 9.100 and 9.110.
The advisory committee was aware that the common law writ of certiorari is available at any
time and did not intend to abolish that writ. However, because that writ provides a remedy
only if the petitioner meets the heavy burden of showing that a clear departure from the essen-
tial requirements of law has resulted in otherwise irreparable harm, it is extremely rare that er-
roneous interlocutory rulings can be corrected by resort to common law certiorari. It is antici-
pated that because the most urgent interlocutory orders are appealable under this rule, there
will be very few cases in which common law certiorari will provide relief.
Id.
81. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130.
82. See Cope, supra note 54.
83. Bruns, 443 So. 2d at 961.
84. See id.
85. FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(B).
2004]
86
Nova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol29/iss1/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
appeal.86 In Florida's civil courts, 8 7 the district courts of appeal have juris-
diction pursuant to rule 9.130 over interlocutory appeals that:
(A) concern venue;
(B) grant, continue, modify, deny, or dissolve injunctions, or re-
fuse to modify or dissolve injunctions;
(C) determine
(i) the jurisdiction of the person;
(ii) the right to immediate possession of property;
(iii) the right to immediate monetary relief or child custody in
family law matters;
(iv) the entitlement of a party to arbitration;
(v) that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to workers'
compensation immunity;
(vi) that a class should be certified; or
(vii) that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to absolute or
qualified immunity in a civil rights claim arising under federal
law;
(D) grant or deny the appointment of a receiver, and terminate or
refuse to terminate a receivership.
88
A fair characterization of rule 9.130 is that the nature of these rulings
goes to the initial quality of the proceedings. If this initial and essential qual-
ity is erroneously determined at the outset of the proceedings, then judicial
resources will be wasted correcting errors and litigants may be substantially
inconvenienced.89
86. See id.
87. FLA. R. ApP. P. 9.130(a)(2). "Appeals of non-final orders in criminal cases shall be as
prescribed by rule 9.140." Id.
88. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(3).
89. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130 Committee Notes (stating "the purpose of these items is to
eliminate useless labor").
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For example, venue determines where litigation will occur.9° As a prac-
tical matter, erroneous determinations of venue may cause significant incon-
venience to the adversely affected party. 9' Thus, such rulings are immedi-
ately appealable pursuant to rule 9.130(a)(3)(A) because if a litigant is forced
to wait until the conclusion of the trial to appeal this order, then the relief
sought would be moot. The trial has already occurred, and the adversely
affected litigant has already sustained the damage caused by the inconvenient
venue.
Likewise, orders that determine jurisdiction of the person are subject to
interlocutory appeals. 92 Without the interlocutory mechanism for relief, a
party who was not originally subject to personal jurisdiction of the court
would have to wait until the trial was concluded to seek relief. However, the
issue of what constitutes an order that determines "jurisdiction of the person"
is not expressly stated in rule 9.130.
93
The classic elements of personal jurisdiction, such as minimum con-
tacts94 and notice,95 are certainly within this rule's scope. Yet in Florida,
there is a time limit on serving a potential party. 96 A violation of this pro-
scribed time limit typically results in a dismissal of the claim without preju-
dice.97 Thus, there arises the issue of whether a violation of the proscribed
time limit for service of process constitutes a question involving "jurisdiction
of the person."98 To provide a potential answer to this question, it is neces-
sary to show how a particular decision on one of the rules involved, rule
1.070(j), 99 can have a ripple effect on the focus of this inquiry. Having set
the legal framework in which this controversy arises, this paper will now
90. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3)(A). See also Bus. Aide Computers, Inc. v. Cent. Fla.
Mack Trucks, Inc., 432 So. 2d 681, 682 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (allowing for interlocu-
tory appeal on the issue of venue pursuant to rule 9.130(a)(3)(A)).
91. See generally Kinney Sys. Inc. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1996) (discuss-
ing Florida's doctrine of forum non conveniens).
92. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).
93. Id.
94. Wartski v. Sencer, 615 So. 2d 794, 795 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding an
order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm
statute and minimum contacts is appealable pursuant to rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i)).
95. Allan v. Hill, 502 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding the appellate
court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal pursuant to rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i) be-
cause "the [trial] court in effect ruled against Allan's claims of immunity from service of
process and improper service of process").
96. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.0700).
97. Id. (directing the trial court to dismiss the action "without prejudice" for violations).
98. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).
99. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.0700).
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proceed to discuss the case law relevant to interlocutory appeals based on
claims of untimely service of process.
V. THE CAUSE OF THE CONTROVERSY
A. Morales v. Sperry Rand Corp.
In Morales v. Sperry Rand Corp.,"' the Supreme Court of Florida con-
sidered "the consequences of failing to obtain service of process within 120
days of the filing of a complaint as required by Florida Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 1.0700) when no good cause for this failure is demonstrated." "' In
Morales, the plaintiff served Sperry's resident agent four days after the 120-
day allowance for service had expired. 0 2 The circuit court dismissed the
complaint based on the plaintiffs failure to serve process within 120 days of
filing the complaint. °3 The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed." 4
On review, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the dismissal be-
cause the plaintiff had failed to "meet the burden of demonstrating diligence
and good cause"' °5 to justify the lateness of the service.10 6 This court also
noted that the trial court had "broad discretion in declining to dismiss an ac-
tion if reasonable cause for the failure to effect timely service is docu-
mented."'0 7 Specifically, this court opined that absent this showing of good
cause, permitting any untimely service to be valid "would for practical pur-
poses, negate rule 1.0700) and the reason for its existence."'0 8 The policy
100. 601 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1992).
101. Id. at 538.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Morales, 601 So. 2d at 539.
106. Id. at 539 (noting that a comparison with federal rule 4(m) is applicable as the Florida
rule is modeled on the federal rule); see also United States v. Ayer, 857 F.2d 881, 885 (1st
Cir. 1988) (holding that the corresponding federal rule's mandates may be relaxed after "scru-
tinizing plaintiff s efforts" in affecting service); Lovelace v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 820 F.2d 81,
84 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the corresponding federal rule for service must be "strictly
applied" in the absence of a show of "good cause for the delay" from the plaintiff), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 965 (1987). See contra Tevdorachvili v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 103 F. Supp.
2d 632, 639 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that the 1993 amendments to rule 4(m) broadens the
trial judge's discretion and allows district courts to "grant relief from rule 4(m), even in the
absence of good cause shown").
107. Morales, 601 So. 2d at 540.
108. Id.
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underpinning the rule is to demand "diligent prosecution of lawsuits once a
complaint is filed."'0 9
Thus, this ruling would provide incentive for plaintiffs to comply with
the mandates of rule 1.070 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Yet this
ruling would have consequences in other, perhaps unforeseen, areas as well.
Specifically, this ruling would affect a later decision on the scope of appel-
late jurisdiction in Florida.
B. The Root of Conflict: Comisky on Morales
In Comisky v. Rosen Management Service, Inc.,"0 the Fourth District
Court of Appeal considered en banc"' the question of whether denials of
motions to quash service based on claims that service was untimely consti-
tute appealable orders." 2 Specifically, the issue addressed was whether un-
timely service pursuant to rule 1.070(i) of the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure falls within the parameters of "an 'order determining jurisdiction of the
person"' of rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure."3 The 5-4 majority in Comisky relied heavily on Morales 14 and its
strict interpretation of rule 1.070(i) of the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure." '5 The Comisky majority held that orders denying motions to quash
service based on claims of untimely service are subject to interlocutory ap-
peal.
116
In Comisky, a third-party defendant was served with process outside the
120-day provision of rule 1.070(i) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure."7
Additionally, the original defendant in the action provided no good cause for
this delay." l8 In writing the Fourth District's majority opinion, Judge Warner
acknowledged that this decision "depart[s] from all prior precedent."'"' 9 Yet,
109. Id.
110. 630 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (en banc) (Polen, J., dissenting), rev'd
per curiam, 748 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1999).
111. See FLA. R. App. P. 9.33 1(a) (providing for the determination of issues which threaten
the court system's "uniformity" or are of "exceptional importance"). En banc proceedings are
decided by a majority of the judges, whereas appeals are generally decided by a panel of three
judges. Id.
112. Comisky, 630 So. 2d at 629.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 629-30.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 630.
117. Comisky, 630 So. 2d at 630.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 629. See generally Khandjian v. Compagnie Financiere Mediterranee Cofimed,
S.A., 619 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); DCA of Hialeah, Inc. v. Lago Grande One
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he reasoned that Morales, which was decided in 1992, authorized this change
because untimely service of process without good cause was adequate to
warrant dismissal of the party. 2 ' Additionally, Judge Warner opined that
failure to serve process within the 120 day time limit goes to the
sufficiency of the service of process, and thus the validity of the
process to subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court, an
order denying a motion to dismiss on those grounds determines the
jurisdiction of the person and is appealable."2 '
Thus, Judge Warner believed that the time provision of the limit provided by
rule 1.0700) was essential to perfecting service of process because the rule
went to its "validity."'
2 2
Additionally, Judge Warner based part of the opinion on the fact that
rule 1.0706) mirrors it's corresponding rule 4(j) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.123 Thus, it should follow that a survey of federal rulings on this
issue is applicable as the Supreme Court of Florida performed in Morales. 24
Indeed, federal case law 25 was construed to support the Comisky majority
position that timeliness of process was an essential element of jurisdiction of
the person. 26
In his dissent, Judge Polen surveyed Florida precedent on this issue and
concluded: "to construe Morales otherwise, without an amendment to rule
9.130 or a decision by the supreme court, would be wholly improper.'
' 27
Additionally, his dissent recognized the distinction between "validity of the
service of process itself ... [and] not merely the timeliness thereof. 1 28 Fi-
nally, Judge Polen argues that to hold that timeliness of service does not con-
stitute jurisdiction of the person and is not, therefore, subject to appellate
Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 559 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Cole v. Posada, 555 So. 2d
367 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
120. Comisky, 630 So. 2d 628, 630 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). "Morales is on point
and requires the dismissal of the complaint as to this appellant." Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 629.
123. Id.
124. See Comisky, 630 So. 2d at 629; see also Morales v. Sperry Rand Corp., 601 So. 2d
538, 539 (Fla. 1992).
125. McDonald v. United States, 898 F.2d 466, 468 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that defective
service outside the 120-day period proscribed by rule 4(j) is insufficient to obtain personal
jurisdiction).
126. Comisky, 629 So. 2d at 629-30.
127. Id.at631.
128. Id.
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jurisdiction, would leave the litigant with a remedy because relief could be
"obtain[ed] through a petition for common law certiorari."' 121
Ultimately, the essence of Judge Polen's dissent became part of the Su-
preme Court of Florida's decision in Thomas.3 ' However, at least for the
time being, Judge Polen's opinion would not solve this issue. Nonetheless,
the ripple caused by Morales was now being felt in other areas: appellate
jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals.
C. The Build-Up to Thomas
The issue of what constitutes the parameters of "jurisdiction of the per-
son" pursuant to rule 9.130 was and would continue to be controversial for
some time.'31 In 1994, the Third District Court of Appeal held in Polo v.
Polo'32 that timeliness of service was not an element of personal jurisdiction
for purposes of interlocutory appeal. 133 This decision was consistent with the
Third District's decision the previous year in RD & G Leasing, Inc. v. Steb-
nicki.'34 Yet in 1994, the Fourth and the Fifth District Courts of Appeal ar-
rived at precisely the opposite result. 35
As has already been explored in detail, the Comisky court in the Fourth
District held that timeliness of service of process was an element of "juris-
diction of the person '' 136 pursuant to rule 9.130 and is, therefore, appeal-
able.'37 Likewise, in Mid-Florida Associates, Ltd. v. Taylor,38 the Fifth Dis-
trict based its jurisdiction to hear the appeal of untimely service of process
upon the Comisky court's precedent. 39 In Taylor, the written opinion does
not directly address the jurisdictional issue raised by the opposing statutory
interpretations of the Second and Third Districts. 40 Instead, the Taylor court
claims jurisdiction in a footnote, cites to two cases in favor and two cases
129. Id. at 631-32.
130. See generally Thomas v. Silvers, 748 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1999).
131. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).
132. 643 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
133. Id. at 56; see also Anthony C. Musto, Appellate Practice, 20 NOVA. L. REV. 1, 14
(1995).
134. 626 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
135. Id. at 1003; see also Anthony C. Musto, Appellate Practice, 21 NOVA L. REV. 13, 24
(1996).
136. FLA. R. APp. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).
137. See generally Comisky v. Rosen Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 630 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (en banc) (Polen, J., dissenting), rev'dper curiam, 748 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1999).
138. 641 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
139. See id.
140. Id. atn.1.
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against the jurisdictional issue, and essentially avoids the controversy. 4' In
1995, the Second District Court of Appeal, in Nowry v. Collyar,142 dismissed
an appeal of an order denying a motion to dismiss based on claims for un-
timely service.'43 The Second District recognized the conflict of its decision
with the other circuits.1" Accordingly, the Second District certified the fol-
lowing question to the Supreme Court of Florida:
DOES AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO DISMISS A
COMPLAINT CLAIMING UNTIMELY SERVICE PURSUANT
TO FLORIDA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1.070(i) FAIL TO
CONSTITUTE AN ORDER DETERMINING THE JURIS-
DICTION OVER THE PERSON, THUS MAKING IT A
NONAPPEALABLE, NON-FINAL ORDER?1
45
Yet at that time, the question was not destined to gain an audience with
the Supreme Court of Florida. 46 Finally, in Novella Land, Inc. v. Panama
City Beach Office Park, Ltd.,47 the First District Court of Appeal recognized
this conflict, as well. 4 8 The court in Novella agreed with the Second and
Third Districts, and held "an order which denies a motion to dismiss for fail-
ure to timely serve a defendant is not an appealable non-final order.'
' 49
However, the court dismissed the certified question in Nowry pursuant
to rule 9.350(b) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure5 ° Thus, for the
moment, the conflict concerning the definition of jurisdiction of the person
was unresolved.
D. The Nowry Inquiry Revived
Finally, in 1997, a dispute arose in which the Supreme Court of Florida
was afforded the opportunity to resolve whether claims of timeliness of ser-
vice constitute questions of personal jurisdiction pursuant to rule 9.130 of the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.5' In Thomas v. Silvers,12 the Third
141. Id.
142. 666 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
143. Id. at 556.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Nowry v. Collyar, 670 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1996) (table decision).
147. 662 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
148. Id. at 743.
149. Id. at 744.
150. Nowry, 670 So. 2d at 939.
151. Thomas v. Silvers, 701 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997), affd 748 So. 2d 263
(Fla. 1999).
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District Court of Appeal granted the appellee's motion to dismiss an appeal
for claims of untimely service as defined by rule 1.070(i) of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure.53 In a per curiam opinion, the court based its deci-
sion on a mixture of statutory interpretation of rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i) 154 of the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure and on Third District precedent.155
The court concluded that untimely service does not fall within the pa-
rameters of "jurisdiction of the person" pursuant to rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)( 1).156
Thus, interlocutory orders claiming untimely service are unappealable for
lack of appellate jurisdiction.'57 In doing so, the Third District also certified
conflict with the Fourth and the Fifth Districts.'58 The question originally
certified by the Nowry court would soon be resolved. 5 9
VI. MAKING THE RIPPLE PLACID
A. Thomas v. Silvers
On October 21, 1999, the Supreme Court of Florida resolved this long-
standing issue."16 In Thomas v. Silvers,16 1 the Supreme Court of Florida held
that appeals of orders denying motions to quash service based solely on
claims that service was untimely pursuant to rule 1.070(i) of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure fall outside the judicially proscribed scope of per-
sonal jurisdiction as provided by rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i) of the Florida Rules
of Appellate Procedure.62 In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court of
Florida recognized the difficulty presented to appellate courts by litigants
continuously seeking review in the district courts for interlocutory appeals. 163
Specifically, the district courts were forced to review these appeals "piece-
meal."' 64 By their very nature, interlocutory appeals typically occur during a
152. Id.
153. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.070(i); Thomas, 701 So. 2d at 390.
154. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).
155. Thomas, 701 So. 2d at 390.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Nowry, 666 So. 2d at 556.
160. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4). The Supreme Court of Florida is authorized to, in
its discretion, "review any decision of a district court of appeal that passes upon a question
certified by it to be of great public importance, or that is certified by it to be in direct conflict
with a decision of another district court of appeal." Id.
161. 748 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1999).
162. Id. at 265.
163. Id. at 264.
164. Id.
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trial, allowing such review, in most cases, only "serves to waste court re-
sources and needlessly delay final judgment."'' 65 Thus, the court based its
opinion on the public policy grounds previously articulated in Travelers In-
surance Co. v. Bruns.166 However, the manner in which this court arrived at
this ultimate conclusion involves substantial creativity and deserves further
explanation.
The dilemma faced by the Supreme Court of Florida in Bruns was how
to manage and limit the crushing workload faced by the district courts while
simultaneously providing efficient and equitable relief from erroneous trial
court rulings. 167 In crafting a solution to this problem, this court utilized its
inherent power afforded by the Florida Constitution in two ways.
68
First, the court utilized its ability to resolve conflict.' 69 This power is
afforded to the Supreme Court of Florida by the Florida Constitution. 7 This
court could have merely held that denials of motions to quash service based
on claims of untimely service do not constitute jurisdiction of the person
pursuant to rule 9.130 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, and
stopped there.' 7' However, taken alone, such a holding might unfairly preju-
dice defendants because they would have no redress until a final judgment
had been entered. In this light, such a ruling could be construed as unduly
plaintiff friendly. Instead, the Supreme Court of Florida went a step fur-
ther."'72
Second, as the Supreme Court of Florida is authorized to promulgate its
own court rules, 173 the opinion noted a recent amendment to the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure."' The practical effect of this amendment is to
augment the discretion of trial judges and encourage them to dismiss parties
who have been improperly served. 75 Thus, defendants should be dismissed
for untimely service more frequently, and never have to appeal the decision
165. Id. (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bruns, 443 So. 2d 959, 960-61 (Fla. 1984)).
166. Thomas, 748 So. 2d at 264; see Bruns, 443 So. 2d at 960-61.
167. See Bruns, 433 So. 2d at 960-61.
168. Id.
169. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
170. Id.; see also FLA. R. App. P. 9.125(a) (providing for direct appeals of trial court rul-
ings by the District Courts of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida for questions either
having "great public importance or hav[ing] a great effect on the proper administration of
justice throughout the state").
171. SeeFLA. R. APp.P. 9.130.
172. See Bruns, 433 So. 2d at 960-61.
173. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) (authorizing the Supreme Court of Florida to write court
rules).
174. Thomas v. Silvers, 748 So. 2d 263, 264 (Fla. 1999).
175. Id.
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at all.' 76 The history and policy underlying this amended rule deserve further
discussion.
B. Amendment to Rule 1.0706)
Eleven months before Thomas was decided by the Supreme Court of
Florida, the court published Amendment to the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 1.0 70 0) Time Limit for Service.17 7 In this proposal, the Supreme Court
of Florida relaxed the harshness of the current rule's mandate which "some-
times acts as a severe sanction."'178 This sanction was severe because "even
if dismissal under the rule is without prejudice, a plaintiff would be unable to
refile suit in cases where the statute of limitations had expired."' 79 The new
rule would allow "a court broad discretion to extend the time for service even
when good cause has not been shown."' 8° This change is crucial because
defendants can use claims of untimely service to evade entirely the courts'
jurisdiction.
Seven months before Thomas was decided by the Supreme Court of
Florida, the court amended the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. On March
4, 1999, the Supreme Court of Florida published Amendment to Florida Rule
of Civil Procedure 1.0700) Time Limit for Service.'8' This adopted amend-
ment provided:
(j) Summons; Time Limit. If service of the initial process and ini-
tial pleading is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after
filing of the initial pleading.., the court, on its own initiative after
notice or on motion, shall direct that service be effected within a
specified time or shall dismiss the action.., without prejudice or
drop that defendant.., as a party ... provided that if the plaintiff
shows good cause or excusable neglect for the failure, the court
shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period. A dis-
missal under this subdivision shall not be considered a voluntary
176. Id. at 264-65.
177. 720 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1998). This proposed amendment was published in the Florida
Bar News. Id. at 506. The court sought "any comments on the proposed rule within thirty
days of the date of publication." Id. Specifically, the court asked for input from "the Florida
Bar Civil Procedure Rules Committee and interested persons." Id.
178. Id. at 505.
179. Amend. to Fla. Rule of Civil Proc. 1.0700) Time Limit for Service, 720 So. 2d 505
(Fla. 1998).
180. Id.
181. 746 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1999).
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dismissal or operate as an adjudication on the merits under rule
1.420(a)(1)."'8
As articulated in the proposal, the practical effect of this amendment is
to afford trial judges greater discretion in quashing service of process on
improperly served parties.'83 Yet there are other important considerations.
This paper argues that another policy reason supports the equity of this
decision. This policy was articulated after Thomas was decided, but was
perhaps still an unwritten factor that determined the ultimate outcome of
Thomas.14 This reasoning goes to the essence of what personal jurisdiction
is and what it is not.
C. Totura & Co. v. Williams
On February 17, 2000, the Supreme Court of Florida decided Totura &
Co. v. Williams.'85 Although the issue in Williams centered on Florida's rela-
tion-back doctrine,' 86 the policies underlying this decision are applicable in
the context of timely service of process because both issues center on rule
1.070j)187 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
In resolving the conflict of Williams, the Supreme Court of Florida held
that rule 1.0700) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure "is intended to be
'a case management tool, not an additional statute of limitations cutting off
liability of a tortfeasor."" 88 This notion is well supported by rule 1.010 of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure'8 9 and is substantially buttressed by
previous holdings. 9 ' In this connection, once a case is filed, the statute of
limitations is tolled, and allowing a party to escape litigation for failing to
serve process in a timely fashion would cause "technical defenses [to] be-
182. Id.
183. Thomas, 748 So. 2d at 264.
184. See generally id. at 263.
185. 754 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 2000).
186. Id. at 672.
187. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.0700).
188. Williams, 754 So. 2d at 678 (quoting Root v. Little, 721 So. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
189. FLA .R. CIV. P. 1.010 ("These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.").
190. See Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So. 2d 817, 818 (Fla. 1993) (identifying the purpose as
"encourag[ing] the orderly movement of litigation"); Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946
(Fla. 1983) ("The purpose of the rules of civil procedure is to promote the orderly movement
of litigation."); Amlan, Inc. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 651 So. 2d 701, 704-05 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) ("The purpose of the rules of civil procedure is to promote the orderly movement
of litigation.") (quoting Mercer, 443 So. 2d at 946).
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come the centerpiece of the litigation . *..."' In that situation, "the merits
are obscured, if not totally overshadowed." 192 Thus, if the time limit pro-
vided by rule 1.0700) is a "'case management tool," ' 193 then it is not truly an
element of personal jurisdiction.
This distinction is precisely why the underlying policy of Williams is
applicable to Thomas. Just because rule 1.0700) of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure prescribes a time limit to effect valid service of process, 94 it
does not mean that failure to comply with the time requirements constitutes a
question of jurisdiction of the person. It merely constitutes an issue of judi-
cial administration in the form of case management. This logic was the same
erroneous logic employed by Comisky:195 to consider untimely service as
invalid may be correct, but to consider untimely service as a jurisdictional
question is essentially to mistakenly view a rule designed to be "'a case man-
agement tool,""' .9 6 as an element of personal jurisdiction. Thus, for the mo-
ment, the ripple created by Comisky is placid.
VII. CONCLUSION
The decision in Thomas was correct and embodies sound judicial poli-
cies. Time limits on service do not equate to true legal power. Timeliness of
service of process is not a substantive element of personal jurisdiction be-
cause it fails to go to the essential quality of service of process: notice.
97
Notice is paramount for a court to have jurisdiction or power over a defen-
dant.198 The time limit on service of process is merely a procedural aspect
designed to efficiently move cases through the courts.' 99 Thus, defendants
are properly precluded from using technical claims of untimely service of
process to evade justice.200 Indeed, as articulated in Judge Polen's dissent in
Comisky, a truly unjust result stemming from the issue of timeliness of ser-
vice of process may be corrected by a common law writ of certiorari.'
191. Williams, 754 So. 2d at 678.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 678 (quoting Root v. Little, 721 So. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
194. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.0700).
195. See generally Comisky v. Rosen Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 630 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (en banc) (Polen, J., dissenting), rev'dper curiam, 748 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1999).
196. See generally Williams, 754 So. 2d at 678.
197. See Bedford Computer Corp. v. Graphic Press, Inc., 484 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Fla.
1986).
198. Id.
199. Williams, 754 So. 2d at 678.
200. Id.
201. Comisky, 630 So. 2d at 631-32.
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Case management is an important aspect of judicial administration.2 °2
When questions of personal jurisdiction intersect with questions of appellate
jurisdiction, the situation can be quite complicated. This is especially true
when the judiciary must craft a solution that balances the interests of litigants
203 Thragainst the interests of judicial economy. In Thomas, the Supreme Court
of Florida creatively and equitably solved this issue so that both litigants'
rights and the judicial economy are preserved. Indeed, after Thomas, plain-
tiffs' causes of action are better protected and less interlocutory appeals will
be entertained. In Thomas, the Supreme Court of Florida effectively clarified
the essence of personal jurisdiction through the scope of appellate jurisdic-
tion.
202. Cope, supra note 54, at 62.
203. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The gavel bangs. All rise. It begins as any other criminal trial in Flor-
ida. The jury sits patiently as the judge informs them of the charges alleged
against the Defendant, and then the attorneys sweep the jurors away with
their opening arguments. Slowly, the facts begin to unfold. The jury learns
that on September 13, 2002, a woman from Lee County, Florida was brutally
raped in her own home while her children slept in the next room.' When she
takes the stand, she tells the jury that the Defendant broke into her home in
the dead of night on that September evening. 2 They listen raptly as she re-
counts her horrific experience. The Prosecutor, representing the State of
* Nicole Velasco received her B.A. from Florida State University and is a 2006 J.D.
Candidate at Nova Southeastern University. She would like first and foremost to thank the
Honorable Jeffrey R. Levenson of the 17th Judicial Circuit of Florida, Broward County Court,
for his inspiration. She would also like to thank her family and friends, especially senior staff
members Suzen Corrada and Mark Friedman, for their encouragement throughout the writing
of this article. She gives very special recognition to Adam Mayer for his love and unending
support.
1. Britt Dys, Rape Case Sparked the Bill, FLA. B. NEWS, Apr. 1, 2004, at 10.
2. Id.
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Florida, corroborates the victim's testimony by presenting DNA evidence
which irrefutably links the Defendant to the alleged crime.
When it is the Defendant's turn to take the stand, the jurors listen to his
claims that he formerly dated the victim.4 He argues that the sexual inter-
course with her was consensual, which is why his DNA was found at the
scene.5 However, this explanation quickly becomes unsatisfactory when the
prosecution calls its rebuttal witness: a police officer who testifies that the
time during which the Defendant alleges to have "dated" the victim, the De-
fendant was in jail.6 After the Defendant testifies, his attorney declines to
call any more witnesses.7
After both sides have presented all of the evidence, the defense makes
the first closing argument.8 The prosecution follows with its final attempt to
remove all reasonable doubt of the Defendant's guilt from the jurors' minds.9
The defense gets up once again, this time to rebut the State's argument and
impress the final words upon the jury. °
The jury deliberates for ninety minutes before returning from the jury
room.1" All rise again, this time anxiously awaiting the jury's decision as
they file into the jury box. The foreman hands the verdict to the bailiff. Si-
lence permeates the courtroom, and then a wave of shock and disbelief
washes over its occupants as the clerk announces a verdict of not guilty. 2
The scene you have just envisioned is not an imaginary one. It is a re-
cap of the true story of Christopher Hiatt's prosecution and subsequent ac-
quittal,'3 which disgusted one Florida legislator enough to try to change the
process of Florida criminal trials. 14 The proposed solution is articulated in
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Dys, supra note 1.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Dys, supra note 1.
12. Id.
13. State v. Hiatt, No. 02-003394 CF (Fla. 20th Cir. Ct. 2003), at http://www.leeclerk.
org/crim detail.asp?CsNum=02003394CF&CsType = .
14. Dys, supra note 1. Representative Carol Green sponsored House Bill 1149. Id. In
the article, she stated that she "was so upset by what [she] watched happen" in the trial, and
that in her opinion, Hiatt lied in his testimony. Id. The prosecutor in the Hiatt case stated, "It
was hideous." Id.
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House Bill 1149,15 and has the power to snatch away defendants' present
advantage of having the last word in criminal trials. 6
The order of closing arguments in criminal proceedings is currently
governed by rule 3.250 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,17 or, as
most Floridian practitioners affectionately call it, the "sandwich rule." This
rule states that "a defendant offering no testimony in his or her own behalf,
except the defendant's own, shall be entitled to the concluding argument be-
fore the jury."18 As was the case in State v. Hiatt,19 defendants who present
nothing more than their own testimony at trial have the distinct advantage of
giving the first closing argument and the rebuttal argument at final summa-
tion, thereby sandwiching the prosecution's argument in between. The
courts of Florida have followed rule 3.250 without question for over 150
years.2 ° Consequently, for over a century and a half, the order of closing
arguments in Florida's criminal trials has hinged upon the defense's trial
strategy.
The proposal espoused by House Bill 1149 posed to end that tradition
by repealing rule 3.250 and enacting section 918.19 of the Florida Statutes.2'
Although ultimately the bill was not among those signed by the Governor,22
its proposition raises fascinating legal issues. A statute like proposed section
918.19 would entitle the prosecution to the first closing argument and the
rebuttal argument in all criminal trials, without giving any effect to the evi-
15. H.R. 1149, Fla. Leg., Reg. Sess. (2004), available at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/
loadDoc.aspx?FileName= h 149_.doc&DocumentType=Bill&Number=I 149&Session=
2004 (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
16. Id.
17. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.250.
18. Id.
19. Hiatt, No. 02-003394 CF (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2003), at http://www.leeclerk.org/crim_
detail.asp?CsNum=02003394CF&CsType=.
20. Britt Dys & Jan Pudlow, Who Gets the Last Say? Bill Would Reverse the Order of
Closing Arguments, FLA. B. NEWS, Apr. 1, 2004, at 1. During the hundredth year of the rule's
enactment, the Supreme Court of Florida stated, "Never once... during the past one hundred
years has this court deviated from the proposition that the right given by the statute is a vested
procedural right which cannot be denied to a defendant when he is entitled to exercise it."
Faulk v. State, 104 So. 2d 519, 521 (Fla. 1958).
21. H.R. 1149.
22. H.R. 1149, Fla. Leg., Reg. Sess. (2004), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/session
/index.cfm?Mode=Bills&SubMenu= 1&Tab=session&BIMode=ViewBillnfo&BillNum=
1149&Chamber =House&Year=2004&Title=%2D%3EBill%2520Info%3AH%25201149
%2D%3E Session%25202004 (last visited Oct. 14, 2004). The bill died in committee on
April 30, 2004, after being introduced to the Florida Senate and referred to the Judiciary and
Criminal Justice Committees. H.R. 1149.
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dence the defense may or may not present.23 Thus, if and when the change
does pass into law, it will be the defense who perpetually gets "sandwiched."
The heated debates over whether to enact this new bill 24 begs the ques-
tion: is it the law and the facts upon which jurors base their verdicts, or is it
the closing arguments? Does having the last word determine whether justice
will be served? This article will explore the answers to these questions, as
well as which avenues should be taken to ensure that Florida's criminal jus-
tice system is one about seeking the truth.
Part II of this article discusses the purpose of the closing argument and
its impact on the criminal trial. Part III surveys the history of this facet of
Florida criminal procedure law, as well as how a change such as that pro-
posed by House Bill 1149 would affect criminal procedure in Florida. Part
IV analyzes the laws governing the forty-six other states that have already
implemented rules similar to proposed section 918.19 of the Florida Statutes,
while Part V examines the four states that have declined to follow the pro-
posed Florida rule. Part VI discusses the possible reaction of the Supreme
Court of Florida to such a rule. Finally, Part VII will conclude with a rec-
ommendation that Florida's legislators continue to seek the repeal of rule
3.250 to give prosecutors the statutory right to make the final argument in
criminal trials.
II. THE POWER OF THE LAST WORD
The power of the last word is one that most of us like to have when we
argue, and lawyers in particular have been known to suffer from "the last
word disease., 25 This power that lawyers crave usually takes shape in the
form of the closing argument, which is one of the most crucial elements of
the entire trial presentation.26 In fact, closing arguments are viewed by our
criminal justice system as so vital that they are recognized as fundamental to
the right to present a defense at trial. 7 In 1975, the United States Supreme
Court described the importance of the closing argument by stating, "[t]he
difference in any case between total denial of final argument and a concise
but persuasive summation could spell the difference, for the defendant, be-
23. H.R. 1149
24. Dys & Pudlow, supra note 20, at 1.
25. Jason Vail, To Reply or Not to Reply: When Having the Last Word Doesn't Cut It,
OR. ST. B. BULL., Dec. 2000, at 33.
26. Tucker Ronzetti & Janet L. Humphreys, Avoiding Pitfalls in Closing Arguments, FLA.
B.J., Dec. 2003, at 36.
27. Michael R. Flaherty, Annotation, Propriety of Trial Court Order Limiting Time for
Opening or Closing Argument in Criminal Case--State Cases, 71 A.L.R. 4th 200, 208-09
(1989) (citing Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975)).
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tween liberty and unjust imprisonment., 28 Undoubtedly, most criminal de-
fendants view the quality of their closing arguments as a factor upon which
their freedom depends.
The right to assistance of counsel provided by the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, 9 along with the Due Process Clause con-
tained within the Fourteenth Amendment,3" have been interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court to mean that "there can be no restrictions upon
the function of counsel in defending a criminal prosecution., 31 Indeed, the
right to present a closing argument in a criminal trial is one that American
courts take very seriously,3 2 and failure to provide a defendant with the op-
portunity to exercise that right has been deemed reversible error by the high-
est court of this country.3 3 Even pro se defendants are entitled to present a
final summation at the close of evidence, 34 regardless of whether the case is
tried before a jury.35 This right has also been interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court, along with certain state courts, as deriving from the language
of the Sixth Amendment.36 It is worth mentioning that although it is not the
focus of this discussion, the right to final summation, though widely recog-
nized,37 can, like other substantive rights, be waived.38
Perhaps the magnitude of the closing argument is best understood in
light of its purpose. In a criminal trial, the closing argument is a mechanism
for sharpening and clarifying the issues upon which the trier of fact must
render judgment.3 9 It reinforces in the jurors' minds, in words and phrases
28. Herring, 422 U.S. at 863.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In relevant part, the Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury .. .and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
31. Herring, 422 U.S. at 857.
32. See, e.g., State v. Plaskonka, 577 A.2d 729, 731 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) (stating that
failure to give a defendant the opportunity to present a closing argument is grounds for a new
trial on appeal).
33. Herring, 422 U.S. at 865.
34. JACoB A. STEIN, CLOsING ARGUMENT § 3 (1996) (citing Herring, 422 U.S. at 864 n.
18; Holmes v. State, 637 A.2d 113, 116 (Md. 1994)).
35. Plaskonka, 577 A.2d at 731; Holmes, 637 A.2d at 116.
36. Holmes, 637 A.2d at 116.
37. Herring, 422 U.S. at 860.
38. 15 FLA. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 1773 (2001); STEIN, supra note 34, § 4.
39. STEIN, supra note 34, § 2 (citing Herring, 422 U.S. at 862).
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that make sense to them, a clear picture of what the evidence has already
painted."
The trial is like a jigsaw puzzle. It has a bunch of tiny little pieces
of evidence, all coming in at different times-and really meaning-
less to a jury. And when you put it together in the summation, it be-
comes a great big painting. A beautiful painting is what you want
them to see.41
Others describe the closing argument as a device through which to or-
ganize and highlight favorable evidence, rebut opposing arguments, explain
the applicable law, and show the jury that the evidence leads to a verdict in
favor of the arguing attorney.42 In other words, the goal is "to convince the
trier of fact that the advocate's view of the disputed issues is correct and that
it should render a verdict accordingly." '43
According to Texas, a state that has specifically defined the main pur-
pose of arguments to the jury, summations must assist in proper analysis of
the evidence so that the jury may reach a "just and reasonable conclusion
based on the evidence alone."'  The courts of Texas have also created a spe-
cific standard by which jury arguments are measured.45 The attorney's ar-
gument must fall into one of four general categories: 1) summation of the
evidence; 2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; 3) response to argu-
ment made by opposing counsel; or 4) pleas for law enforcement. 6
It is generally atypical for a court to create such methodological rules
with regard to final summation.4' During closing arguments, more than at
any other point in the trial, an attorney has the opportunity to truly become
an advocate for his or her client. 8 Thus, in the interest of encouraging advo-
cacy, courts generally allow attorneys a wide margin for error49 and liberal
40. STEIN, supra note 34, § 200.
41. BETTYRUTH WALTER, THE JURY SUMMATION AS SPEECH GENRE 40-41 (Jacob L. Mey
et al. eds., 1988) (quoting attorney Stanley E. Preiser's response to the question, "[W]hat is
the main thing you are trying to do during the summation?").
42. J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS 133 (Murray L. Schwartz et al. eds.,
1983).
43. H. Mitchell Caldwell et al., The Art and Architecture of Closing Argument, 76 TUL.
L. REv. 961,969 (2002).
44. Alex v. State, 930 S.W.2d 787, 791 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Dickinson v. State,
685 S.W.2d 320, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)).
45. Alex, 930 S.W.2d at 791.
46. Id. (citing McKay v. State, 707 S.W.2d 23, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)).
47. 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 554 (1991).
48. STEIN, supra note 34, § 1.
49. Id.
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freedom of speech" in the presentation of their arguments to the jury.5 It is
generally true, therefore, that the law governing closing arguments is without
specific rules and is noticeably less technical than other bodies of law.
2
However, not everyone agrees that permitting such freedom for the pur-
poses of promoting advocacy is a good idea. 3 One author, when comment-
ing on the negative effects of the adversarial system as it relates to the prac-
tice of criminal law, discussed the tactics and behavior some attorneys em-
ploy at trial. 4 The author specifically mentions that the tendency of trial
lawyers to "obscure the facts rather than illuminate them"55 and to "increase
prejudice rather than reduce it,"56 is due to the pressure attorneys feel to cre-
ate stronger cases. 7 "Each side, after all, is not fighting for the truth to
emerge; it is fighting to win."5" While presumably not all attorneys operate
under this mentality during the normal course of a trial, some do argue to win
during closing argument; and those who do not, nonetheless seek to be as
persuasive as possible when speaking their final words to the jury. 9
The significance of being the last to speak is so entrenched in American
culture that we associate the "last word" with an advantage to the person who
gets it.6" Lawyers and judges alike carry this association directly into the
legal world61 with regard to the order of closing arguments in criminal tri-
als.62 Judge Walden of the Fourth District Court of Appeal has stated, "[A]s
all acquainted with trial tactics know ... the right to address the jury finally
50. 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 554 (1991) (citing Ga. Power Co. v. Walker, 114 S.E.2d 159,
161 (Ga. Ct. App. 1960); State v. Crisp, 94 S.E.2d 402, 406 (N.C. 1956); Johnson v. Life Ins.
Co. of Ga., 88 S.E.2d 260, 269 (S.C. 1955)).
51. STEIN, supra note 34, § 1.
52. Id.
53. LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND POLICY 182 (Mary Dougherty et
al. eds., 5th ed. 2001).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. BAUM, supra note 53, at 182.
59. WALTER, supra note 41, at 41. Dr. Walter conducted extensive studies on jury sum-
mation, including its perceived importance in the words of attorneys. Id. When asked the
question, "What is the main thing you are trying to do during the summation?," the majority
(fifteen of the thirty-four attorneys questioned) responded that their goal is to persuade, while
only two replied that they attempt to win the case at summation. Id at 40-41.
60. John B. Mitchell, Why Should the Prosecutor Get the Last Word?, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L.
139, 145 (2000).
61. Id. at 149.
62. See Wike v. State, 648 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1994) (Anstead, J., specially concurring);
Raysor v. State, 272 So. 2d 867, 869 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
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is a fundamental advantage which simply speaks for itself."63 "Under [our]
system, and in reality, it does matter who gets the last opportunity to address
the jury."'
The plethora of literature on the subject of how to argue more effec-
tively at final summation 65 suggests that attorneys believe that closing argu-
ments are powerful enough to persuade a jury to come to their conclusions,
even if the law or facts on their sides are slightly lacking.66 Indeed, some say
that in "close" cases, where neither the law nor the facts appear predomi-
nately one-sided, the persuasive talent of the lawyers, which will surface
mostly during opening and closing arguments, could possibly be the tie-
breaker.67 "The closing argument, no matter how strong, will seldom save a
botched trial, but where the issues are close and the decision is in doubt, an
effective final argument can be the difference between winning and losing.,
68
Such ideas are undoubtedly based on attorneys' beliefs that they possess con-
trol over the outcomes of the trials in which they argue, and that their skills
can positively impact their client's position.69 Studies show, however, that
this conception may be more than a belief.
70
63. Raysor, 272 So. 2d at 869.
64. Wike, 648 So. 2d at 688.
65. Mitchell, supra note 60, at 147 n. 16 (listing a sampling of the books that can be found
in one's law library on the subject of closing arguments).
66. See, e.g., Ray E. Moses, The Last Word, CHAMPION, Aug. 1997, at 55. The article
discusses how to "help jurors make correct choices," as well as how "to influence those
choices by what [we] say during the argument phase of the trial." Id.
67. Caldwell et al., supra note 43, at 969.
68. STERN,supra note 34, § 201.
69. Mitchell, supra note 60, at 148; WALTER, supra note 41, at 38-39. Dr. Walter ques-
tioned thirty-four attorneys in her study on jury summation. WALTER, supra note 41, at 38-
39. When asked, "What is the value of the summation to the trial process," seventy-six per-
cent responded that it is extremely important:
1. "If a case can still be won or lost at the summation stage, then it is clearly the most impor-
tant part of the trial." S. Gerald Litvin
2. "I regard the trial as only a device to enable you to sum up to a jury."
A. Charles Peruto
3. "I think it's probably the single most important factor that determines the guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant. It's that important."
"To me the entire trial is a preface to a summation. It's all leading up to that. The lawyer
is gearing the whole trial to that hour he can stand up before the jury and GO! He can do his
thing." Eugene F. Toro
4. "I think it's probably the most important part of the trial because it's the only part of the
case that represents pure advocacy. It's the one time in a trial when almost without restraint a
lawyer can stand in front of a group of people and literally argue his case. It's the most per-
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The Department of Psychology at Yale University published a study on
opinion changes in individuals, including a section focused specifically on
the nature of persuasive communication as it relates to the forming and
changing of opinions.71 The authors made several observations regarding the
reactions of audiences to persuasive speeches, one of which appears to be
particularly true of juries during closing arguments :72
Shortly after being exposed to one communication, the audience is
likely to be exposed to additional communications presenting com-
pletely different points of view and designed to create completely
different opinions. Hence, the long-run effectiveness of a persua-
sive communication depends not only upon its success in inducing a
momentary shift in opinion but also upon the sustained resistance it
can create with respect to subsequent competing pressures. 73
suasive part of the case. He tries to explain away some of the calamities and exploit some of
the good fortune he's experienced."
"His summation ... brings to bear on the litigation all of the lawyer's skills: his imagina-
tion, his use of language .... "
"Those of us who defend criminal cases are concerned with that perhaps 20% in the mid-
dle where the lawyer's skill can make the difference. And in that category of cases, I think
the summation is probably the most influential part of the trial."
Herald Price Fahringer
5. "It's the most important thing I can contribute." Donald J. Goldberg
6. "I think proper summation can make a difference in a case that's not even close."
Raymond A. Brown
7. "From a defense lawyer's standpoint, it's the critical stage of the trial. Particularly in
fairly lengthy cases involving complicated factual patterns, where it's not going to be clear to
the jury what the case is really about until they hear it summarized and put together and related
to one theory or another. I think it's probably, from the defense standpoint, the single most
important phase of the trial." Thomas Colas Carroll
8. "It's priceless-if properly used. Communicating is the key point. By communicating
you persuade." John Rogers Carroll
9. "It's of real significant value primarily because you have an opportunity for the first
time-and actually for the last-to have direct contact with the jury." Joseph J. McGill
Id.
70. See generally CARL I. HOVLAND ET AL., COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF OPINION CHANGE (1953).
71. Id. at 6-11.
72. WALTER, supra note 41, at 18 (referring to HOVLAND ET AL., supra note 70, at 17).
73. HOVLAND ET AL., supra note 70, at 17.
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However, no subsequent competition exists for the attorney with the last
word in a jury trial, which may explain, at least in part, why the last word is
so coveted.
In an ideal criminal justice system, the party with the law and the facts
on his or her side would always win,74 regardless of who was the last to
speak to the jury. In reality, however, there are times when the party with
the law and the facts loses at trial.75 While such losses are exceptions and
may occur for any number of reasons, 76 some might blame the closing argu-
ments,7 probably even more so when they mirror the theatrical, persuasive
summations that are so often seen on television.7' Along with books and
film, television has had a significant impact on society's perception of the
legal system.79 Consistent with the media's portrayal is the picture of the
closing argument as "the great dramatic moment."" Trial attorneys who
understand that society expects this kind of drama at trial, perhaps in an at-
tempt to live up to the image, incorporate it intentionally into their closing
arguments.8
Jurors like to be entertained. 'OK, smart, big time, well paid law-
yer. Entertain us a little.' And they expect to hear just a tad of ora-
tory. To the extent that we all try to dress well, and not use bad lan-
guage before them, and try not to show our worst side to them, we
are catering to that fact.82
Attorneys have been fixated on the idea that closing arguments affect
jury verdicts for at least ninety years.83 In 1912, Yale Law Journal published
an article criticizing the new time constraints that the attorneys of that time
were beginning to face with regard to closing arguments.84 The author
blamed the "foolish verdict[s]" that often resulted on the brevity of these
74. Caldwell et al., supra note 43, at 969.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Dys, supra note 1, at 10. The article quotes Florida Representative Carole Green,
who, upon learning of the jury's not-guilty verdict in the Hiatt case, stated that the victim
"was victimized by what's happened in the court proceedings." Id.
78. Mitchell, supra note 60, at 149.
79. Id. Mr. Mitchell suggests in his article that perhaps this image persuades some law-
yers to join the legal profession in the first place. Id.
80. Id.
81. WALTER, supra note 41, at 42.
82. Id. (citing the response of a criminal defense attorney when asked, "What is the main
thing you are trying to do during the summation?").
83. John I. Williamson, The Disappearing Argument, 21 YALE L.J. 489 (1912).
84. Id.
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85
arguments, an accusation which contains an underlying message that clos-
ing arguments are crucial to the verdict-rendering process.
But perhaps to the dismay of some trial lawyers, at least one study has
revealed that closing arguments are irrelevant to the decision-making process
of jurors.8 6 The heads of this study labeled the "crucial importance" with
which attorneys regard the last word as merely "another myth lawyers hold
dear.,87  According to the authors of the study, closing arguments do not
even factor in to the jury's process of verdict rendition. 8 Not a single juror,
in over 2000 post-verdict interviews, attested to reaching a final decision
during or because of closing arguments.8 9 The authors found instead that
most jurors make up their minds during the trial itself, based on both testi-
monial and documentary evidence,9" while the rest of them decide during
deliberations with their peers in the jury room.9'
In a separate study conducted by Dr. Walter in which 214 jurors were
questioned on the importance of the final summation, eighty-eight percent
reported that they found the closing arguments to be important.92 However,
Dr. Walter conducted yet another study using different jurors, which re-
vealed that only six percent of those surveyed felt that the closing speeches
of the lawyers were important in reaching their decision in that particular
case.
93
85. Id.at491.
86. Howard Varinsky & Paulette Taylor, Trial Myths and Misconceptions, FOR THE
DEFENSE, Nov. 2003, at 26, 56. The authors state that the article was written, after two dec-
ades of speaking with jurors and conducting research to better understand jury behavior and
decision-making processes, with the goal of naming and dispelling age-old trial myths. Id. at
27.
87. Id. at 56.
88. Id.
89. Id. Even for those attorneys who believe that jurors expect to hear closing arguments
at trial, this information may not be surprising, as not all attorneys deem closing arguments to
be essential to the trial process. See WALTER, supra note 41, at 39. "Closing speeches don't
make a damn bit of difference. It's part of the show." Id. (quoting the response of a criminal
defense attorney when asked, "What is the value of the summation to the trial process?").
90. Note that this is entirely inconsistent with the instructions jurors receive which pro-
hibit them from forming decisions about the case until deliberations, when all of the evidence
has been presented. FLA. BAR, FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES §
2.1 (4th ed. 2002). However, as Herbert J. Stern says, "people are never impartial for any
longer than they have to be." HERBERT J. STERN, TRYING CASES TO WIN 115, 119 (1991).
91. Varinsky & Taylor, supra note 86, at 56.
92. WALTER, supra note 41, at 197. According to the study, the number one reason jurors
find the summation to be important is because it helps to refresh their memories. Id.
93. Mitchell, supra note 60, at 152 (referring to WALTER, supra note 41, at 205). Dr.
Walter mentions in her analysis of these results that the jurors were told, prior to deliberating
and filling out the questionnaires, to rely more on the law and the evidence than on the closing
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Despite these findings, jurors have been known to ignore irrefutable
physical evidence of guilt and acquit defendants who strongly appear to be
guilty of violent crimes.94 Psychological experts say that the reason for this
phenomenon is the use of certain implicit trial tactics by defense attorneys.95
If the defense attorney can engage the jurors in "absolutely essential psycho-
logical processes and addres[s] certain emotional issues" the attorney will
successfully sway the jury in his or her direction.96 One way that attorneys
do this is by creating a strong portrayal of the defendant as "psychologically
innocent" and as someone who is just like them.97 Or, if such a portrayal is
not likely to be convincing, the defense might play upon the jurors' emo-
tions9" by focusing on the defendant's tearful family.99 Often they will paint
a picture of the victim as the monster, as long as it is "someone or something
else other than the defendant against whom the jury can feel anger and to
whom they may apply punishment, so as to lend balance to their decision to
grant the perpetrator of a crime absolution, and thereby provide themselves
emotional equity."'00
Although experts attribute the success of attorneys who are able to win
this psychological game to clever selection of receptive jurors during voir
dire,' O' it is not illogical to conclude that closing statements must also be of
aid. Arguments are instruments of persuasion,'0 2 and a key element of per-
suasion is the recommended conclusion that is presented in the communica-
tion. 3 At closing arguments, the recommended conclusion is that the argu-
ing attorney is correct."° During that time, the attorney must "sell" his or her
case to the jury. 5 It is likely that sometimes this "sale" helps to convince
arguments of the attorneys. WALTER, supra note 41, at 205. In Dr. Walter's opinion, the
resulting data, indicating that only six percent felt closing arguments were important to their
decision-making process, was strongly influenced by the jurors not wanting anyone to think
that they disobeyed the instructions of the court. Id. at 205-06.
94. MARTIN BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW § 9:1(b), at 836
(4th ed. 2003).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 9:1(b), at 837.
97. Id.
98. Id. However, it is generally thought to be improper for an attorney to appeal to the
sympathies of the jury. 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 649 (1991).
99. BLINDER, supra note 94, § 9:1(b), at 837.
100. Id.
101. Id. § 9:1(b), at 839.
102. FRANCIS X. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS § 493 (1949).
103. HOVLAND ET AL.,supra note 70, at 10.
104. Caldwell et al., supra note 43, at 969.
105. TANFORD, supra note 42, at 133.
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jurors to turn their backs on the evidence and focus on the defense attorney's
psychologically engaging portrayal of the defendant."6
The debate about whether jurors base their verdicts on the information
they hear at closing arguments, or on information that they receive during the
trial, is one of primacy versus recency. 1°7 Primacy and recency describe
trends that lawyers have always intuitively sensed, though perhaps without
complete understanding.'0 8 The term "primacy" refers to the notion that
what we hear first is significant, because it induces us to commit to certain
positions and lays a foundation for the information that follows.'09 The term
"recency" refers to the notion that what we hear last is most memorable, and
is therefore easier to recall and has the largest impact on our decisions." '
Whether jurors base any part of their verdicts on the statements made by
counsel during closing arguments is a debate that is not likely to cease.
However, if it is true that jurors make up their minds during the trial based
on the evidence," ' then changing rule 3.250 so that it entitles the prosecutor
to the first and final closing arguments, without giving any effect to the tes-
timony presented by the defense, would actually benefit the defendant.
Without the current version of rule 3.250, the defense would be free to pre-
sent as much testimony or other evidence as needed, thereby having a pre-
sumably significant impact on those jurors who make up their minds during
the trial based on the evidence presented to them. 12
Even if, on the other hand, jurors are swayed by the statements attor-
neys make, and closing arguments do factor into their decisions, a change in
rule 3.250 is warranted. 13 Given the susceptibility of jurors to sometimes
ignore the evidence before them,"4 the arguments in favor of giving the State
of Florida the final argument before the jury in all criminal trials are suffi-
ciently compelling, especially when coupled with the fact that the prosecu-
tion bears the heavy burden of proof.'s
106. BLINDER,supra note 94, § 9:1(b), at 837.
107. STERN, supra note 90, at 115.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Varinsky & Taylor, supra note 86, at 56.
112. Id.
113. Dys & Pudlow, supra note 20, at 10. As Representative Carole Green stated, Florida
needs to "take some of the gamesmanship out of this process, and get truth back where it
needs to be." Id.
114. BLINDER, supra note 94, § 9: 1(b), at 836.
115. Faulk v. State, 104 So. 2d 519, 521 (Fla. 1958).
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III. THE BIRTH OF THE "SANDWICH" RULE
The "sandwich" rule has been an integral part of Florida jurisprudence
for more than 150 years."l 6  The concept of allowing the defendant in a
criminal trial to have the final word before the jury was originally codified in
chapter 539 of the Laws of Florida in 1853." 7 In its original form, the statute
provided that "in all cases wherein the defendant upon his trial introduces no
testimony, he shall, by himself or counsel, be entitled to the concluding ar-
gument before the jury,"" 8 which the Supreme Court of Florida unequivo-
cally ratified in 1858."9
It was not until 1911 that the legislature added the words "except his
own'12° to the statute to allow a defendant to testify in his or her own behalf
without losing the right of having the final say before the jury.'2 ' The devel-
opment of the rule finally culminated in 1939,122 and thus, the "sandwich"
rule as we currently know it was born.
A. The Common Law
At common law, the widely accepted rule in the United States'23 is that
the party with the burden of proof has the right to open and conclude the
final argument before the jury. 124 In criminal trials, that party is the prosecu-
tion, who has the great burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a
116. Id. (discussing the history of rule 3.250 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure).
117. Id.
118. Heffron v. State, 8 Fla. 73, 74-75 (Fla. 1858) (quoting Pamph. Laws of 1852-3, page
116).
119. See id.
120. Faulk, 104 So. 2d at 521. Note that throughout this article, the defendant is often
referred to with masculine pronouns due to the language used by lawmakers of earlier times;
however, these laws and principles certainly apply to females as well.
121. Id.
122. Wike v. State, 648 So. 2d 683, 686 (Fla. 1994). The rule was ultimately codified as
section 918.09, Florida Statutes, which was repealed in 1970 after the adoption of rule 3.250
of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1968. Id.
123. Not all countries agree with our common law. See generally Marilyn Vavra Kunkel
& Gilbert Geis, Order of Final Argument in Minnesota Criminal Trials, 42 MINN. L. REv. 549
(1958). The French, for example, have criticized the American criminal justice system be-
cause "we know of no such rule of fair play" as they do, namely that "[t]he accused is entitled
to the last word." Hon. Pierre Crabit~s, Why American Criminal Justice is a Failure, 23
A.B.A. J. 697, 700 (1937). Because our common law does not allow for such a rule, the
French say that we "have no conception of fair play to the accused," and that we have "the
souls and minds of hangmen." Id. at 700.
124. 75A AM. JuR. 2D Trial § 539 (1991); 15 FLA. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 1771 (2001).
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reasonable doubt." 5 Before 1853, this was the law in Florida,'26 and it con-
tinues to be the law in all but three other states. 27
The rationale behind the common law rule is that the party with the
burden of proof should be entitled to the opening and closing arguments to
the jury. 28 This structure for the order of closing arguments is grounded in
the premise that justice is best served if the defendant knows the actual ar-
guments that the prosecution will make in support of a conviction before the
defendant is faced with the decision whether to reply, and if so, what to re-
ply- 2
9
Perhaps another reason for the rule has to do with rules of psychol-
ogy. 3° The legal system has always understood the principles of primacy
and recency, which may be why the overwhelming majority of jurisdic-
tions' give the party who carries the burden of proof the absolute right to
speak last.'32 Many psychologists agree that between primacy and recency,
recency is more powerful. 1'
Admittedly, if rule 3.250 was repealed so that it mirrors the common
law, the defense would never have the benefit of either primacy or recency at
closing argument. However, this seemingly unjust proposition is counter-
125. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.7(c) (1999).
126. Faulk, 104 So. 2d at 521. The common law theories governing closing arguments are
still the law in Florida for civil trials. See City of Fort Lauderdale v. Casino Realty, 313 So.
2d 649 (Fla. 1975) (Overton, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he right to open and close final
argument rests upon the general principle of law that the party on whom rests the burden of
proof is required to go forward with the evidence and ... is entitled to open and close.").
127. Only Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina operate under criminal procedure
laws like that of Florida, which allows the defendant in a criminal trial the last word before the
jury, if he or she offers no testimony. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-71 (2003); N.C. GEN. R.
PRACT. SUPER. AND DIST. CTS. 10; State v. Mouzon, 485 S.E.2d 918, 921 (S.C. 1997); State v.
Crowe, 188 S.E.2d 379, 384 (S.C. 1972); State v. Brisbane, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 451 (S.C. 1802).
128. 15 FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1771 (2001) (citing Wike v. State, 648 So. 2d 683,
686 (Fla. 1994)).
129. 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 125, § 24.7(c), at 552 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.1,
Notes of Advisory Comm.).
130. STERN, supra note 90, at 116.
131. Note that Florida, along with Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, is not
among the majority referred to.
132. STERN, supra note 90, at 116.
133. Id. Mr. Stem disagrees, and argues that it is most effective to begin strongly and
corroborate a powerful opening with evidence and testimony along the way. Id. at 117. He
suggests that being the first to speak at closing argument is beneficial, and advocates that the
method of beginning strongly should be applied throughout the trial. Id. In his opinion, what
the jurors hear first is most powerful. Id. This theory that primacy is more powerful than
recency may support the old saying that you never get a second chance to make a first impres-
sion. See STERN, supra note 90, at 116.
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acted by the great burden of proof that is placed upon the prosecution. 34
Additionally, the state cannot appeal an acquittal,' while the defendant, if
convicted, has a constitutionally protected right to an appeal.'36 Repealing
rule 3.250 and returning to the principles embedded in the common law fa-
vors traditional notions of fairness.
37
B. Rule 3.250 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure
The portion of rule 3.250 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure
relevant to this discussion provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the
accused may choose to be sworn as a witness in the accused's own behalf
and ... a defendant offering no testimony in his or her own behalf, except
the defendant's own, shall be entitled to the concluding argument before the
jury."'138 To properly understand the application of this rule, one must first
know what constitutes testimony. Various appellate courts of Florida, in-
cluding the supreme court, have established that testimony includes docu-
ments,39 diagrams,"4 a sketch or drawing of the premises upon which the
alleged crime took place, 14 1 a video tape viewed by the jury, 142 and still pho-
tographs. 143 Indeed, rule 3.250 applies to documentary evidence.'
44
134. 15 FLA. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 1771 (2001); 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 539 (2004); 5
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 125, § 24.7(c), at 552; STEIN, supra note 34, § 5; STERN, supra note
90, at 116.
135. Balikes v. Speleos, 173 So. 2d 735, 737 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (citing FLA.
STAT. § 924.07(1)).
136. Harriel v. State, 710 So. 2d 102, 103 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (citing FLA.
CONST. art. V, § 4(b)).
137. United States v. 2,353.28 Acres of Land, 414 F.2d 965, 972 (5th Cir. 1969) (stating
that allowing the party with the burden of proof to proceed first and last at final argument
favors traditional notions of fairness).
138. FLA. R. CRJM. P. 3.250.
139. 15 FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1778 (2004) (citing Paulk v. State, 405 So. 2d 785,
786 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
140. Grimsley v. State, 304 So. 2d 493,494 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
141. Barkley v. State, 10 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1942).
142. Scott v. State, 559 So. 2d 269, 273 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
143. 15 FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1778 (2004) (citing Kennedy v. State, 83 So. 2d 4, 5
(Fla. 1955); Talley v. State, 36 So. 2d 201, 205 (Fla. 1948)). However, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal recently held that still photos taken from a video entered into evidence by the
state, which was not a motion-picture video but a compilation of still frames, does not consti-
tute evidence on behalf of the defense separate from that offered by the state. Zackery v.
State, 849 So. 2d 343, 345-46 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). If, however, the defense had
made the still photographs from a motion-picture video offered into evidence by the state,
those photographs would have constituted evidence, and therefore the defendant would have
forgone his right to conclude the argument to the jury, as the photographs would have been
additional to that which the state used to prove its case. Id. at 345.
[Vol. 29:1:99
115
: Nova Law Review 29, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
TAKING THE "SANDWICH" OFF THE MENU
Consequently, to secure the rebuttal argument at closing under rule
3.250, a defense attorney may forgo presentation not only of relevant or even
significant testimony, but of nearly all documentary evidence as well. 145 For
example, in Williams v. State,146 the defendant's attorney failed to call wit-
nesses of whose existence the attorney knew, and who would have corrobo-
rated the defendant's story. 147 On appeal, the court found that such a failure
on the part of defense counsel was committed intentionally and solely for the
purpose of reserving the rebuttal at closing argument in accordance with rule
3.250.148 The court held that Mr. Williams had been convicted at trial of rape
and kidnapping as a consequence of his attorney's ineffective assistance, and
stated that it would have made a difference to Mr. Williams' case had his
attorney called the relevant witnesses to testify on his behalf. 149 Accordingly,
the court held that Mr. Williams did not receive a fair trial and reversed for a
new trial.150
Situations like this one provide opponents of rule 3.250 with ammuni-
tion. Not surprisingly, those in favor of repealing rule 3.250 argue that it
allows, and on some level may even encourage, defense attorneys to employ
tactical procedures at trial.' As the Williams case illustrates, such tactics
can include refusing to call witnesses on behalf of the defendant, even if
those witnesses' testimony could mean the difference between liberty and
imprisonment,' for fear of losing the sandwich against the prosecution at
closing argument.153
This reluctance to give up rebuttal arguments in criminal trials is
unlikely to subside. Perhaps one reason for opposition to a new rule is the
principle embedded so deeply in American society that a criminal defendant
is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and that it is better to lose scores of
guilty convictions than to wrongfully convict one innocent person. 54 As
John Adams once said,
144. Id. at 344.
145. Diaz v. State, 747 So. 2d 1021, 1026 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
146. 507 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
147. Id. at 1123-24.
148. Id. at 1123.
149. Id. at 1124.
150. Id. at 1125.
151. Dys & Pudlow, supra note 20, at 1. "What this [bill] is about is truly seeking truth
and truly making decisions not based on gamesmanship." Id.; see Diaz, 747 So. 2d at 1026.
152. Williams, 507 So. 2d at 1124.
153. Id. at 1123.
154. Kunkel & Geis, supra note 123, at 549.
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We are to look upon it as more beneficial that many guilty persons
should escape unpunished than one innocent should suffer. The
reason is because it is of more importance to the community that
innocence should be protected than it is that guilt should be pun-
ished, for guilt and crimes are so frequent in the world that all of
them cannot be punished, and many times they happen in such a
manner that it is not of much consequence to the public whether
they are punished or not. But when innocence itself is brought to
the bar and condemned, especially to die, the subject or victim will
exclaim, "it is immaterial to me whether I behave well or ill, for
virtue itself is no security." And if such a sentiment as this should
take place in the mind of the subject there would be an end to all
security whatsoever. 155
Indeed, attorneys opposed to the change in the law base their opposition
in part on the theory that allowing prosecutors to have the last word will re-
sult in wrongful convictions. 15 6 However, one might conclude that guaran-
teeing prosecutors the rebuttal in all criminal trials would have entirely the
opposite effect, given the propensity of defense attorneys to omit potentially
significant evidence for the tactical sake of having the final word before the
jury. 157 Without the pressure weighing upon their shoulders to reserve the
rebuttal argument at closing, defense attorneys can devote true zeal to the
representation of their clients by presenting as much defensive evidence as
may be appropriate for the particular case.
The Third District Court of Appeal recently addressed this issue in Diaz
v. State.5 ' At trial, the court encountered a rule 3.250 problem that arose due
to an issue with the scope of cross-examination of a particular witness."
The court had placed certain restrictions upon cross-examination, 6 ° relying
on the premise set forth by the Supreme Court of Florida that "the defendant
may not use cross-examination as a vehicle for presenting defensive evi-
155. STEIN,supra note 34, § 553.
156. Dys & Pudlow, supra note 20, at 10. The article quotes Tallahassee criminal defense
attorney Tim Jansen, who warned that if the bill becomes law, "[y]ou may see more convic-
tions where the evidence does not rise to beyond reasonable doubt." Id.
157. Diaz, 747 So. 2d at 1026; Williams, 507 So. 2d at 1123.
158. 747 So. 2d 1021, 1021 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1023. The court relied on Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1982), in
which the Supreme Court of Florida set forth the proper purposes of cross examination: "(1)
to weaken, test, or demonstrate the impossibility of the testimony of the witness on direct
examination and, (2) to impeach the credibility of the witness .... Therefore it is held that
questions on cross-examination must either relate to credibility or be germane to the matters
brought out on direct examination." Id. at 337.
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dence."' 16' Defense counsel was therefore unable to question one of the
state's witnesses regarding a fact pertinent to establishing his client's defense
of self-defense, as the court deemed it outside the scope of cross-
examination. 162 Consequently, defense counsel had to "make the witness his
own,"' 163 thereby losing the advantageous "sandwich" at closing argument. 164
The defendant was found guilty of second-degree murder. 165
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal expressed its agreement
with the trial court by stating, with distinct annoyance, that "but for the exis-
tence of rule 3.250 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure the scope of
cross-examination issue presented in this case would not exist," and that
"[t]he truth finding process was not compromised."' 166 In the court's learned
opinion, rule 3.250 as currently written discourages criminal defendants from
presenting evidence that could potentially benefit their clients, because de-
fense attorneys feel as if they must pay a price to present such evidence. 67
Although a criminal defense attorney may not withhold evidence which
directly exculpates his client of the crime charged for the sake of addressing
the jury last in closing argument, the same cannot be said of other types of
important evidence which may not be per se exculpatory, but are significant
to a secondary, but nevertheless important issue.168
Before introducing such evidence counsel is forced to weigh what is
to be gained by the introduction of that evidence against the loss of
the final argument. All too often, defense attorneys believe that their
oratorical persuasive abilities in final argument can better serve their
clients and the balance is erroneously stricken in favor of closing ar-
gument. 169
Additionally, the court pointed out that rule 3.250 promotes "less than
ethical behavior in the courtroom."' 7 ° Defense attorneys are prone to pro-
duce exhibits with which to question witnesses on cross-examination and to
parade before the jury, but then refuse to enter those exhibits into evidence
for fear of losing the right to "sandwich" the prosecution with two closing
161. Id.
162. Diaz, 747 So. 2d at 1024.
163. Id. at 1023 (quoting Steinhorst, 412 So. 2d at 337).
164. Id. at 1023.
165. Id. at 1022.
166. Id. at 1025.
167. Diaz v. State, 747 So. 2d at 1026.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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arguments. 71 Each of these problems can easily be eliminated by changing
rule 3.250 so that the state has the first and final closing arguments in all
criminal trials. 172
C. The Guilt Phase Versus the Penalty Phase
It is important to understand that the procedures used during the guilt
and penalty phases of a criminal prosecution in Florida are governed by
separate rules. 7 3 Rule 3.250 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure
governs closing arguments during the guilt phase.'74 The guilt phase is the
part of a criminal trial during which the jury, or in the case of a bench trial,
the judge, determines whether the defendant is guilty of committing a
crime.'75 By contrast, during the penalty phase, which is also known as the
sentencing phase, the finder of fact determines the punishment for a defen-
dant who has already been found guilty.'76 Perhaps the distinction is most
simply understood as the difference between "did he commit murder?" and
"should he die for committing murder?"'77
In capital cases, the order of closing arguments during the penalty phase
is governed by rule 3.780 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
provides that both the state and the defense will be given an equal opportu-
nity to present one final statement, and the state shall proceed first. 7 8 Under
rule 3.780, a trial judge has no discretion to change the order of final argu-
ments during the penalty phase; it is mandatory that the defendant address
the jury last.179 "[A] defendant always presents the final closing argument in
the sentencing phase."'
' 80
The "sandwich" rule has no bearing on the penalty phase of a criminal
trial,' 8' and therefore repealing rule 3.250 will not have any adverse effects
on the rights of a defendant in a capital sentencing hearing.
171. Id.
172. Diaz, 747 So. 2d at 1026.
173. See 15 FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1772 (2001).
174. Id. § 1777; FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.250.
175. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 727 (8th ed. 2004).
176. Id. at 1169.
177. Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and Deathworthiness: Differentiating
Between Guilt and Punishment in Death Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 21,28 (1997).
178. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.780(c).
179. 15 FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1772 (2001).
180. Wike v. State, 648 So. 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 1994).
181. 15 FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1772 (2001).
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D. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
In the federal system, the order of closing arguments is as follows: the
prosecution opens the argument, the defendant is then given an opportunity
to reply, and then the prosecution is allowed to reply in rebuttal.'82 This
structure is set forth in rule 29.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure.'83 To preserve fairness, the government's rebuttal is limited to issues
raised by the defendant in his or her argument."
As with the common law, the order of closing arguments in federal tri-
als favors the party bearing the burden of proof.'85 The Fifth Circuit has held
that because an order that permits the prosecution to proceed first and last
during final jury summation mirrors the burden of proof, it is improper for a
defendant to argue that allowing the prosecution to do so is unfair.'86 Ac-
cordingly, state statutes that imitate the federal system with regard to the
order of closing arguments have been upheld against due process chal-
lenges. 8 7 In fact, the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the constitutional-
ity of rule 3.250 when applied "against" the defendant in Preston v. State.
188
At trial, Mr. Preston called two witnesses to testify on his behalf, and
was thus not entitled to "sandwich" the prosecution with two closing argu-
ments.'89 On appeal, he raised three issues: 1) that the rule violated due
process by having a "chilling effect" on a defendant's right to call witnesses,
because if a defendant does call witnesses, he relinquishes his right to the
first and final arguments at closing; 2) that the rule denies defendants the
equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, as it discriminates procedurally against those who
do call witnesses; and 3) that allowing the prosecution to have the final ar-
gument has the psychological effect of diluting the defendant's presumption
of innocence, thereby violating due process. 90
With regard to the defendant's first argument, the court was disinclined
to agree that rule 3.250 produces a "chilling effect" on the defendant's right
182. 5 LAFAVEETAL., supra note 125, § 24.7(c), at 552 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.1).
183. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.1.
184. 4 LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 29.13
(Mark S. Rhodes, ed., 2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 2003) (citing United States v. Sarmiento, 744 F.2d
755, 765 (11th Cir. 1984)).
185. Id. at 553 (citing United States v. Braziel, 609 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1980)).
186. Braziel, 609 F.2d at 237.
187. 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 125, § 24.7(c), at 553 (citing Preston v. State, 260 So. 2d
501, 502 (Fla. 1972)).
188. 260 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1972).
189. Id. at 503.
190. Id.
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to call witnesses, as the decision to call witnesses is a basic choice that every
defendant must make if his counsel agrees that it is strategically desirable.1 91
To the defendant's second argument about unequal protection of the laws,
the court responded that the accusation is based on the premise that all de-
fendants are similarly situated, which is not at all true. 192 To the contrary,
when the situation arises in which the defense may call witnesses to build
"its own case for innocence," the defense receives "a more balanced expo-
sure before the jury."' 93 As for the defendant's third issue, the court stated
simply that the right to open and close the argument to the jury at final sum-
mation, while substantial, has never been raised to constitutional status and
the court was not about to raise it then.' 94 Instead, the court highlighted the
fact that under the common law and under statutes in the vast majority of
states, the right to open and close the final arguments belongs to the prosecu-
tion, who bears the great burden of proof.'95
After reading the opinion in Preston, one might conclude that the Su-
preme Court of Florida supports a rule that allows the prosecution to address
the jury last, given the fine arguments the court makes in support of the
structure of summations employed by so many other states.196 Indeed, the
prevailing view throughout the nation with respect to the order of closing
arguments in criminal trials emulates the view adopted by the federal sys-
tem.'97 Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina are the only
four out of our fifty states that have not embraced this structure.'98
191. Id. at 504.
192. Id.
193. Preston, 260 So. 2d at 504.
194. Id. at 504-05.
195. Id. at 505.
196. Id. at 504-05.
197. 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 125, § 24.7(c) at 552.
198. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.250; GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-71 (2003); N.C. GEN. R. PRACT.
SuP. AND DIST. CTS. 10; State v. Mouzon, 485 S.E.2d 918, 921 (S.C. 1997); State v. Crowe,
188 S.E.2d 379, 384 (S.C. 1972); State v. Brisbane, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 451 (S.C. 1802); Dys &
Pudlow, supra note 20, at 10 (mentioning that forty-six other states in the United States em-
ploy procedural rules that grant the prosecution the right to the first and final arguments at
closing in criminal trials).
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IV. THOSE FORTY-SIX OTHER STATES
Although the majority 99 of the United States employs an order for clos-
ing arguments that favors traditional notions of fairness, 20 not all forty-six
of those rules were originally enacted that way. For example, California's
statute governing the order of closing arguments in criminal trials initially
made the prosecution's opportunity to conclude the argument before the jury
merely discretionary,2°" thereby leaving room for the possibility that the de-
fendant could conclude. However, in 1873, only one year after its enact-
ment, the legislature amended the section giving the prosecution the absolute
right to rebut the defendant's closing statement.2 2 The order of closing ar-
guments in California has since remained the same.203
The history of the order of closing arguments in Minnesota presents a
particularly fascinating story. At one time, Minnesota had the unique dis-
tinction of being the only state in the entire country to always give the defen-
dant in criminal trials the concluding argument at final summation. 2°, The
proposition was introduced in 1875 as section 631.07 of the Minnesota Stat-
utes205 and, despite frequent agitation for change,20 6 was not amended until
112 years later.207
199. In most states, the order of closing arguments is either identical to that used by the
federal system, or else provides that each side will have the opportunity to speak only once,
with the defense being the first to proceed. Examples of the former structure include: Con-
necticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-88 (West 2004); California, CAL. PENAL CODE §
1093(e) (West 2004); and Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-123 (Michie 2003). Arkansas,
however, includes a clause in its statute that requires both parties to state openly and fully
their basis for arguing that a certain verdict applies. Id. If a party refuses, the party "so refus-
ing" will be denied the conclusion of the argument. Id. New York is an example of the latter
type of statute. N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 260.30 (McKinney 2004). Texas simply requires
that the prosecution proceed last, and leaves the specifics to the discretion of the trial judge.
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 36.07 (Vernon 1981).
200. United States v. 2,353.38 Acres of Land, 414 F.2d 965, 972 (5th Cir. 1969) (stating
that allowing the party with the burden of proof to proceed first and last at final argument
favors traditional notions of fairness).
201. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1093 (2004) (Historical and Statutory notes). As enacted in
1872, the pertinent subsection read: "When the evidence is concluded.., the District Attorney
or other counsel for the people must open and the District Attorney may conclude the argu-
ment." Id. (emphasis added).
202. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1093(e) (2004).
203. Id.
204. Kunkel & Geis, supra note 123, at 550.
205. Id.
206. Id. The article cites and discusses a Minnesota Crime Commission report from 1927,
which was one of several attempts made to change the law. Id.
207. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.07 (West 2002) (Historical and Statutory Notes).
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During the time that section 631.07 governed in its pre-amended form,
researchers conducted a survey of the attorneys in Minnesota, inviting each
attorney in the state's eighty-seven counties to respond to a questionnaire.2 °s
Upon analyzing the results, the researchers noted that:
The most persuasive contention of [the] prosecutors is that defense
counsel may wander far afield in his final argument, including ir-
relevant, often prejudicial material, and possibly misleading com-
ments on fact or law. Defense counsel may interject any number
of theories on the evidence that the prosecution cannot annswer
[sic]. One respondent concluded that ". . . this statute ... enables
the defense to throw out a last-minute red herring." The state's
remedy is limited to corrective instruction by the presiding judge
and the unwise tactic of objecting during defense counsel's argu-
ment.209
The researchers further found that "the rights of the accused in a crimi-
nal trial are thought to be adequately protected by constitutional safeguards
without the additional advantage of having the final argument before the
jury," which was one reason those in opposition of the Minnesota statute
advocated its amendment.2 0 The study also revealed some attorneys' beliefs
that section 631.07 led to fewer convictions. 21  Those attorneys grounded
their belief in the notion that a typical jury is "highly vulnerable to strong
arguments by counsel, 212 and that when the factors and merits of the case
appear to be equal,213 the order of closing arguments could be the deciding
factor.214
On the other hand, some of the prosecutors who responded felt that al-
lowing the defendant to have the final word balances the equities, because
prosecutors are privileged with unconstrained financial resources for investi-
gation, more advanced investigative facilities, and cooperation from state and
208. Kunkel & Geis, supra note 123, at 551. One hundred twenty-eight attorneys replied.
Id.
209. Id. at 552.
210. Id. at 553.
211. Id. at 555.
212. Kunkel & Geis, supra note 123, at 555. However, the authors of the article noted that
psychological studies (conducted during that time) on the importance of the argument pro-
duced inconclusive findings. Id.
213. Id. The heads of the study commented on this statement, saying that if the factors
and merits of the case appear to be equal, then the state has established no more than an equal
case, and has therefore not met its burden of proof. Id.
214. Id. at 555.
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federal agencies.1 5 One attorney went so far as to say that if the state's evi-
dence is sufficiently compelling in and of itself, then their case should be
able to withstand the defense's closing argument.216
Clearly, the struggle to change the law in Minnesota was an uphill
climb.2"7 Ultimately, however, perseverance prevailed, and the statute was
amended in 1987.8 It now reads:
when the giving of evidence is concluded in a criminal trial... the
prosecution may make a closing argument to the jury. The defense
may then make its closing argument to the jury. The prosecution
shall then have the right to reply in rebuttal to the closing argu-
ment of the defense.
219
The result of this 112-year-old battle surely provides optimism for those
who wish to change the laws in the misfit states.
V. FOUR BLACK SHEEP
Each of the four misfit states have similar rules with regard to the order
of final arguments that give the defendant an opportunity to close before the
jury.220 None of these rules grants the criminal defendant an absolute right to
the last word, as section 631.07 of the Minnesota Statutes did in its pre-
amended form. Instead, each of the four states makes the defendant's right
to close contingent upon the defendant's refusal or failure to present evi-
dence at trial in defense of the charge alleged against him or her.22'
South Carolina was the first of the misfit states to adopt such a rule.22
The Supreme Court of South Carolina made its departure from traditional
laws in 1802 with its decision in State v. Brisbane.223 On an appeal, defense
counsel raised the issue of changing the order of closing arguments for the
215. Kunkel & Geis, supra note 123, at 554.
216. Id.
217. See id. According to a news article published by the Star Tribune in 1999, the strug-
gle is far from over. Id.; see Paul Gustafson, Criminal Prosecutors Want Last Word, STAR
TRm. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Feb. 20, 1999, at IB, available at 1999 WL 7493933.
218. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.07 (West 2002) (Historical and Statutory Notes).
219. § 631.07.
220. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.250; GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-71 (Supp. 2003); N.C. GEN. R. PRACT.
Sup. AND DIST. CTS. 10; State v. Mouzon, 485 S.E.2d 918, 921 (S.C. 1997); State v. Crowe,
188 S.E.2d 379, 384 (S.C. 1972); State v. Brisbane, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 451 (S.C. 1802).
221. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.250; § 17-8-71; N.C. GEN. R. PRACT. SUP. AND DIST. CTS. 10; Mou-
zon, 485 S.E.2d at 918; Crowe, 188 S.E.2d at 379; Brisbane, 2 S.C.L. at 451.
222. See Brisbane, 2 S.C.L. at 451.
223. Id.
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sole purpose of having "the point settled as a rule [there]after. ' '224 He swayed
the court by stating that allowing the prosecution to open and close the ar-
guments before the jury at final summation was a relict of English rule, and
that our country would be better served by a law "more agreeable to the
rights of freemen. '225
At that time, the order of closing arguments in civil trials in South Caro-
lina provided a defendant who called no witnesses in his or her defense with
the privilege of the last word.226 Defense counsel convinced the Brisbane
court that the rule would serve an even stronger purpose in criminal trials
because much more is at stake in a criminal trial. 227 Thus, the rule became
one of standing practice in South Carolina's criminal justice system.2 8
It seems clear from the Brisbane case that the court's motivation in im-
plementing the rule was to create a more just system for those defendants
who opt not to present a defense at trial; not, as it seems today, to discourage
defendants from presenting a defense at trial. 229 But the practice of allowing
a criminal defendant, who presents no defensive evidence or testimony, to
speak to the jury last continues to be upheld by the courts of modern-day
South Carolina.230 One cannot help but wonder whether such support for the
rule is based on belief in its validity, or on the typical reluctance of a society
to change the way things have been done for over 200 years.
In North Carolina, like in Florida, the order of closing arguments is gov-
emed by rule as opposed to common law or statute.231 It provides that in
both civil and criminal cases, if the defendant introduces no evidence, the
right to open and close the argument to the jury "shall belong to him. ' 232 The
practice of allowing this order for closing arguments in North Carolina dates
back to at least the mid- 1800's.233 Today, the Supreme Court of North Caro-
224. Id. at 453.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Brisbane, 2 S.C.L. at 453.
228. Id. at 454.
229. Diaz v. State, 747 So. 2d 1021, 1026 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999). Judge Sorondo
made this observation in Diaz with regard to this structure of closing arguments. See id.
230. State v. Mouzon, 485 S.E.2d 918, 921 (S.C. 1997); State v. Crowe, 188 S.E.2d 379,
384 (S.C. 1972).
231. See N.C. GEN. R. PRACT. SUP. AND DIST. CTS. 10. The order of closing arguments in
the penalty phase of a North Carolina trial is governed by statute, and provides that the defen-
dant shall have the right to the final argument. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (2003).
232. N.C. GEN. R. PRACT. SUP. AND DIST. CTS. 10.
233. State v. Anderson, 7 S.E. 678, 680 (N.C. 1888). In State v. Anderson, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina briefly acknowledged the right of a defendant presenting no evidence
in his behalf to conclude the argument before the jury, indicating that by 1888, the rule was
common knowledge. Id.
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lina continues to protect the right of a defendant who presents no evidence in
his defense at trial to address the jury finally, by holding that it is not a right
of which the defendant can be deprived by an exercise of judicial discre-
234tion.
Additionally, by statute in North Carolina, up to three attorneys may ar-
gue to the jury on behalf of the defendant. 235 The Supreme Court of North
Carolina has set forth the rule that in capital cases, although the maximum
number of attorneys per side that may argue to the jury is three, each attorney
may address the jury as many times as they wish during closing.236
Thus, for example if one defense attorney grows weary of arguing,
he may allow another defense attorney to address the jury and
may, upon being refreshed, rise again to make another address dur-
ing the defendant's time for argument. However, if the defendant
presents evidence, all such addresses must be made prior to the
prosecution's closing argument.237
Failure to allow each attorney to address the jury in this manner constitutes
prejudice to the defendant per se, and warrants a new trial.238 Clearly, a de-
fendant in North Carolina who presents no evidence with which to defend
himself at trial is entitled to great procedural advantages.
The purpose of Georgia's rule, according to the Supreme Court of
Georgia, is to allow counsel for an accused with no defense "every opportu-
nity to persuade the jury that the State has failed to prove his guilt. ' 23 9 Al-
lowing a defendant to open and conclude the argument under these circum-
stances has been common practice in Georgia since 1852.240 Lawmakers
created the law to make the order of closing arguments in criminal trials par-
allel to the order used in civil trials.241' Today, this aspect of Georgia's crimi-
nal procedure is controlled by section 17-8-71 of the Georgia Code.242
234. State v. Eury, 346 S.E.2d 447, 450 (N.C. 1986) (quoting State v. Raper, 166 S.E. 314
(N.C. 1932)).
235. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-97 (2003). The statute permits three attorneys per side to
address the jury. Id.
236. State v. Barrow, 517 S.E.2d 374, 376 (N.C. 1999); State v. Mitchell, 365 S.E.2d 554,
559 (N.C. 1988); Eury, 346 S.E.2d at 450; State v. Gladden, 340 S.E.2d 673, 688 (N.C. 1986).
237. Gladden, 340 S.E.2d at 688 (explaining the court's interpretation of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 84-14, now § 7A-97, which grants this right).
238. Barrow, 517 S.E.2d at 377; Mitchell, 365 S.E.2d at 559.
239. Yeomans v. State, 192 S.E.2d 362, 365 (Ga. 1972).
240. Hargrove v. State, 45 S.E. 58 (Ga. 1903) (explaining the origin of Georgia's rule).
241. Id.; see Phelps v. Thurman, 74 Ga. 873 (1885); Chapman v. Atlanta & W. Point R.R.,
74 Ga. 547 (1885). These civil cases held that unless the defendant's plea was one of justifi-
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Although on its face, the statute does not explicitly state that a defen-
dant who offers only his own testimony at trial is entitled to the final closing
argument, the courts of Georgia have interpreted the law to mean just that."3
Unlike Florida, however, Georgia courts have held that a defendant who is
wrongfully denied the right to open and close the arguments to the jury, but
who, from the evidence, is clearly guilty of the crime alleged, is not entitled
to a new trial.2" In Florida, even in light of evidence indicating the defen-
dant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court of Florida has
reversed convictions when the defendant has been wrongfully denied his
right to open and close the final arguments to the jury.245
The legislatures of Georgia and Florida appear to have been in synch
very recently, as the Georgia Senate attempted to change their statute
through the passage of Senate Bill 414.246 Much like Florida House Bill
1149, Georgia's bill posed to amend section 17-8-71 and repeal all laws con-
flicting with the statute as amended, so that "the prosecuting attorney shall
always conclude the argument to the jury. 247 Unfortunately, the fates of the
Georgia and Florida bills also appear to have been in synch, as neither Geor-
gia Senate Bill 414 nor Florida House Bill 1149 will become law in 2004.248
Thus, it is Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida which
comprise the four states that have perhaps become known as black sheep
among America's criminal justice system.
cation, the defendant was not entitled to the first and last arguments at final summation.
Phelps, 74 Ga. at 837; Chapman, 74 Ga. at 547-48.
242. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-71 (2003).
243. Scott v. State, 253 S.E.2d 698, 699 (Ga. 1979).
244. Id. at 700.
245. Wike v. State, 648 So. 2d 683, 686 (Fla. 1994); Birge v. State, 92 So. 2d 819, 822
(Fla. 1957); 15 FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1777 (2001).
246. S. 414, 2004 Gen. Assem., Leg. Sess. (Ga. 2004) available at http://www.legis.state.
ga.us/legis/2003_04/versions/sb4l4 As passedSenate_5.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
247. Id.
248. Georgia Senate Bill 414 was not among those signed by the Governor. The list of
those bills that were signed by the Governor after the 2003-2004 Session are available at the
Georgia General Assembly website. Ga. Gen. Assemb. available at http://www.legis
.state.ga.us/(last visited Oct.14, 2004). Florida House Bill 1149 died in committee on April
30, 2004, after being introduced to the Florida Senate and referred to the Judiciary and Crimi-
nal Justice Committees. For a complete history, visit the Florida Senate website. Fla. Sen.
available at http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfn?Mode=Bills&SubMenu = 1 &Tab
=session&BI Mode=ViewBilllnfo&BillNum=1 149&Chamber=House&Year=2004&Title=%
2D%3EBill%2520Info%3AH%25201149%2D%3ESession%25202004 (last visited Oct. 14,
2004).
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VI. WHAT WILL THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA SAY?
The Supreme Court of Florida enjoys the right, under article V, section
2(a) of the Constitution of Florida, to adopt rules for the practice and proce-
dure in all courts of Florida.249 Rules that are substantive in nature are left to
the legislature.25° Neither branch of the government may exercise a power
given to the other.2 1' Thus, the fate of the proposition espoused by House
Bill 1149 may ultimately depend upon whether the rule is deemed procedural
or substantive.252
The question, of course, is what makes a rule procedural as opposed to
substantive? The Supreme Court of Florida defines substantive law as it
relates to criminal law and procedure as "that which declares what acts are
crimes and prescribes the punishment therefor. '253 The court defined proce-
dural law in the same context as "that which provides or regulates the steps
by which one who violates a criminal statute is punished., 254 Put simply,
substantive law creates and defines rights, while procedural law is "legal
machinery '255 through which those rights are made effective.256
If rule 3.250 were ever to be repealed by a statute enacted by the legis-
lature, the issue will arise of how the Supreme Court of Florida will react. 57
Attorneys in opposition of the change argue that the rule is procedural, and
that the Supreme Court of Florida will find it unconstitutional.2 5 8 Not sur-
prisingly, advocates of the change argue that the rule is clearly substantive:
"[I]f you don't follow that rule... cases are reversed. And they are not sub-
ject to a harmless error analysis. That means it is a fundamental error. In
249. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
250. TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. 1995); Benyard v. Wain-
wright, 322 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1975).
251. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
252. STAFF ANALY. H.B. 1149 CRIM. PROSECUTIONS, H.R., 2004 Reg. Sess., at 4; see Dys
& Pudlow, supra note 20, at 10.
253. In re Fla. R. Crim. P., 272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1972) (quoting State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d
236, 238 (Fla. 1969)).
254. Fla. R. Crim. P., 272 So. 2d at 65 (quoting Garcia, 229 So. 2d at 238).
255. Garcia, 229 So. 2d at 238.
256. Id.; Benyard v. Wainright, 322 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1975).
257. Dys & Pudlow, supra note 20, at 10.
258. Id. An example of the supreme court's power occurred in 2000, when the court de-
clared the Death Penalty Reform Act of 2000, passed by the legislature, an "unconstitutional
encroachment" on the court's "exclusive power to 'adopt rules for the practice and procedure
in all courts."' STAFF ANALY. H.B. 1149 CRiM. PROSECUTIONS, H.R., 2004 Reg. Sess., at 5
(citing Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. 2000)).
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our view, that means it is a substantive right, which ... the legislature [has]
the total power to change. 259
Admittedly, the Supreme Court of Florida said that the right that is
granted to defendants in rule 3.250 is a "vested procedural right. 2 60 How-
ever, the court has also said that "[tihe fact that a statutory provision could
appropriately be labeled 'procedural' does not necessarily mean that it vio-
lates article V, section 2(a). 261 In fact, the court has refused to nullify pro-
cedural statutory provisions that are "intimately related to" or "intertwined
with" statutory provisions that are substantive in nature.262 With specific
regard to laws that combine substantive and procedural provisions, the Su-
preme Court of Florida has stated that the judiciary and legislature must
work together to give effect to such laws without encroaching on each
other's constitutional power.263 It is certainly arguable that rule 3.250, even
if considered procedural, also involves substantive law, given the fact that
failure to follow rule 3.250 is reversible error2" and can result in the reversal
of convictions even when the court acknowledges overwhelming evidence of
guilt. 265 In this respect, the Supreme Court of Florida actually appears to
harbor some resentment toward the "sandwich" rule, which is apparent from
the court's words in Birge v. State266 when forced to reverse the conviction of
a heinous crime: "It is not our privilege to disregard it even though we as
individuals might feel that [a defendant] is as guilty as sin itself. 267
Furthermore, the rule was originally enacted by the Florida Legislature,
not the Supreme Court of Florida, in 1853.268 When the supreme court rati-
fied the rule in 1858,269 and again in 1958,270 it stated that the rule is a "posi-
tive clear-cut unequivocal legislative enactment and we are bound to follow
it until the Legislature in its wisdom sees fit to change it."'271 If the legisla-
259. Dys & Pudlow, supra note 20, at 10 (citing Brad Thomas, public safety policy direc-
tor for Governor Jeb Bush). Mr. Thomas also mentioned when interviewed for the article that
the Governor supports the proposition contained in House Bill 1149. Id.
260. Wike v. State, 648 So. 2d 683, 684 (Fla. 1994); Faulk v. State, 104 So. 2d 519, 521
(Fla. 1958); Birge v. State, 92 So. 2d 819, 822 (Fla. 1957) (emphasis added).
261. In re Commitment: Cartwright, 870 So. 2d 152, 158 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
262. Id. (citing Caple v. Tuttle's Design-Build, Inc., 753 So. 2d 49, 54 (Fla. 2000)).
263. Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. 1992).
264. Wike, 648 So. 2d at 686; Faulk, 104 So. 2d at 521; Birge, 92 So. 2d at 822.
265. Wike, 648 So. 2d at 686; Birge, 92 So. 2d at 822.
266. 92 So. 2d at 819.
267. Id. at 822.
268. Heffron v. State, 8 Fla. 73 (1858).
269. Id.
270. Faulk, 104 So. 2d at 521.
271. Id. (emphasis added).
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ture now sees fit to change the law, as House Bill 1149 indicates, then it
seems appropriate that the supreme court shall stay true to its word.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that the party with
the burden of proof shall proceed first and last during the final arguments of
a trial.272 It seems unreasonable that in a country which has adopted this pro-
cedure in an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, Florida seeks to remain
behind. Rule 3.250 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, as currently
written, discourages defendants from presenting evidence in their defense,
273
increases the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel, 274 and promotes un-
ethical behavior in the courtroom. 275 Whether a bill like House Bill 1149
ultimately becomes law and changes the order of closing arguments in crimi-
nal trials in Florida, the problem is unlikely to disappear. Like the prosecu-
tors of Minnesota, who faced a similar struggle years ago, the prosecutors of
Florida should not give up on this issue.276
A rule that began perhaps as a protective measure for defendants who
fail to defend themselves during their own criminal prosecutions,277 has
evolved into a mechanism for snatching away from the prosecution what the
common law clearly dictates belongs to them.27' Florida should take the ad-
vice of its learned Third District Court of Appeal and change rule 3.250, so
that we can "enhance the search for the truth and eliminate the misguided
notion that having the final argument in summation is more important than
the introduction of potentially important evidence.2 79
272. 75A AM. JuR. 2D Trial § 539 (1991 & Supp. 2004).
273. Diaz v. State, 747 So. 2d 1021, 1026 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
274. Williams v. State, 507 So. 2d 1122, 1124 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987); 14 FLA. JUR.
2D Criminal Law § 473 (2001).
275. Diaz, 747 So. 2d at 1026.
276. Gustafson, supra note 217 (reporting that prosecutors vowed to keep pushing for a
change in the order of closing arguments until successful).
277. Preston v. State, 260 So. 2d 501, 504 (Fla. 1972) (stating that the rule, as the Supreme
Court of Florida sees it, is "intended as an aid to those defendants entitled to avail themselves
of it, rather than as a limitation upon those desiring to call defense witnesses.") (emphasis
added). It is clear, however, that what the court intends the rule to be, and how defendants
actually view it, are separate and distinct. See id.
278. 15 FLA. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1771 (2001).
279. Diaz, 747 So. 2d at 1026.
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